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ABSTRACT
Through the Mouth
An Essay on Appetite and Ecocide
By
Iemanjá Brown
Advisor: Wayne Koestenbaum

This dissertation is an exploration of mourning and resilient joy in the midst of ecocide.
Resisting the pervasive classification of the human as inherently destructive, I look to appetite as
an aesthetic procedure that includes a material desire for intimacy with the more-than-human.
My study considers the intersections of aesthetic production (primarily twentieth-century poetry
and visual art), climate science, geology, cultural studies, theory within the contemporary
nonhuman turn, and Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. I employ an
interdisciplinary approach, which helps me explore the various ways that literal and figurative
appetite can be a way of sensing and exploring alternatives to the crisis of simultaneous capitalist
accumulation and environmental degradation.
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INTRODUCTION

I imagine that when medieval European monks began gilding parchment so that worms
would stop eating into the pages of books, at least one monk protested. Maybe the protest came
from a belief—perhaps shared by English tutors of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries who fed
children miniature gingerbread books so they would better learn their lessons—that even small
creatures deserve to devour knowledge in their own particular ways (Stewart 42). The worms
and the children were probably less interested in consuming words than in biting at pages or
gingerbread. But their ingestion of abstracted knowledge nicely literalizes the ways in which all
eating invites both the material and the immaterial into the body. Unlike the reprimanded person
who might respond to the command to “eat your words” by forcing an abstraction back into the
mouthy realm from which it emerged, the worms and the children literally consume somebody
else’s writing. Perhaps such consumption leads to the digestion of particular ideas, but probably
not. It does, however, lead to other forms of knowledge—forms of knowledge this dissertation
will explore. But before all that, I want to stay with the idea that the abstract can take a
consumable form, which is a kind of transubstantiation epitomized in the wafer that becomes
Christ’s body made edible for some immaterial promise of spiritual uplift.
Whether or not eating leads to educational or spiritual edification, the mouth remains a
good threshold for confusing the material and the abstract. As a result, I will, in this dissertation,
take for granted that it is perfectly acceptable to come to know a thing by eating it. I will also
assume that appetite arises amidst, and constitutes, a wide variety of relations—none of which
are inherently destructive, and some of which are immensely intimate. Poetry, in this
dissertation, will usually be the thing that cultivates and accompanies appetite. But, of course,
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such cultivation and accompaniment happens in many locations. In 2011, the children’s book
author Maurice Sendak told Terry Gross, the public radio host, that once, when he responded to a
particular child’s letter with a hand-drawn wild thing and a note, he received a response from the
child’s mother saying “Jim loved your card so much he ate it” (Sendak). In the following
chapters, I will explore where deep curiosity or desire for intimacy seem necessarily to lead
toward ingestion. Sendak said the child’s appetite for the wild thing drawing was “one of the
highest compliments [he had] ever received” (Sendak). What the child, and Sendak, knew was
that the urge to ingest can also be an urge to love something into the body.
In Latin, appetite is its own verb: appetere, which means to seek after. In many ways, I
think of this verb as a seeking after intimacy—a search that often fails, but produces interesting
relations nonetheless. I like the verb appetere because it insinuates an active subject whereas
English makes appetite a possessable noun. I have been seeking in this dissertation. I have been
seeking knowledge, sure, but mostly I have been seeking ways to ways to exercise my brain—
and my material practices—toward the places of some joyful and collaborative way of being
amidst daily and exponential extinctions, amidst losing battles against extractive industries, and
amidst first-world distraction. The ongoing search that this dissertation documents is a deeply
personal one that has turned to poetry, science, philosophy, history, and whatever else has
seemed necessary at the time. The material I have written about has moved through my everyday
practices, my teaching, my emotional landscape, and sometimes my body. As a result, personal
narrative has made its way into this dissertation and has become a way for me to be accountable
to what I think, write and do.
My writing is also conditioned by, and accountable to, the geographies from which I
write and from which the material I explore has emerged. Much of this dissertation was
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dreamed-up, before it began, in the watery peripheries of New York City, where I wandered with
high school and middle school students for years, sometimes by boat, sometimes by foot,
teaching ourselves about what we found. In the refuse of urban periphery—one that has since
been enveloped into the urban by a flood of money that followed the hurricane of 2012—I
learned how to think in place. This dissertation shows evidence of the pleasure of beginning to
find out by investigating the spot where I stand. It thus traces the geographies of where I felt I
needed to go, or where I got hired, or where I was secretly writing but didn’t name. The map of
this dissertation is in my individual body, across the places I’ve been exploring, and in my
backyard in Brooklyn where all the drafts of this thing have been torn up, composted, and added
to the soil to give it carbon with all the nitrogen of food scraps deemed better for worms than
humans. Those drafts are being digested underneath queer New York where Dorothy Allison
longed for southern pig fat (174), James Schuyler wrote he could eat thin February’s sharp sun
(6-7), and Audre Lorde got out of loving in doorways and into a bed surrounded by avocados she
bit and let drip on her lover’s stomach (251). These geographies, literal and literary, are
important because it is from particular places that my questions emerge. And I explore those
questions through particular literary works that retain their own geographies.
The ways I have approached the subject of this dissertation, through a physical and
intellectual seeking, are perhaps no different from the way one might consider anything worthy
of thought. But for me, what has emerged from this process is an autocritical mode that has
become important to how I want to encounter things and ideas. This mode is also a little
embarrassing because the number of hiding places dwindle and the presumption that the I of this
particular investigation should matter seems shamefully lacking humility. But such questions
shape the concerns of this dissertation. If appetite names an urge for material intimacy, the
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humiliation of vulnerability and failure is very close behind. Humiliation is everyone’s domain,
but I learned to love it because of the ways queers—especially my elders—embrace, and turn
into joy, the humiliation of their so-called wrongdoings. I like how the failures of straightness
become small bundles of humiliation that produce pleasure in dethroning the self—which is, I
suppose, another way of talking about jouissance. For Wayne Koestenbaum, humiliation is prior
to a sense of self such that “identity germinates from humiliation’s soil” (16). Informed by that
fertile humus, I make the queer assumption in this dissertation that the urge toward intimacy
always risks humiliation and that humiliation can be both pleasurable and productive of
relationships that are probably more interesting than those normative ones from which they stray.
In many ways, I am asking what kinds of methods and knowledge appetite—as an
intimate and humiliating material search—produces. Because appetite is a form of approach that
changes that which seeks and that which is sought, I have thought of appetite as both subject and
method of this dissertation. And if I am making a particular argument about what appetite
teaches me about method, I am perhaps arguing for the right deeply and freely to associate in the
way that appetite invites the world into the mouth. This does not have to be a devouring of the
world, but rather a recognition of intimacy with that which surrounds on all scales. The urgency
to physicalize the thinking process in an intimate and humiliating way need not be a call to
rearrange scholarly practice. But this urgency might contribute to a pedagogical question of what
it means to reconfigure approaches to the world as it is gobbled by catastrophic and quotidian
destruction.
My sense is that a perception of the verb “devour” on a large scale is felt by many, if not
collectively metaphorized as such. I don’t want to oversimplify, but I do want to consider the
prevalence of a verb that is activated on multiple scales. To be concrete about the verb without

4

being too concrete about the subjects, here are some examples: gentrification in action feels like
a beast digesting a neighborhood and leaving in return a waste product that is startlingly
homogeneous in character and in likeness to the other places that have so been digested—i.e.
“this neighborhood is now shit.” Industry seems to gobble up the urban and global periphery,
leaving a far more nefarious waste product in the form of toxicity and degrading avenues for
sustaining life—human or otherwise. Large-scale agriculture does the same. Methane-producing
cows grazing what used to be the Amazon is one of many examples. Maps that show how
colonialism and imperialism move are visualizations of the verb.
For Marx, the rift in what was once a harmonious metabolic relation between the social
(human) and the natural (everything else) is first caused by primitive accumulation. The rise of
capitalism makes the social eat into nature at unsustainable rates. In their book The Ecological
Rift, Brett Clark, John Bellamy Foster, and Richard York explain that as capital shifts to new
rifts—from overeating wood to overeating fossil fuels, for example—more rifts occur, leaving
the world with a rift in the planetary system wherein the nine established planetary boundaries
for maintaining an earth system that is livable for humans are irreparably crossed. Capitalism is a
restless movement that “must be constantly renewed, replenished, but on a larger scale” (Clark et
al. 348). The growing force, which Marx called “fundamentally unrestrainable,” creates, for him,
an “uncontrollable mode of social metabolic control” that disregards systems, temporalities and
processes that have not yet been incorporated into its logic (Marx qtd. in Clark et al 348-9). For
Marx, and many Marxist materialists today, the social gets conflated with capital as an agent of
insatiable hunger, either gobbling through the so-called natural sphere, or sucking the lifeblood
of anything it finds to be other.
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For those who call this time of climate change and mass extinction the Anthropocene, it
is the human species who overeats the milieu and makes the metabolic process one of
devastation. Accumulated acts of resource extraction and habitat destruction feed the human
machine that then produces its waste product: carbon, toxicity that will outlast us all, eutrophic
waters, the list goes on. Contemporary theorist Claire Colebrook writes that humans annihilate
their milieu—which she equates with the climate—because of a voracious appetite for the
destructive. She relates this annihilation to the over-consumption of sugar (137). Beyond asking
which significant differences among humans are erased when it is only one abstracted mouth
doing the gobbling, I also wonder about the analogy between ecocide and sugar consumption.
The annihilation of most life on the planet perhaps should not find an easy analogy with the
desire to eat more donuts. And also, sugar plantations gobbled the forests of the Caribbean and
helped run a globalized economy based on forced labor, only to be replaced by cheaper,
subsidized alternatives like corn and beets that make their way into processed, shippable food
objects. Maybe sugar is one place to look for the Anthropocene, but not because the
individualized sugar tooth begs for more.
Everyone reading this was born into the Anthropocene, where destruction is cheap. But
not all responsibility is equal and not all consumption of the milieu is destructive. If it is, then
humans are inherently the anthropos of the Anthropocene and nothing else. More specificity is
required. The call to rename the era the Capitalocene tries to solve this problem by taking agency
away from a generalized human and replacing it with capital. The development of the term
attempts to account for the ways most humans, especially poor humans, cannot be held
responsible for what this planet is currently undergoing and instead tries to reveal how
destruction is a result of the ways in which capital devours on all the scales it creeps into. Others
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have submitted the idea of Plantationocene precisely because goods like sugar changed the face
of the planet, in transforming both ecosystems and power structures. Variants of the new
ecological epoch proliferate—Plasticene marks the proliferation of plastic, Atomicocene marks
the dawn of the atomic age and the “Good Age of Man” names the technocratic hope that
geoengineering will save the planet for future human use. Feminist scholar Donna Haraway
proposes the Cthulucene to name the conditions of vast multispecies connection as well as the
hope that we will increasingly employ that connection to support multispecies survival.
Haraway’s call for inter-species kinship networks and shared action is similar to Bruno Latour’s
call for a terrestrial politics, which he outlines in his 2017 book Down to Earth. In it, he argues
that, beginning in the 1980’s, the global elite began fleeing the shared world. Their attempt is
visible through the politics of denial around the connected crises of mass migration, inequality,
and climate change. Latour’s argument toward a terrestrial politics arises from his reflection that
everybody is losing ground, though the effects are massively uneven. He twins the issues of soil
erosion and forced migration, accounting for a collectivized anxiety around “the ordeal of
finding oneself deprived of land” (6). His call to literally return to Earth is not unlike William
James’ call for a horizontal philosophy over a century before in which he wrote that “The earth
of things, long thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether, must resume its rights” (qtd
in Richardson 50).1
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In her book, Pragmatism and the American Experience, Joan Richardson notes the connections between James and
Darwin, who were both forced into long periods of horizontality because of seasickness. Drawing on Gillian Beer’s
scholarship, Richardson notes that “Darwin’s extended experience of horizontality contributed significantly to an
embodied sense of creatureliness, priming his intelligence for the discovery he would make concerning our growth
out of the common ground of life on the planet” (50). She notes, too, that Emerson had already described thinking as
horizontal—like the strata that forms the ground on which we stand. It seems appropriate that a necessarily humble
response to current (climate) conditions might begin with a call to be conditioned by Earth, to look down and to pay
attention to dirt. The urgency to investigate ground as a means toward rebuilding relations with Earth is a recurring
theme in this dissertation.
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Both Latour and Haraway route the human back toward relation with the other-thanhuman rather than assign new forms of agency or dwell in the abstract categories that tend to
conflate lived with abstract agency, letting out particular actors until nothing seems to be left.
The urgency to turn toward relations is also a response to feeling out of time as ecocide
continues and projections of increasing catastrophe are made in closer and closer timeframes.
Time has long been a lurking devourer, whose systematic undoing of the known is often feared
as entropic. Even as the West has looked back at its history and usually decided it was
progressive, there seems to be a fear—particularly with climate change, though I don’t think this
is new—that the present marks a point at which progress might end and entropy will take over.
For those whose futures have been threatened by colonialism, the end of the world has already
unfolded as past and present invasion digest the future. For example, the scholar Rob Nixon
writes that Australian aborigines referred to initial English colonizers as “future eaters” (96). On
the other hand, the past is often described as operating on the present in appetitive ways. The
philosopher Henri Bergson describes the present as “the invisible progress of the past gnawing
into the future” (194). And the contemporary poet Haryette Mullen writes that “past perfect food
sticks in the craw” (91). Conflating the work of the mind, and language in particular, with that of
the mouth in the way the saying “stuck in the craw” does, Mullen makes the past a glut in the
mouth that doesn’t eat its way into the future as it does for Bergson. For her, the past is just not
quite digestible—not quite able to become the waste product that a progressive history produces
from what came before, but conceptually and physically creating resentment for that which
simply will not go away.
Perhaps the difficulty of assigning agency to abstracted, insatiable time, the human or
capital, is that this abstraction produces an emphasis on the verb rather than the noun. Heraclitus
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famously celebrated time, not as a static noun, but as an active, shifting verb that he equated to
the movement of water making its way toward sea. In the early twentieth century, William James
used the same metaphor to describe the stream of consciousness that Modernists would try to
reflect in their writing—doing away with the sentence as a mechanism for ordering and instead
putting it into a form that, like a wandering mind, resists stasis. Perhaps the Modernist attempt to
make the sentence accountable to constant change sprang, not just from the various crises of the
early twentieth century, but also from the West’s reclamation, half a century earlier, of a sense
that the Earth is in undetermined flux. Geologists like Charles Lyell had begun describing
Earth’s history in much longer timescales that were made up of massive geological
transformation, catastrophe and extinction. Not long after, Darwin began describing life on Earth
as mutable rather than fixed by an outside force. Darwin put the world in flux through the
description of how organisms fit into their milieus in ways that change as the Earth does,
producing new—but not better—species. Western science was coming to understand both
organism and milieu—the Earth—as continually shifting. Time wasn’t the enemy, nor was it the
harbinger of progress. Ecological thinking also began to emerge, moving the study of the
organism out of the Baconian call to penetrate the Earth and extract her secrets and back into its
context, revealing the relationship among elements of a system rather than identifying traits of a
singular species (Merchant 168).
In this flux of things, individual living organisms became defined by their ability to
create a boundary between themselves and the rest of the world. These boundaries are often
understood as that which insulates the organism from the outside: both its immune system that
wards off intruders and its physical barrier that is often skin or membranes (Landecker,
“Metabolism, Reproduction”). Biologist Lynn Margulis explains Harold J. Morowitz’s definition
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of the emergence of life as an establishment of boundary by writing that he “emphasizes that, in
the watery environment in which life arose, a nonaqueous barrier was necessary to separate the
cell from its surroundings” (85). The isolation from the environment by way of a membrane,
Morowitz argues, is a basic condition for life.
Thus, a living organism is often defined by its ability to separate itself from its
environment, while simultaneously taking from that environment to sustain itself. Throughout
the twentieth century, the metabolic relationship between organism and environment would
remain a question whose answers would help scientists and philosophers to redefine life. As life
came to be defined as a bounded organism capable of metabolizing and reproducing, twentiethcentury science and philosophy became increasingly interested in how life sustains itself without
help from the outside. Between 1906 and 1908, the embryologist Hans Driesch gave his lectures
on entelechy—that element explored by Aristotle that distinguishes life from inert matter.
Driesch explained life as that which can make itself, using the example of sea urchins that once
cut in half, will re-form themselves into two. His example is conveyed as a negation. That which
lives is not a machine—contrary to the mechanistic worldview with which the West was saddled
following the Scientific Revolution (Jones 72-3). In 1972, Chilean biologists Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela defined living cells in similar terms, calling them autopoetic.
Because the biologists saw these cells as capable of reproducing and sustaining themselves
without the help of an outside, they defined them as autonomous and closed. From the cellular,
their concept of autopoiesis has been scaled up to identify self-maintaining ecosystems and
anthropogenic systems.
At the same time that Maturana and Varela identified closed systems capable of
regeneration, Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock were developing a theory of the Earth as a
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self-regulating organism. Working with Margulis’ bacteria research and Lovelock’s atmospheric
research, the two scientists put forth a theory of Earth, not as an inanimate rock whose only life
covers the surface and swims in the oceans, but as an intricate system whose parts work together
across scales to regulate the whole. The theory helps connect ideas across the scientific
disciplines in a way that forces human thinking to more closely resemble Earth’s systems:
jumping scales from the microbial to the atmospheric and inclusive of physical, chemical and
biological forces all at once. The Gaia Theory is fundamental to understanding the cascade of
ecological changes that are occurring in this moment, because it highlights the interdependence
shared by all things of the planet, including that which is often described as not living. The
theory also changes the relationship between organism and environment, leaving behind a onesided evolutionary process in which organisms adapt to their environments, and expanding it to
the notion that environment is also shaped by organisms (Joseph 32).
The philosopher Hans Jonas would similarly write, in his 1966 study of metabolism,
Phenomenon of Life, that both milieu and organism are defined precisely through the metabolic
relation. Out of his friendship with biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who was doing research on
the organism as open system in the early 1950’s, Jonas produced a philosophy of metabolism in
which the process of consumption becomes that which produces the organism through a
relationship between the inside and outside. Rather than defining the organism in terms of its
boundary, and its ability to metabolize and reproduce, Jonas looked to the metabolic relation
between organism and milieu. Sociologist Hannah Landecker describes his theory as making
metabolism, “not a boundary between two things, but a dynamic production of there being two
things at all: without metabolism, there would be no need to have inside and outside, organism
and environment, animal and world. In other words, there are not two things which then
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exchange things, requiring a boundary to keep them distinct but a third thing – a metabolism –
which produces the two-ness of organism and environment” (“Metabolism of Philosophy” 15).
For Jonas, the organism is in constant flux, taking in varied matter, but maintaining a self
precisely through its relation to the outside. If this is the case, the organism does not return to a
prior state by replenishing itself, but redefines itself through nourishment.
If both organism and milieu are changed through the metabolic relation, there is also a
way in which they maintain autonomy. In the early twentieth century, Konstantin
Mereschkowski introduced the idea that a single-celled organism could eat another without
destroying it, creating a symbiotic relationship between eater and eaten. Lynn Margulis expanded
Mereschkowski’s ideas about endosymbiosis in the 1960’s, concluding that, because the eaten
organism can continue to procreate autonomously, such internal reproduction could be the origin
of multicellular life (Joseph 53). In other words, after the single-celled organism arises from
boundary-making, it consumes another without destroying that other, producing complex life
through a symbiotic relationship that happens within the host. Thus, not only do organism and
milieu produce each other in a dynamic metabolic process, organisms can make themselves into
milieus for others to thrive, remaining autonomous at the same time that one contains the other.
In the 1990s, the burgeoning study of epigenetics once again redefined metabolism away
from a mechanistic input/output model. If, before the twentieth century, life had been defined in
relation to metabolism and reproduction, the idea that consumption affects the quotidian whereas
reproduction affects the generational was confused as scientists began seeing how that which is
metabolized also acts as cellular signal, changing how genetic traits act in the organism’s system.
The closed DNA system was wrenched open to the metabolic influence, making the organism
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genetically exposed to whatever is intentionally and unintentionally consumed. In Landecker’s
words, scientists began seeing how “nurture metabolizes nature” (“Metabolism, Reproduction”).
The open DNA system is mirrored by the organism’s overall system, which appears less
and less singular in the twenty-first century. If the autopoietic body was understood as a
singularity in large part due to the boundaries between itself and its milieu, new research into the
human body has popularized the notions of the organism as always already multiple. Donna
Haraway draws on the last thirty years of biology research—and on Lynn Margulis’ work on
endosymbiosis in particular—to negate the self-producing and autonomous autopoietic organism
in favor of the holobiont, which she defines as “symbiotic assemblages, on whatever scale of
space or time, which are more like knots of diverse intra-active relatings in dynamic complex
systems than like the entities of a biology made up of preexisting bounded units (genes, cells,
organisms, etc.) in interactions that can be conceived only as competitive or cooperative” (26).
These contemporary studies show the porosity of the organism’s boundary, and even
question the existence of a boundary to begin with. As Landecker writes, “The boundary of the
organism becomes more important as a transducer of signals than as a partition that keep
environment and body distinct” (“Food is Licking” 21). In other words, the porous membrane of
the organism works to redefine life as that which negotiates its porousness rather than throws up
barriers to the environment in order to exist separately. If this is the case, appetite is not an urge
to break the barrier between the organism and the milieu, but an urge to negotiate an alreadyporous system by way of desire.
The porosity and relationality of both organism and milieu enter Western metaphysics in
the twentieth century through the philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead. In
Process and Reality, Whitehead explores a subatomic, speculative realm that is dynamic.
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Though he is able to describe it with language, he must set up a vast terminology to help the
listener (these ideas were first communicated to the public in lecture form) curtail the desire to
associate words’ meanings beyond his intention. As I have moved in and through his ideas, I
have found it helpful to visualize them. I first worked through his ontology in watercolor, so that
both my confusion and the indeterminacy of process could be represented by a material that
seeps. Now, when explaining Whitehead’s ideas to others, I use objects at hand to activate, not
the subjects, but the verbs that are most necessary to understanding (to the extent that I do) the
ways Whitehead describes the universe in process.
Last time I explained his ontology, I was sitting on a curb with my friend and described it
as follows: All the dead leaves cushioning the edge where the street meets the curb are the
wondrous chaos of this disordered universe. Those leaves, for our purposes, will be everything
there is, on a subatomic and therefore speculative level. Remember they are diverse, they do not
all belong to the limited category of leaf, they are unique singularities in this world. Let’s take
one example of how the creative process of becoming transpires, remembering that this example
is simultaneously being replicated—in method, but not in kind—all over the place. One leaf has
feelings toward the other leaves, or, for Whitehead, it “prehends” the others. Some of the
feelings are negative and some are positive, and those feelings vary in intensity. The negative
feelings keep the leaf away from some and the positive feelings draw the leaf toward others. In
drawing toward those others, the leaf enters a process of becoming with the other leaves. But the
process is not directed at a determined end. They emerge from feelings, not from preconceived
ideas about what those feelings might produce. This indeterminate process continues, as the
many leaves become what Whitehead calls an “actual entity” in its becoming, a process which he
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names “concrescence.” This is the physical part of the actual entity’s becoming, which is the first
phase.
At some point, the leaf—in its “complex unity”—begins to have a self-feeling that
Whitehead calls appetition (21). Appetition is like feeling, but whereas feeling is physical,
Whitehead says appetition is mental—which is not to be confused with the cognitive abilities of
the brain, but remains mental insofar as it has to do with the actual entity’s sense of itself.
Appetition is an urge for or against the continuance of the complex unity of leaves, and if the leaf
has an appetition for continuance, it begins to look toward the undetermined future and recognize
itself as what has not yet been, but might be. Or, it begins to recognize itself with a definiteness
that is subjective. In other words, it becomes a subject. Whitehead describes appetition as
including a “principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be” (47-8). So, it is
an active movement toward undetermined ends. Whereas the leaf feeling the other leaves merely
brought the many into complex unity, appetition names the point at which that unity experiences
an urge toward becoming by seeing itself as the complex unity of leaves that it is. The process
ends when satisfaction is reached and the becoming is arrested in a form that no longer moves
toward undetermined ends. From satisfaction, the entity is separated from the rest of the world
and at that point, the active and creative becoming ceases to be. The complex unity, which has
come to recognize itself as a subject, perishes. In other words, the emergence of a boundary is
the end of becoming. But, in the same way that the actual dead leaves we’re discussing will get
digested by bacteria and worms and—if they find their way off the concrete—get incorporated
into soil, the residue of the process becomes datum for future processes. Because the process is
one of the many data becoming one (and then perishing once the one is done becoming), past
processes are inherited into present processes and so on.
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Whitehead’s focus on the undetermined future that is produced through concrescence
marks a shift in philosophy from a focus on the past to a focus on novelty (Shaviro “Interstitial
Life”). As twentieth-century science continued to focus on homeostasis, Whitehead’s
interpretation of the world is driven by a process ontology that, though inheriting the past, is
always productive of the new. Perhaps influenced by Modernism and his proximity to poets like
Gertrude Stein, Whitehead’s ontology turns the static, underlying substance with which Western
philosophy had long been obsessed into a process of continual change. The process he describes
implicates the entire universe in each subatomic becoming—which is first driven by feelings and
then by appetite. Unlike substance theory in which ontological sameness connects everything,
Whitehead’s ontology makes that which is shared the act of process instead of an inert substrate.
For him, that which produces the world is a drive toward difference. Contemporary media
scholar Steven Shaviro, in using this ontology to describe the experiential world, writes that “an
entity is alive precisely to the extent that it envisions difference and thereby strives for something
other than the mere continuation of what it already is” (Without Criteria 104).
In Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, he is returning Western thinking to organicism,
wherein all things of the universe are deeply connected in complex, rather than universal, ways.
His aesthetic ontology is similar to the Early Modern notion of sympathies and antipathies
wherein the affinity and rejection among all things of the universe make up concealed forces that
drive much of the experiential world. The literary scholar Mary Wilson-Floyd calls this system
“an organizing structure for a whole range of actions and beliefs” (1). They course through
everything and can be the determining factor for “inexplicable bonds” (Wilson-Floyd 7). Not
only did Early Modern Europe depend on these “animate qualities of the environment” to
determine emotional, spiritual, and physical experience, they could also be manipulated and
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studied (Wilson-Floyd 1). Although Foucault’s claim that there was a break in the seventeenth
century between such occult thinking and modern empiricism, Wilson-Floyd and others argue
that the Early Modern drive to unearth nature’s secrets to see how sympathies and antipathies
operated as well as bend them to one’s will, can be seen as experimental science and thus
intimately linked to the experimental method. Whitehead’s notion of a speculative realm in
which surges attraction and rejection that are both hidden and have experiential effects upon the
material world seems linked to the notions of sympathies and antipathies. Both hidden
sympathies and Whitehead’s speculative realm collapse scale and bring the universe into
relation. In other words, Whitehead returned to a pre-empiricist moment, but instead of
attempting to manipulate the speculative realm, he merely aims to describe it.
If sympathies produce sameness across distance and scale, Whitehead’s ontology
implicates the universe in each becoming, but always with the possibility of creating difference.
Foucault describes the Renaissance conception of sympathy with some degree of disdain: it “is
not content to spring from a single contact and speed through space; it excites the things of the
world to movement and can draw even the most distant of them together…Sympathy is an
instance of the Same so strong and so insistent that it will not rest content to be merely one of the
forms of likeness; it has the dangerous power of assimilating, of rendering things identical to one
another, of mingling them, of causing their individuality to disappear—and thus of rendering
them foreign to what they were before” (22-3). Like Whitehead’s appetite, which is “including in
itself a principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be,” Foucault’s definition
of sympathies is categorized by a sameness that “will not rest” (32). But rather than producing
homogeneity, Whitehead’s ontology is characterized by an appetite for difference and the
production of novelty. Wilson-Floyd argues that Foucault misunderstands Early Modern
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cosmology. Categorizing it as a hidden set of processes based on affinity and rejection, WilsonFloyd makes sympathies much more complicated than resemblance across scale. Whitehead’s
ontology remains equally complex. Steven Shaviro calls it “ramshackle” (Without Criteria xii). I
appreciate a ramshackle philosophy; it sounds like furniture has been strewn about a house that
was only partially evacuated—as if in Whitehead’s world, those parts of Western philosophy
previously understood as indispensable have left, and what remains is a messy ode to disorder. In
other words, Whitehead’s resistance to order looks a lot like his ontology of the world that is
always in process toward novelty.
Empiricism, arising along with the philosophical shift from organicism to mechanism,
attempted to create order from the disorder of mystical sympathies. The view of the body as
connected to multiple scales of life, up to the cosmos, through relations that could be harnessed
to produce magical outcomes was largely replaced by the body as a knowable, and trainable,
machine that mirrored what was becoming a knowable surround. Silvia Federici describes this
shift as she traces the rise of capitalism from the enclosure movement to the rise of empiricism in
her seminal work Caliban and the Witch. She argues that as land was enclosed, the body became
a laboring machine that mechanistic philosophers like Hobbes and Descartes helped separate
from the mind, women were brought under the rule of the state by force—particularly through
the excising of disobedience by accusing them of witchcraft—and all of this was reproduced and
exaggerated in the rapidly-expanding colonized world. During the rise of empiricism that
produced the Scientific Revolution, nature moved “from an active teacher and parent,” to “a
mindless, submissive body” (Merchant 190). The ecofeminist Carolyn Merchant writes that “the
new mechanical order and its values of power and control would mandate the death of nature”
(190). What Federici and Merchant, along with other feminist thinkers of the 1990’s reveal, are
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how the seventeenth century continued to produce analogy across multiple scales. But these new
analogies draw everything under the rubric of the destructive capitalist approach to life as that
which can be both understood and used. For science and philosophy—disciplines which were
being pulled apart by the rise of Empiricism—the mind became separated from the inert matter
of the body, which could be penetrated and understood by science. As such, the body became an
Other that, along with the appetites that drive it, could be controlled. This separate body was
deemed necessary to control because, in its baseness, it tends to misbehave. The Puritans were
particularly tied to the conception of the body as a receptacle for immorality. Jonathan Edwards
writes that “The body of man is full of filth,” a belief which Federici sees informing everyday
practices, where the subjugation of the body became an obsession (153). From Puritanical
prohibitions around eating to the seventeenth century passion for studying excrement, the body
became, in the Western world, a depository of immorality and vice rather than the piece of an
intimately-connected cosmos that organicism had made it.
If, as Francis Bacon writes, “magic kills industry,” the culture that industrialized every
organism and milieu also cannot leave magic behind, either because it cannot stop disciplining
the magic out, or because it lets the magic in in different ways (Federici 142). The resurgence of
Whitehead in the past decade perhaps responds to a desire for magic—for indeterminacy—in a
late-capitalist world.2 Strangely, while Whitehead’s process philosophy produces hope for a way
out of the current mechanistic predicament, his ontology seem to share quite a few characteristics
with capitalism—reinstating the notion that there is no way out. As productive of the
undetermined new and inclusive of the entire universe, Whitehead’s ontology is easily conflated
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The resurgence of Whitehead can be seen across the philosophy of science and the non-human turn. Steven
Shaviro, Erin Manning, Luciana Parisi and Mark Hansen are among those contemporary theorists using his work.
All of them, I would argue, are heavily influenced by Isabelle Stengers’ exploration of his philosophy in Thinking
with Whitehead.

19

with capital as it is described by many Marxists. Capitalism also appears to be an unrestrainable
verb that operates in hunger to implicate the world in its processes, the basis of which seem to lie
outside of human control.
I get the sneaking feeling that the lure of Whitehead also lies in the way his speculation
so aptly describes the other abstractions with which humans are presently grappling, which are
not all new but which seem to pulsate more vehemently. Globalization and rise of the internet,
topics that preoccupied much of the thinking in the 1990s, appear to work as Whitehead’s
ontology does: collapsing scales beyond human agency and producing fast-paced connection.
New media accelerate all of these trends, farming out human cognition to technology, making
human sensing appear less reliable than human-made tools. Perhaps new media are not so
different from climate disaster as it is understood through Anthropocene thinking:
simultaneously anthropogenic and outside human understanding or control. When all of these
comparisons between Whitehead and other forms of the too-big-to know are put together, it
appears as though theorists interested in Whitehead are merely aestheticizing that which they
oppose. If theorists are simultaneously interested in Whitehead for his aesthetics, for a world
constructed in a priori desire that is always in process, that world translated into the experiential
world strangely resembles those future-eating forces that such thinkers are supposedly against.
At the same time, an indeterminate world remains appealing—despite the fact that it aptly
describes capitalist system—because it offers some version of hope in a freedom from the
current ways in which novelty is produced within the conditions of this world.
Perhaps as a result, Whitehead has been appealing for affect theory and, along with
Bergson and Deleuze, for process thinkers. He has also been significant for those in the nonhuman turn because of how he decenters the human, offering subjectivity to everything,
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including, first and foremost, to the subatomic, speculative realm. As theory of the Anthropocene
has conceived of the human as a geologic agent, infusing it with a kind of super destructive
power, it has also made appealing a final break with the great chain of being so that the human
might be once and for all dethroned. The object-oriented ontologists have done this by making
the human an object like any other object—simultaneously experiencing the world in relation to
other objects while also withdrawing from that relation in the same way that all objects withdraw
from one another.3 Of course, those philosophers who propose that the human must now be
ontologically objectified in order to save the planet from crisis appear willfully ignorant of how
humans have already been objectified—and continue to be—in order to make them justifiable
property to be violently possessed.
While object-oriented ontology decenters the human without sufficient thought toward
social history, other theorists in the non-human turn seek to uphold the agency of other-thanhuman life by revisiting vitalism and animism rather than taking down the anthropos.4
Whitehead’s speculative philosophy had already decentered the human, not by way of
objectification but by getting out of subject-object relations through making everything part of
his process ontology. His decentering is also about feelings, and his focus on aesthetics means
the human moves into the periphery. Whitehead was working with Leibniz’s Monadology, which
contributed to the philosophical debate on substance by describing the shared ontological world
as made up of monads, which are indivisible, varied, and continually changing. Leibniz’s
Monadology describes these bits as containing both perception and appetite. The monad’s
perception is its sensing of that which lies outside itself, whereas appetite is the self-propelling
force toward change. Like Aristotle before him, Leibniz described the fundamental entities of the
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world as animated by their appetite toward change. He finds no knowable cause of this appetite.
In fact, he writes in a letter that to inquire about causes of perception and appetite would be
“ultramundane, so to speak, and to demand reasons of God why he has willed things to be such
as we conceive them to be” (538). Like Leibniz’s monads, Whitehead’s actual entities find
themselves in that processual concrescence—or becoming—first by way of how they feel other
actual entities. The chain of being isn’t entirely eradicated—Whitehead puts humans on a higher
level of consciousness, but the process of becoming implicates all things, including what others
might call inert matter (Hansen 23). The fact that the self is consistently becoming, along with
the world around that self, makes everything “a historic route of actual occasions” rather than
fixed (Whitehead 89).
But Whitehead’s speculative realm is distinct from experience. The processes that
Whitehead explains in the subatomic realm are both ontologically valid and divided from the
experiential realm. Media theorist Mark Hansen describes this division as the “speculative ban,”
which he defines as “the prohibition against invoking or appealing directly to actual entities to
explain experiential events and societal processes” (Hansen 86). What happens in the
speculative, processual realm is not accessible by way of experience. Hansen argues that the
contemporary interest in Whitehead has failed to heed the philosopher’s wish to keep separate
these realms. The speculative ban helps disarticulate Whitehead’s description of process from
capitalist forces—keeping the former out of observable reach while the latter remains
anthropogenic rather than conflated with the ontological. But at the same time that Hansen
argues that theorists must respect the speculative ban, he also argues that new media breaks it by
“feeding forward”—bringing the future into the present for humans to sense. If Hansen is to be
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believed, the reprieve that experience got from the restlessness and continual process of the
speculative is broken by new technology.
At the same time, if new media leaks the ontological into the experiential, I would argue
that the old technology of poetry also has a similar capacity, though with different results. I think
that poetry can mirror the speculative realm in its ability to put language—as an inherited set of
data—into processes that are productive of the new. I do not think poetry grants particular access
to the ontological, so much as offer a mirror ontology. I will explore this idea further in Chapter
Three, but what I learn from reading poetry and Whitehead together is that poetry is both able to
cultivate an appetite for the here and the now and mirror the speculative by mimicking that
which happens on an ontological level. Poetry can perhaps produce the pleasure of the restless
movement of the ontological that capitalism tries to emulate in the experiential world—greedily
crossing scales in destructive ways. But the pleasure of bringing appetite out of the speculative,
and into the observable realm, need not be a move toward destruction.
Whitehead was not the first European to write a metaphysics of pleasure. In the
seventeenth century, from his exile in Amsterdam, Baruch Spinoza opposed Descartes’
mind/body separation and described appetite as an undetermined path toward joy. Rather than
attempting to contain appetite with reason, as Plato had advocated, Spinoza made appetite a
significant urge to follow. As he composed Ethics, his famous contribution to the philosophic
debate on substance—about which he argued for one substance with infinite attributes—he
worked as a lens grinder and eventually died from his daily inhalation of the dusty substance that
the glass left behind. 5 But first he gave Western philosophy joy and pleasure disarticulated from
morality. In Ethics, he puts forth the idea that appetite is a striving for perseverance in being that

Though Whitehead claimed that his philosophy was “closely allied” with that of Spinoza, he also wrote that it was
Spinoza’s singular substance that made them different (Whitehead 10).
5
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all creatures share (part 2, preposition 9). Desire is particular to humans because it is the
combination of appetite and consciousness; but he deemphasizes the difference, choosing to
focus on the affective realm that is shared amongst all living beings. From desire and appetite, he
attempts to remove teleology, arguing that:
What is called a final cause is nothing but a human appetite insofar as it is considered as a
principle, or primary cause, of some thing. For example, when we say that habitation was
the final cause of this or that house, surely we understand nothing but that a man, because
he imagined the conveniences of domestic life, had an appetite to build a house. So
habitation, insofar as it is considered as a final cause, is nothing more than this singular
appetite. It is really an efficient cause, which is considered as a first cause, because men
are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites. (Part 4, Preface)
Because he takes away final causes, he also eliminates morality. People do not desire good
things, but rather “deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or
desire it” (Spinoza part 3, preposition 9).
Spinoza constructs his version of the good life around the experiences of increased and
decreased power to strive—in other words an increase or decrease in appetite. The personal
experience of joy is thus a confirmation of direction toward one’s appetite. As Spinoza’s focus
on affect has led to his resurgence in contemporary theory, his specific understanding of joy has
been particularly useful to activist/scholars.6 Carla Bergman’s and Nick Montgomery’s 2016 AK
Press book, Joyful Militancy, uses Spinoza to articulate a way of thinking about joy without the
neoliberal promise of happiness that feminist scholar Sara Ahmed critiques in her book The
Promise of Happiness. In it, Bergman and Montgomery write that “Empire accumulates and
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spreads [Spinozan] sadness” (53). But joy, which they define using Spinoza, does not emerge
from “the desire to exploit, control, and direct others” (29). Joy is instead “resonant with
emergent and collective capacities to do things, make things, undo painful habits, and nurture
enabling ways of being together” (29).
The joy that Spinoza finds in the pursuit of appetite, or the novelty that Whitehead sees it
producing, contradicts the ways in which appetite, as it has been defined against the order of
reason, has been constrained and restricted. For some of the ancient Greeks, appetite is the
dangerous will toward pleasure that is always in tension with reason. While Plato calls it
corrupting, Socrates doesn’t think appetite is necessarily good or bad, but simply indifferent to
the soul’s wellbeing. In De Anima, Aristotle describes appetite and desire as productive of
movement, which is why the soul is always in motion. In non-human animals, the forces of
desire and appetite are alone responsible for the animation of the soul. The human, of course, has
the added appendage of reason, which delimits the activities of these animating forces. Later,
Kant wrote that “sexual love makes of the loved person an Object of appetite; as soon as that
appetite has been stilled, the person is cast aside as one casts away a lemon which has been
sucked dry. … as soon as a person becomes an Object of appetite for another, all motives of
moral relationship cease to function, because as an Object of appetite for another a person
becomes a thing and can be treated and used as such by everyone” (163). While useful to many
feminist theorists in the late twentieth century, Kant’s description of sexual appetite as inherently
objectifying, reduces appetite to a base urge that dehumanizes whomever it is directed toward.
Not only is the sour lemon sucked dry, but Kant insinuates that an appetite for such sourness is
misdirected to begin with. Appetite must therefore be restricted and directed away from the sour
sex that inherently dehumanizes.
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The power of reason that must restrict the appetites, taming the instinct toward excess,
must also decide what is edible. Western reason likes to decide against cannibalism—a decision
that Julia Kristeva claims Christians are able to make by eating the Eucharist and thus taming the
desire to eat one’s own species (118). But before the Eucharist, Aristotle established the
superiority of some cultures over others by claiming “some of the tribes about the Black Sea
have gone savage [because they] are said to delight—in raw meat or in human flesh, or in
lending their children to one another to feast upon” (219). The tendency toward producing
aversion, or toward using that which has been restricted to make arguments about who should be
counted as human—as colonial discourse did with cannibalism—shows the power of ordering
that which enters the body in producing larger social order.
In recent years, Food Studies has expanded its scope to explore how consumption helps
produce race and gender categories whose histories other disciplines have long been tracing. In
her book Racial Indigestion, the literary scholar Kyla Wazana Tompkins argues that the
racialized and gendered Other—and thus, also whiteness—was produced in the antebellum
period through the conceptualization of the edibility of the Other. Through exploring eating
practices, Tompkins makes the categorization and ordering of bodies an intimate corporeal
experience that is routed through the mouth and digestive system, rather than in a more familiar
place like skin. Similarly, through a study of dietary advice in the United States, E. Melanie
DuPuis argues that the body, as a frequent microcosm for the nation state, is produced through
the cultivation of particular appetites. She writes that “the idea of a sovereign nation paralleled
the idea of the free individual, capable of free will and therefore also in control. Diet, therefore
represents sovereignty through ingestive choice” (9). Like the nation state, the U.S. body—from
the Puritan obsession with digestion, to abolitionist conceptions of reform, to contemporary
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obsession with detoxification—has been pushed toward a particular notion of purity. Dietary
advice, she argues, has been largely aligned with political advice, overtly or not, and continues to
help form what she calls “ingestive subjectivity,” which is the conception of “both the self and
society as a controlled and bounded body that makes choices about what to ingest… [that] create
a fixedness, an ontological certainty about what is inside and outside” (6). The scientific and
philosophical thinking about the organism’s metabolism is thus applied to the individual in
society, helping to align humans with broad categories that determine political power.
The bounded societal body is also a colonial one. Fred Kaufman’s A Brief History of the
American Stomach continually returns to the descriptions of insatiable settler colonialism. His
refrain is the metaphorical devouring of land by settler colonialism that is so often enacted
literally through the mouth. The book accumulates lines like this one: “The American stomach
has long sought to dominate the world by devouring it” (117). He ends with an anecdote about
attending a Thanksgiving reenactment dinner in Plymouth and his final thoughts about the
insatiable colonial appetite, which is literalized in the metonymic saying “eating Indian,” in
which the “Indian” signifies corn. The saying was common well into the twentieth century.
American cookbooks were full of examples: baked Indian pudding, Indian flapjacks, etc. (95).
Kaufman ultimately tells a broad narrative of the American stomach as one that devours land as
it invents new ways of considering the digesting body and desirous mouth. This longing through
the mouth was earlier described by bell hooks in her essay “Eating the Other,” in which she
considers the differences between appreciation and appropriation, producing an important
tension between the commodification of Otherness and the obliteration of the Other, describing it
in a way that is now all-too-familiar from conversations about eating one’s way through an
“ethnic” part of town, that “Within commodity culture, ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that
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can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture” (hooks 366). It is connected also to
“imperialist nostalgia,” a concept hooks takes from Renato Rosaldo, who defines it as “nostalgia,
often found under imperialism, where people mourn the passing of what they themselves have
transformed” (69). While such nostalgia mourns the loss for which the mourner is at least
partially responsible, hooks argues that contemporary interest in the so-called “primitive” makes
the Other into a realm of “plenty, bounty, a field of dreams” (369). In other words, abstracted
into the social milieu of settler colonialism, settler appetite brings with it a simultaneous
mourning of lack for which has been eaten and a glorification of that Other that is still being
served.
Of course it need not only be white people, or white culture, or the burgeoning white
nation state that eats. And those bodies need not eat into obliteration or erasure. Tompkins
reminds her reader that “the fantasy of a body’s edibility does not mean that body will always go
down smoothly” (8). Digestion in turn transforms the eater, as well, making the eater and that
which is eaten materially and conceptually bound and changed.
But the settler sense of nostalgia for what has been devoured that is paired with the desire
for more is connected to appetite’s continual connection to lack. On a basic level, appetite often
involves lack because it can be an indicator of the need for nourishment. For Whitehead, because
it involves the “realization of what is not and may be,” appetite also insinuates lack—an
undetermined end to be sought out (48). Lacan’s petit object a might be the psychoanalytic
equivalent to Whitehead's appetite, but it remains individualized, whereas Whitehead’s lack is
both unique and productive of a shared world that isn’t solely available to one subject. In this
dissertation, I am considering what it means to experience lack in the midst of climate change
and extinction. If appetite can be understood as an urge toward the undetermined transformation
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of the organism and milieu, what becomes of the urge toward a novel coming-together of
organism and milieu if that milieu is a site of death and waste(ful) accumulation? Part of the
inherent lack in appetite is that whatever is desired might not be attainable. When considered in
this time of mass extinction, what does it mean to want something that is simply no longer
present? How do literary practices, often grounded in the assumption of a fecund nature, change
as everyday life is increasingly conditioned by lack? In turn, do aesthetics reconfigure appetites,
pushing toward different objects in undetermined ways? And, given the dire state of affairs, what
does it matter if culture tracks changing conditions or cultivates different responses?
Ursula Heise warns that extinction outpaces the classification of species, putting into
question the relation between knowledge and awareness, attunement, or mourning. The scale of
extinction, wherein we know that hundreds of plants and animals go extinct every day, but
cannot always name what is lost, is a scale that tests the limits of knowledge systems. I am
exploring how appetite might be figured as one way we sense ourselves into, and a part of, the
abundant lack—the simultaneous abundance of capitalist accumulation, proliferating “invasive”
species and sea level rise, alongside environmental degradation and extinction—about which
rational thinking cannot produce sufficient knowledge. As a desire to internalize external matter,
appetite foregrounds material exchange, creating relations between organism and milieu that
move outside the cognitive. In her book Gut Feminism Elizabeth Wilson writes the “gut is an
organ of mind: it ruminates, deliberates, comprehends” (5). Not only can cognition be dispersed,
but redirecting knowledge away from the brain and giving it to the body in general, means that
what is known expands. Friedrich Nietzsche believed food affected ways of thinking, which
drove him to advise philosophers on their diets (Bennett 44). Many ancient Greek philosophers
warned against eating beans, for fear they would disrupt tranquility of mind. And Pythagoreans
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believed fava beans contained the souls of the dead and should therefore be avoided. In this
dissertation, I follow similar lines of thought, considering appetite in relation to how one comes
to find out by making oneself a receptacle for the world.
In my consideration of what happens to knowledge systems amidst the condition of
abundant lack, I do not want to subscribe to the idea that humans are innately destructive—or
that the situation of capitalism makes humans destructive up until the point that capitalism is
eradicated. I also do not want to argue that poetry makes people think differently and therefore
act in new ways. I want language and action to mingle more in the ways they do in the world—to
co-create each other in non-causal modes. I want to explore additional modes of being an
organism in a troubled milieu—an exploration that I hope finds mournful and productivelystrange ways of being in climate crisis. This exploration, as I have said, is as much about method
as it is about content. Thinking with Whitehead, I ask how the world looks different when
uniform substance is replaced by desire-driven change that also holds on to history. And what
would be the method that mimicked such a world in process, or took for granted as true the
description of such a world?
My method has not been one of traditional literary analysis. I do not follow one particular
school, or attempt to tell a particular history. Instead, I explore poetry and art as theory that
emerges in context but can and must also be considered in relation to present conditions. Driven
by scholarly and personal questions of what the aesthetic can do in times of crisis, I employ a
methodology that is decidedly outside the strictures of one discipline. My method follows the
lead of the poetry and art I write about, putting into conversation the various kinds of
knowledges invited by each work I explore. Thus, my dissertation focuses on individual works
rather than a poet’s or artist’s oeuvre so as to ask a more concrete question about how the work
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theorizes the organism and the milieu, rather than about the poet or artist in her particular literary
and artistic milieu. Choosing to localize my efforts in singular poems and art pieces, I dwell in
the particular in order to explore more deeply the breadth of possibilities each work invites. If the
climate crisis requires thinking the human into a new geologic scale, I begin with the small and
the local. Thus, I do not claim that a study of dirt need include the poets Elizabeth Alexander and
Minnie Bruce Pratt, or that a study of marine extinction need begin with Marianne Moore. My
particular elemental inquiries might emerge from any number of aesthetic projects; my
exploration marks but one possibility for using appetite as rubric.
As I look to specific examples within the rubric of appetite, I have attempted to honor
particularity through formal choices in my writing. Between my chapters, I have short essays
entitled “Writing in the Interstices.” These “hinge” essays tie together what has come and what
follows in a way that moves toward specificity instead of conclusion or generalization. The first
essay considers dirt and water together through an exploration of a specific art work. The second
considers water and invasive species through an exploration of a single organism. The last essay
takes the place of a conclusion and returns to where I have begun: with worms that both invade
and bring an end to the book.
By moving away from expected conclusions and toward specificities, I am thinking about
how ideas continue to move, instead of settling. I am using Whitehead’s language in the title,
referring to his claim that “life is in the interstices” (105). This claim speaks to his description of
the ontology of life as pure potentiality. Arising between appetition and the decision that
culminates in a singular act of becoming, thus leading to the perishing of the subject, life arises
in indeterminacy. Life emerges in an open system just before a boundary goes up to define that
which has become. Life is therefore not an easily recognizable inevitability of the metabolic and
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the reproductive conjoining to bring about a regenerative thing that moves through the world. It
is a momentary, unsettled occurrence between subatomic happenings. I explore this idea through
the form that this dissertation takes. My small “hinge” essays are refusals to settle with
generalizations that can summarize the process that comes before. They are instead questions
about how form can shape ideas by postponing the decision that sets a final boundary—a
boundary that sometimes risks moving too far up in scale. Instead of concluding a chapter, I
move into the interstice—to the indeterminate edge of what has been and the germ of the
undetermined thing to come.
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CHAPTER ONE: DIRT

Coming in from outside, skin might have a dirty residue from the garden or the street; dirt
might be swept off with a hand. Jay Z turned this touch into a dance by repeating his command
to “brush your shoulders off” and discard that which sullies (“Dirt off Your Shoulders”). He
could mean shoulders ridden with class sediment of production’s excess built up on skin; or
shoulders upon which fall the burden of racialized notions of that which may be deemed dirty; or
a queer shoulder like that of Allen Ginsberg, which is put “to the wheel” in his apostrophe to
America, as he lets it bend toward—take the bottom to—the masculinized car that penetrates the
continent in a dirty way or penetrates the dirty continent, inviting multiple layers of abjection
(Ginsberg 86). Dirt is a surface accretion and also an ingested material that gets metabolized
toward new subjects—sticking, ordering, and working for dirt’s whispered adjectival form: dirty.
In its excessive materiality, dirt ornaments and begins to make dirty but there is also a
mistranslation. As dirt picks up the y, it envelops the social markings that dirty performs. And
dirty extends, attaching its little taboo to that with which it mingles: dirty war, dirty talk, dirty
trick, dirty look. But whether in its pejorative or re-appropriated form (Dirty South, or more
locally, the Dirty Third that is Houston), dirty sullies, often, whatever has already been marked.
Work has plenty to contend with before dirty picks it up.
Mary Douglas, in her classic work on conceptions of dirt and cleanliness, Purity and
Danger, writes that dirt is “matter out of place” and that “Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt
is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering
involves rejecting inappropriate elements” (35). Douglas focuses on the abstraction that is the
dirty and Julia Kristeva picks up where Douglas leaves off in Powers of Horror, looking to the
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place of the abject in human culture. 7 Both these thinkers describe dirty’s position in the
margins; where it threatens the clean and pure body on multiple scales, from the individual to the
body politic. If dirty has been a good tool for aligning humans and the things they do with that
which must be overcome (the merely natural, the dirt, and the unrefined), how is it possible to
rethink the habits of disposing in order to live? What does it take to sense what has been deemed
expendable in ways that complicate how the ideal subject is supposedly formed? Douglas writes
that purity, like the white virgin that so often encapsulates the concept, is “poor and barren” in
the end; when that purity is reached, Douglas contends, it is “hard and dead as stone” (161). That
hard purity is already impossible. It is a well-maintained fantasy that requires a lot of literal and
figural toxic upkeep (think shampoo and the patriarchy). Moving away from the disappointment
of the clean and the pure, this chapter will reorient toward something else—a dirt that doesn’t
need to, but can, be sought with an appetite.
Dirty’s social markers settle outside the materiality of dirt but they also need it. The lack
that dirty insinuates is also a material lack that becomes associated with the ground, the earth, the
base. Dirt also extends beyond its container. It is heterogeneous particulate matter; both
nourished and nourishing, both contaminated and contaminating, so that references to dirt also
contain, for example, both ancient iron content and the nitrates with which people have infused
the soil and created explosives. Dirt, then, lingers with dirty in this extension—in this materiality
that invades the aesthetic in perpetuity.

7

Douglas and Kristeva are, of course, not the only ones to consider the clean and the dirty in relation to the social.
Other studies include Sabine Schulting, Dirt in Victorian Literature and Culture (2016); Kathleen M. Brown, Foul
Bodies: Cleanliness in Early America (2011); Katherine Ashenburg, The Dirt on Clean: An Unsanitized History
(2008); Virginia Smith, Clean: A History of Personal Hygiene and Purity (2008); William A. Cohen and Ryan
Johnson (Eds), Filth: Dirt, Disgust and Modern Life (2005); Patricia Yaeger, Dirt and Desire (2000); Suellen Hoy,
Chasing Dirt: The American Pursuit of Cleanliness (1996). These texts, for the most part, consider dirt in its
adjectival, abstracted form, looking to ways that conceptions of the dirty construct categories of race, caste and class
as well as tracing the ways that conceptions of dirty and clean are produced under capitalism, especially as
marketing strategy.
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The frame is always dirty. It alerts the spectator of the thing to be seen by casting out the
dirt from the aesthetic object. In other words, the frame limits the backstory of the aesthetic
object by partitioning its boundaries. The frame pushes the dirty elsewhere, away from the
object, but in doing so, retains the trace of that disposal in a way that I am claiming takes part in
the materiality of the frame that then moves back toward the object as ornamentation. Dirty is
always helping categorize people and places, a fact with which this chapter will proceed while
focusing on dirt’s materiality and delaying a direct reflection on the dirty as frame.

I. EAT DIRT
If humans eat for other reasons than destruction, the literal appetite for dirt is one good
place to look for this alternate relation. I am considering appetite for dirt as an attempt at
intimacy with the elemental, an attempt to know through the mouth. Here, I’m going to think
about dirt-eating and some of the implications of an appetite for ground and how that appetite
helps digest multiple timescales that extend beyond human experience. Exploring dirt-eating is
one way to cross temporal and spatial scales, looking to the complex entanglements of the
anthropogenic and what used to be called nature. If the earth is too large for the human mind to
consider in its entirety, if the human role as geologic agent is too great to imagine, if the
catastrophic effects of climate change are too many to consider together, perhaps it is
nevertheless possible to turn to the ways in which the body is already sensing on these scales.
Dirt-eating is but one of these forms of sensing what it is humans cannot know. To examine the
practice beyond how it has been deemed abject, is to consider but one of the ways the human
body becomes a small, temporary vessel for the deep social and material sedimentation of
ground.
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Geophagy, or the appetite for dirt, is listed in the DSM with pica, which more generally
describes the desire to eat “nonnutritive substances” (95). This is suspicious, to say the least,
especially when we see that geophagy is first pathologized by slave owners in the Americas who
saw dirt-eating as a form of madness that depreciates the geophagist’s use value. There is, of
course, also the chance that geophagy served as a form of resistance, a way for dirt to help
people withdraw from the economic system that bound them, but I’ll get to this later.
Geophagists do not eat dirt indiscriminately. Clays are most appealing to those with
cravings, humus—the product of decomposing forest matter and the youngest component of soil,
who is etymologically tied to the human and humility—is on the bottom of the list. If given a
choice, geophagists will reach for a red clay over clay of other colors, reports anthropologist Sera
Young in her book Craving Earth, a contemporary book-length study on the subject (33).
Consuming dirt is common, especially among pregnant women and children. In the U.S., the
practice is associated with the South, especially with Black women. But as a class marker,
geophagy also aligns itself with a formulation of “white trash.” Geophagy is still very much a
marker of abjection, though it leaves uneven traces on raced, classed and gendered humans. The
social markers of dirt-eating operate on a large scale, but on a smaller one, there exists a
particular moment where the urge arises, most often right after it has rained.
One such moment happened for me on I-95 as I drove home to New York City not too
long ago. I passed through the familiar scene of sad big city appendage: the giant port that’s been
mechanized and moved from the city to periphery, and the oil refinery with its clean energy signs
and plumes of smoke majestically saying otherwise. An immigration detention center is close by,
holding those whose arrival into the U.S. is probably quite bound up in the impacts of how ships
and dirty refinement move next door. As I felt the guilt of being a human who uses the goods
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that are produced and moved around here, outside my daily purview, my attention turned to a
construction site next to the highway. The site was empty except for a backhoe and a large,
beautiful pile of dirt. Some of the dirt was red, the kind of red that, for me, expands the mouth
when I look at it, as if my insides are making space for what they want to be near them. The silty
texture heightens the feeling, as I picture the little grains getting tossed around in my jaw. This is
not a confession. It is a story of one small desire that is not about hunger but about appetite,
about wanting to get so close to the material, that the best way to gain intimacy is through the
mouth.
To get closer to that dirt, I began poring over soil maps of New Jersey. One origin for the
color I liked a lot, the one I’ve decided is true (this is what you get to do as an amateur, make
decisions based on aesthetics, which is, I think, a good way to make decisions), is that it emerges
from red shale, which is most common in tropical regions. It forms in temperate and humid
environments, weathering rapidly to build up layers of the kind of red clay that is often
associated with the identity of the Deep South (see the outflow of music, poetry, novels, memoir
with “red dirt” in the title). The red dirt is but one reminder of Southern presence in the north.
Like the kudzu that has come to envelop so much of New York, up from the Southern ground
that vine began “invading” over a century ago. Southern humidity has come north, too, as this
planet warms up. The upturned soil on the side of the highway is but one example of this change.
The red shale bedrock of northeast New Jersey is considered young, formed in the warm
weather of the Triassic and Jurassic periods 150-250 million years ago. When the last glacier
receded from that area about 20,000 years ago, creating New York City and Long Island with its
moraine, it helped distribute some of the shale to the soil’s surface. So the red is young for a
geologist, old for the rest of us, and appetizing to some of us. And the appetite for that color is
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one that, I think, senses how the localized pile of upturned dirt is stratified with a vast temporal
expanse. The geophagist’s ingestion of deep time makes the human organism into a container for
a timescale that both precedes and outlasts, if not the species, most contemporary understandings
of what it means to be human.
That red ground in New Jersey is also a product of an elaborate confluence of human
activity. So what I saw might have been brick fill that helped build the highway. Or it could have
been from any number of chemical spills. Or from paint. Or diesel oil dyed red to abide by
government regulation. It could have been a trick of the imagination, a desire to crave something
amongst the disgust of toxic petroleum refinement and the well-ordered monster of the shipping
industry.
To eat dirt is also to make oneself container for these human supplements to dirt,
especially toxins that outlast the individual human lifespan. Clay, the choice material for most
geophagists, works to eliminate toxins from the body. Clay has a large surface area, layered with
positively charged ions that exchange with other positively charged toxins and move through the
digestive system without damaging it. This is why you can dip wild potatoes in a clay sauce
before biting in and expel the toxic alkaloids without being poisoned. Or why clay is used in the
attempt to remediate oil spills, cap landfills, or as a barrier to toxic seepage in New York City’s
waters when the Army Corps of Engineers buries contaminated dredged material the Corps pulls
up to make way for larger and larger container ships (United States Army Corps). But because
the residual of the anthropogenic, especially lead, creeps into and remains in the clayish object of
geophagist desire, the appetite for ground is a hazard that lingers longer than clay can.
Remember that when Rachel Carson turns the national attention to the long-lasting danger of
post-WWII chemical spraying, she does so first with “A Fable for Tomorrow,” which begins
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with a bucolic scene of a farmland community that had remained the same since “the days many
years ago when the first settlers raised their houses, sank their wells, and built their barns” (2).
The destruction of the community and the production of a silent spring begins with “a strange
blight [that] crept over the area” (2). That which creeps is equated to “Some evil spell” but it is
“No witchcraft, no enemy action,” that destroys ecosystems and “silence[s] the rebirth of new
life in this stricken world” (3). Chemicals like DDT, she warns, are to blame for producing such
a world. She ends the allegory, and begins her scientific and historical exploration of pesticides,
again, with that which creeps, writing: “A grim specter has crept upon us almost unnoticed, and
this imagined tragedy may easily become a stark reality we all shall know” (3). Though Carson
helped ban DDT, chemicals that creep continue to do so. Therefore clay protects and it also
bloats with toxicity. Geophagists might be eliminating the toxins from their systems because clay
binds the little intruders so as to expel them from the body—to expel them into the elsewhere
that is also right here.
To sense clay as necessary for ingestion is to enact an expelling of outside pollutants and
also to make the body polluted with both dirt’s pollutants and the connotations of a practice that
looks dirty. Bioremediation looks clean, in the postindustrial soil, in the body with toxins, in the
Gulf of Mexico where BP’s oily seepage is met with clay that binds, but dirty is not far beyond.
What the dirt-eating body reveals is an openness to toxicity that is inevitable regardless, but that
hides behind the purity of the acceptable food items produced from ground—food items that
leave behind them chains of toxicity for other human and more-than-human bodies to deal with.
Pesticides make clean-looking vegetables but, as we know, pesticides poison those organisms—
human and not—who apply the pesticides, live near them, or drink water anywhere on this
planet.
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Eating dirt in the midst of climate change brings the state of things directly into the body.
This may be the case with all that is ingested, but with dirt, the human body is especially
exposed. Industrial byproduct, gasoline from cars, pesticides from farms, landfill leak, all
contribute to the sullying of ground. Soil is necessary for these industrial activities—either
because it is substrate for growth or substance to be penetrated while looking for whatever
mineral or petroleum product can be found underneath, or because once it serves its purpose, it
becomes sink for the dumping of byproduct. The human body consuming dirt also becomes a
container for byproduct. Instead of simply the recipient of zucchini—or whatever—product, the
dirt-eater willingly eats what is left over, not just from delicious weathering of old rock, but of
new leftovers of industrial activities that benefit from the slow geologic process of elemental
transformation.
So dirt-eaters often expose themselves to a myriad of heavy metals and chemicals such as
lead, cadmium and arsenic. These contaminants work upon bodies in varied ways as the climate
changes. As temperature and rainfall fluctuate, so too does the pH and moisture of soil, affecting
the bioavailability of both minerals and contaminants (Cook, et al. 112). As climate change
increases fluctuations in the environment, the dirt-eater’s body becomes a measure of such
inconsistency.
In much of the research on geophagy, it is associated, not with valuing dirt information
entering the body, but with an impossible and sad attempt at curing mineral deficiency. 8 The dirt
I saw in New Jersey is considered deficient itself. Its color shows that there is not much organic
matter present, just a deep iron. This ground cannot be easily farmed, according to most Western
agricultural practices; it must be fertilized to make up for its lack. But the human is also a lack to
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See, for example: Abrahams and Parsons, Hunter-Adams, Kawai et al., Tateo and Summa, and Young.
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which dirt can be added. All that iron is supplement, appealing to anemic bodies like mine that
turn to all the “wrong” things to make up for that lack; hiding the unspoken urge for a rusty nail
or fork, choosing to chew on dandelion leaves or gnaw on bones and suck out the marrow to
avoid more unacceptable forms of supplementation. The pathologized geophagist is usually
anemic, and the research is inconclusive on whether treating the anemia can rid her of the urge to
eat dirt (Cook, et al. 111). If the desirous human is the lack for which dirt is the supplement,
there are also ways in which this relationship is reversed. Wanting to meet teeth to this deprived
soil is perhaps a way for those teeth’s calcium to be a supplement to the lack of calcium in the
soil—a desire to be needed by ground. Humans are permeable creatures who need the outside to
come in so we can keep living—sometimes those things are found in dirt. Sometimes that dirt
protects, as it shields the digestive system from toxic intruders. Sometimes dirt is that intruder
itself, introducing its own toxicity. Sometimes dirt offers iron or calcium or zinc. Sometimes
dirt-eating helps geophagists acquire the minerals they need, sometimes it does the opposite, as
clay binds to important nutrients, making the body unable to digest them so that eating becomes
deprivation. Dirt-eating doesn’t yield one particular result. Its undetermined effects are not
dissimilar from the undetermined effects of eating anything, but dirt-eating is an exaggeration of
the fact that the human relationship to its milieu is never determined; and the shifting in this
relation happens at an accelerated rate as the effects of ecological catastrophe unfold.
In the South, where topsoil had begun to be depleted very soon after colonialism began,
slavery became one supplement for dirt-lack. Without glacial deposit of minerals, southern soils
can’t produce as those of other parts of the US can, so that in the environmental histories of the
region, the Old South is made to seem natural because of the lack in its soil for which
institutionalized slavery becomes the solution. Alfred Cowdrey’s environmental history of the
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southern US concludes that “The chief peculiarity of southern soils, except the alluvial, is that
they are old” (2). To account for both a peculiar (read: peculiar institution) and an old element of
the South, he explains that because glaciers did not form in the region, most of its soils “lack the
topping of minerals” that ice carried elsewhere and the area also “lacks the secondary gift of
glaciers—the deep loess, wind-carried from the glacial region, that forms the basis of the
Midwestern prairies” (2). In other words, the Old South can be naturalized through a lack in its
soil whose hinge is the peculiar labor of the toiling frame, abundant with working people. The
dirt’s lack is always attended to through labor, but it is also supplemented later, in the Gilded
Age, by new science that enabled farmers to see the “land as only a vehicle” as they developed
industrial fertilizers (Cowdrey 108). The lacking dirt, then, that is supplemented in these ways, is
simultaneously instrumentalized by those earth eaters who are meant to supplement the lack.
Today, as the oceans are acidifying, so too is dirt. With increased global temperatures and
rainfall, soils leach out their alkalines. When wetlands are drained for strip malls, agriculture and
highways, clays dry up and erode, removing the buffer between acid and earth (Cook, et al. 113).
Like the human body that, by ingesting clay, creates a wall between stomach lining and whatever
else is ingested, the digesting Earth, at times, needs a clay lining. And in places like The
Meadowlands—just north of where I saw the red dirt in New Jersey—that lining is being lost.
Draining and toxic dumping have made the area prime example of Superfund sadness. The poet
James Schuyler notices those industrialized wetlands in his 1969 poem “Hudson Ferry.” Instead
of the grandiosity of the city and its waters that Walt Whitman or Hart Crane tell us about in
their New York Harbor poems, Schuyler prompts his reader to “look at the smoke blazing over
Jersey/the flats are on fire it’s like a flushed cheek” (11-2). Schuyler calls attention to the
industrialized view across the Hudson, but makes it tender as “a flushed cheek.” He writes that
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“nearer a smokestack blows a dense dark blue,” but he is less concerned with the smoke as
polluter than about how to name the quality of its color. Schuyler’s is the kind of precision that
the wetlands require. Instead of homogenous throwaway zone of capitalist refuse, the
Meadowlands are specific and they require an attention to that specificity. Schuyler makes
industrial destruction particular, not beautiful but important to spend time looking at, and to
notice as analogous to the “flushed cheek” of a human body. Schuyler’s specificity shows care.
He gives the Meadowlands space in the poem, working out exactly what they resemble instead of
turning away from the ugliness they evoke. They are not simply industrial wasteland, but a result
of the kind of smoke that “looks cold trailing like hair/the bite-me kind springy or flung about”
(14-5). Humans digesting, like the gasping respiratory system of the poor wetlands of northern
New Jersey, need a remediative layer, but such layers are also little bundles of toxicity.
Linda Lorraine Nash, in her history of environment and disease, says that U.S.
farmworkers of the 1950s who witnessed, and suffered the effects of, the industrialization of
agriculture “read their bodies as a kind of instrument whose limits and illnesses measured the
health of the land. Farmworkers located disease not in their own bodies or in their own
communities but in a landscape that they found foreign and physically threatening” (138). If the
body is measure of the land’s growing toxicity, this is perhaps especially true for the dirt-eater.
Like geologists, using their mouths to identify soil and stones—wearing away at their teeth in the
process—the dirt-eater measures with her mouth. Taking ground into the body, containing it in
the bloated stomach, the geophagist samples her milieu, coming to know its contents, toxic or
otherwise, through the digestive system. Philosopher of science Isabel Stengers urges scientists
to foster an appetite for the “terrain” instead of the lab (68). Though she’s being figurative and
telling scientists to see their subjects in context, the geophagist literalizes this call. The dirt
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knowledge she ends up with as a result is one that moves first through the digestive system rather
than the brain. She knows what the ecologist Eugene Odum knows when he tells the writer Gary
Snyder that biomass has “more information of a higher order of sophistication and complexity
stored in a few square miles of forest than there is in all the libraries of mankind” (107-8).
The circulation of dirt information through the body occurs on a molecular level,
affecting genetic structures. Sociologist Hannah Landecker’s studies of contemporary research in
epigenetics redefines food, showing how it can no longer be considered mere substance for
maintaining life, but as signal: information that tells the organism something on a molecular
level (“Postindustrial” 495). If this is the case, what kind of information does dirt impart? What
does this mean for the belly expanded with clay? Landecker looks specifically at the effects of
consumption, intentional and inadvertent, in the postindustrial landscape of plastics and high
fructose corn syrups, sugar’s subsidized replacement. If plastic can become epigenetic mark,
signaling to bodies how to behave, what kinds of information get imparted by dirt that acts as
receptacle for industrial and postindustrial waste? What kinds of knowing are being constituted
here, through dirt as information?
The circulation of dirt-knowledge through the body also occurs beyond the lifespan of the
individual with an appetite. Recent studies in epigenetics show that toxins ingested by organisms
(usually rats are the chosen specimens) affect, not only their own bodies, but those of their
offspring. Landecker says, “Instead of flowing through the body, expelled as heat and waste, socalled foreign matter is assimilated to help the body live not in but into an environment in its
future, to anticipate” (“Postindustrial” 515). If eating becomes anticipation of a future milieu,
what sort of future is being invoked when the milieu is consciously ingested? How does dirt
ingestion represent and therefore start to posit into existence, some different world to step into?
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If it is so often the pregnant body that craves dirt, how does the consumption of ground, of the
waste and substrate of the postindustrial landscape, reveal a particular kind of world to the
developing fetus? Pregnant-eating becomes, when considering epigenetics, not just a present
craving but a craving for information that determines the genetic outcome of offspring. So if
pregnant-eating is anticipation of a future milieu, what kind of future is the geophagist craving
along with dirt? Perhaps one that sees the human body as porous conductor of toxicity; or one
that sees ground as necessary object of desire and gives primacy to a deep temporal frame. In
other words, there is, possibly, a productive sullying of the future in its digestive container of the
present.
Landecker shows that genes and environment cannot be so strictly segregated as they
once were. If the milieu becomes signal, then there is the possibility that “environmental things
can be biologically inherited, and that genetic inheritance can be realized or silenced by
environmental conditions. Meaning that something genetic can look environmental and
something environmental can look genetic” (Landecker, “Food is Licking” 25). If this is the
case, then social history starts to get enfolded into genetic makeup. And genes become examined
as sediment that, like the earth’s crust which contains the material evidence of automobiles, tell
social histories in their makeup. We are not only refused purity from our current environmental
milieu, but we are genetically refused it from our environmental and social historical milieu as
well. The danger in this thinking is that it risks forgetting that race is a socially-constructed
category with material effects, not the other way around. How can epigenetics account for the
material without making science, once again, the justification for biological determinism?
What epigenetics risks is putting our thinking back into the nineteenth-century discourse
from which dirt-eating as pathology emerged. Geophagy became medicalized within institutional
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slavery in the Americas, where there are many accounts of enslaved peoples who ate dirt. Named
Cachexia Africana, geophagy was said to cause disease, especially yaws (Young 74). Sera
Young’s book, Craving Earth, frames enslaved dirt-eaters as geophagists, though she may have
asked if there is evidence of a craving for dirt manifesting in these cases, or if these stories mark
alternate desires of people who resist their enslavement by eating dirt to diminish their use value
within the institution of slavery. Thomas Roughley warns in his 1823 book, The Jamaica
Planter’s Guide that geophagy “reduces the woman to a state of weakness, and barrenness, and
makes her prone to idleness and disaffection to work” (118). In other words, there is the
possibility that the ingestion of ground was related to a refusal to work the land, or give birth to
others who will, for the slave-owner's profit; and instead assimilate that land into the body. Of
course, dirt-eating may have been a response to hunger and malnutrition, but there are ways the
practice points to a willed resistance as well. Michelle Gadpaille, in her essay, “Eating Dirt,
Being Dirt,” argues that dirt-eating is more than “pathology or taboo” but might “represent a
means of negotiating power for the powerless: those of the African diaspora, especially its girls
and women” (3). She argues that “Though not owners of their bodies, slaves were responsible
keepers of their digestive systems. To eat dirt could thus be a creative, self-destructive way of
robbing the owner of his property, through either death or re-sale” (Gadpaille 8). Taking
possession of their innards if not their entire bodies, dirt-eaters perhaps gained autonomy by
bringing ground in through the mouth. Through what Gadpaille calls “self-destructive,” the
enslaved geophagist does not destroy herself but forecloses some of the ways her body can be
instrumentalized through work and reproduction. In other words, she perhaps makes herself, to
use Roughley’s words, barren and idle to gain a level of autonomy within an institution that
denies her that right.
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Many slave-owners’ reacted to dirt-ingestion by both physically restricting an appetite for
ground and pathologizing that desire. In 1836, The London Medical Gazette recommends
attaching “A metallic mask or mouthpiece, secured by a lock” so as to create a “means of
security for providing against their indulgence in dirt-eating” (qtd. in Young 73) The enslaved
subject exceeds her purpose by eating dirt and is reined in by the metal frame that covers her
face. In the images (which are on the internet), her head is all mask. The mask, as violent frame
over the face, pollutes, not because of its materiality, but because of its grotesque signification.
The commodified body is legible as such through the tortuous adornment that assigns
proprietorship. 9 But the mask will not be enough if the desire is not for dirt. It will not be enough
if the desire directs itself toward a transformation that internalizes the exterior in order to be
located in some elsewhere, away from the here of enslavement.
Gadpaille reads how dirt-eating also becomes medicalized when it endangers the
purchase price of enslaved peoples. She writes “plantation owners, denied a fresh supply of
slaves by the trading ban of 1807, had an economic interest in exhibiting benevolence in their
treatment of the remaining slave population” so that slave owners would attempt to heal instead
of criminalize the practice (Gadpaille 6). She points out, however, that this treatment is doled out
from a distance. Gadpaille writes that “Amidst this enlightened care for the afflicted slave,
however, Roughley uses the noun ‘creature.’ The ill slave becomes a creature rather than a
human being; it appears that for Roughley the eating of dirt deprives the slave of her/his
humanity” (Gadpaille 6). Tending to geophagy as a medical condition thus becomes a way to
rationalize the dehumanization of the slave at the same time as feigning concern. One form of
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The artist Marianetta Porter recreated these muzzles out of silver and displayed them next to piles of dirt in her
2001 series, Memory and Oblivion. Patricia Yaeger briefly describes the show in the introduction to her book Dirt
and Desire: Reconstructing Southern Women's Writing, 1930-1990, which begins with dirt-eating (ix).
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resistance to this dehumanization comes from further aligning with what is deemed non-human
and is both violently policed and pathologized through medical knowledge systems that justify
racialized violence. Still nestled into the DSM under pica, geophagy, as it is understood in the
U.S., is also nestled into this history of slavery on colonized lands. The craving of dirt invites
this history, invites the larger frame of how the land is toiled and spoiled, and how the individual
is implicated in that process, bringing it in through the mouth along with the rest of the body.
Helen Oyeyemi’s 2009 novel, White is for Witching, speaks back to this pathologizing of
the pica sufferer through a character who is both depressed and, at times, possessed. Oyeyemi, a
Black writer, lays out the devolution of a young white woman as she slips into a depression in a
household possessed by her female ancestors. As the house’s supernatural abilities grow more
potent, the young woman, Miranda, grows smaller, eating mostly those non-food items for which
those diagnosed with pica are told they suffer an appetite. Miranda gets away from the house and
goes to college, meeting her girlfriend, Ore. Ore is reading about the soucouyant, a figure in
Caribbean folklore who sheds her skin at night and sneaks through crevices in peoples’ homes to
suck their blood. An archetypal character of the insatiable woman who eats children because she
cannot bear her own, the soucouyant becomes both that which Ore fears and that which she is
scared to become. Ore says she wants to write a book about her, a book “that explores the
meaning of the old woman whose only interaction with other people was consumption” (144).
Mirroring Miranda’s feverish appetite for chalk, dirt, onyx, and whatever else appeals to her
throughout the novel, the soucouyant is driven by consumption. Taking the form of fire after she
sheds her skin, the non-human entity makes up for in appetite the reproductive capacity she lacks
or refuses.
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Ore and Miranda return to Miranda’s house, and the older generations of women are
shocked to see the two together. They deem the lovers “Disgusting,” saying, “These are the
things that happen while you’re not looking, when you’re not keeping careful watch, when clear
water moves unseen a taint creeps into it—moss, or algae, salt, even. It becomes foul,
undrinkable. It joins the sea” (180). The possessed house binds Miranda in her depression,
increasing a supernatural force upon her as the novel continues. Whether the character's pica is a
result of, or a resistance to, that force, the house marks how the feminized home-space can
reproduce strictures of patriarchal modes in magical ways. Miranda's response is to “join[] the
sea” and “become foul, undrinkable.” She makes herself inconsumable and also associated with
the oceanic. Aligned with that which floods and destroys, invading the house with “a taint that
creeps”—perhaps as pesticides creep in Rachel Carson’s “Fable for Tomorrow”—Miranda and
Ore avoid being desirable for consumption by turning towards each other, and this perhaps
protects them from the ancestors who behave like the soucouyant. Or they relieve the
soucouyants from their fatal power by also taking pleasure in that which will not produce
children.
While in Oyeyemi’s novel, the house is a frame of multi-generational feminized anxiety
that forces Miranda toward an appetite for that which should not be craved, many real people
with pica turn their appetites toward the house itself. Geophagists often eat their walls, longing
for the paint chips, drywall or clay of their homes (Abrahams and Parsons 64, “Why”). Anne
Carson, in her essay “Putting Her in Her Place: Woman, Dirt, and Desire,” describes the ancient
Greek marriage ceremony as one in which there is “much emphasis on doorways, thresholds,
lintels, exits, entrances and the whole ceremonial apparatus whereby the bride is relocated from
her father’s house to her husband’s house, from maidenhood to married status” (162). The
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crossing from one house to another is a safety precaution that curtails the effects of what Carson
formulates as a female porousness that is a danger to the polis. Like Oyeyemi’s queer couple that
taints the water and joins the sea, the ancient Greek woman is associated with wetness that must
be contained and matched by male aridity (Carson 137). What does it mean for the geophagist,
who is usually female, to eat from, and sometimes through, the structure of that which contains
and separates her? To eat dirt is to bring the exterior inside and through ingestion, make of the
inside a kind of exteriority. What frame is the house and where does the body as frame fit in
relation to it?
The ancient Greek marriage ceremony also involved the bridegroom’s offering of
childhood toys to the bride, thus conflating the child’s object of desire with the woman’s at the
same time that the bride was figured as fertile ground instrumentalized through the institution of
marriage. If it is both pregnant women and children who are said to crave dirt, this conflation of
woman and child is made visible in the ancient wedding performance. As containers for a
promised futurity in the heteropatriarchal formulation, pregnant bodies and children make up the
necessary material frame for the abstracted promise of what is to come.
Pica, this desire that extends out through the negative terrain of that which is not food,
first referred to as such by Actius of Amida, is derived from the genus and species name for the
common magpie (Young 142). Because the magpie is seen with the bric-a-brac of anthropogenic
refuse in its beak (especially that which sparkles), its appetite seems to lack discernment. The
poor magpie who doesn’t know what is good to eat, how to teach it proper taste? Observant
people now know, as they probably did then, that these specimens are collected for building
homes. Pica in humans can thus become a reversal of the namesake’s practice, another sort of
chiasmus between the human and the more-than-human. Instead of building from the mouth,
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pica, when it manifests as the practice of eating from the wall, undoes the home from the inside.
If the polis depends upon the oikos that contains, what does the craving to ingest and digest the
frame of the house perform? Is the container trespassed from the inside when it is consumed?
In the anthropological studies, produced in the 1960’s, of the southern dirt-eating
practices, white scholars trace geophagy northward, where those who had left the South still sent
for clay from the “rural birthplace” and when it was not available, they apparently turned to
commercial substitutes like laundry starch (Vermeer and Frate 113). The way scholars explain
this transition is as if geophagists move from the “natural” to the anthropogenic (Vermeer and
Frate 113). Now, online forums on pica reveal a particular desire for Ajax and Comet (“Why”).
Often, people writing on such forums describe strong cravings for driveway gravel (“Why”). In
other words, they seem to crave the in-between spaces of what is generally understood as the
nature/culture divide. What form of contestation of the nature/culture binary occurs in the human
body that eats that which lies between? So often, in fictional, academic and personal accounts of
geophagy, the desirer parks next to the road and begins digging. Why dig next to the road and
not a field? Is there a way of bringing the anthropogenic natural realm into the body that the
geophagist is particularly interested in? Or do they just want to find the most convenient place to
pile some clay into a bag? And if, in the house, many turn away from the natural and toward the
toxic cleaners of their domestic environments, and if these eaters are mostly women, what does
the consumption of domesticity accomplish in the feminized body?
As geophagy interrupts the social reproductive expectations of domestic femininity, it
also perhaps calls attention to how the reproductive capacities of the Earth are foreclosed in the
man-made conditions of capitalism. The arborist and writer William Bryant Logan, in his 1995
book on dirt, refers to the process of soil formation as metabolic, describing the earth’s dirty skin
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as “digested” by the depths of the earth and then “pumped upward again” (95). He remarks that
“Imagining the undersea mouths where the new crust spills out and where the old crust is
swallowed, one thinks of the first goddess, Gaia, she who gave birth to her children only to
devour them” (95). Logan’s metabolic process is familiar—scientists frequently use the same
language. But the Earth’s processes don’t always work in the cyclical ways in which Logan
describes them. Coffins interrupt decomposition, as do landfills; sidewalks interrupt the water
cycle, redirecting rainwater into drains instead of into the soil; seawalls are built to inhibit
erosion so that private beach property can be maintained. In the capitalist system, this
interruption happens on a large scale. Capital becomes the personified devouring actor, eating
through the natural at an exhaustive rate. Marx and Engels used the example of soil exhaustion to
describe how capital devours in this way. As Brett Clark, John Bellamy Foster, and Richard
York in their book, The Ecological Rift, explain, both Marx and Engels were deeply interested in
the problems that soil exhaustion was causing for farmers, and for the future of food, in England.
Speaking with naturalists of their day, the two used soil as an example of the “metabolic rift”
between the social and the natural. These two realms, which might be so easily distinguished
today, are, according to Marx, supposed to act upon each other in harmony. Under capitalism,
there is a rift between the social and the natural, whereby nature is depleted at an unsustainable
rate.
Even if the metabolic process is interrupted, Gaia did not, in most versions, devour her
own children (Cronus did). But Logan’s mistake is still of interest. The devouring mother is an
easy image to turn toward if one is to think about the processes of decomposition in which
organisms take part, despite the ways in which human bodies are so frequently preserved in
formaldehyde and thickly-lacquered coffins. Perhaps those devices help certain humans avoid
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the psychoanalytic obsession with the devouring mother whose symbols include the gaping
mouth and the vagina dentata.10 Not everyone is scared of the Earth who eats. The lesbian writer
Cherrie Moraga describes the Chimayo Shrine, a sacred site in New Mexico that gurgles up sand,
that “its earth mouth opens to us” (14). Instead of a terrifyingly gaping mouth, Moraga’s Earth
gently opens its mouth, out from which comes sacred red sand to take home. Maybe the human
desire to eat Earth is a cannibalistic reciprocation of the devouring mother—a return to
devouring infancy where the child gobbles up the archaic mother. But this reciprocal relationship
need not be so violent; it can be more about pleasure.
My mother, whose longing for some other kind of world that she never got to be born
into dictates most of her impulsive decisions, cultivated an urge in me toward dirt. Last year, she
sent me sand from the Chimayo Shrine in a small glass jar. Raised amidst all the other Italian
Americans in the 1960s Boston suburbs, my mother left young to wander and have a lot of kids.
She wove her longing, and what it yields, into our adventures through clay beds of upstate New
York, where I was raised. She wove it also into the stories she told me about her roaming, stories
which always included a description of the dirt, especially of the perfectly-red kind in the
Southwest. With her, to say you want to eat something—usually a thing that’s a deep brown
red—is to appreciate it in a particularly good way. So she showed me to look at bare earth with
an appetite. Not just dirt, but any good material. Paintings too, when they let their media glob
together and remain.
She’s probably the reason why the texture in the subway ads for Alberto Burri’s show
called “The Trauma of Painting,” convinced me to go, even though I hated the title. I wanted to
grab the inchoate surface of the painting in the ad and dig into it. So, faced with that painting
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It is impossible to cite the abundance of thinking on this idea, but Klein, Freud, Neumann, and Jung are an
interesting assortment of approaches.
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every day, I relented. I went to the Guggenheim, which we are all boycotting because they don’t
pay a decent wage in Abu Dhabi. I went and I didn’t pay. And the trauma of painting had some
pieces that pulled on my hands to stretch out and break a bit to nibble on. I didn’t. I let my mouth
expand with it and then left.
As we all know, the Earth’s mouth opens up for us as well—decomposing and reusing
the material that emerges from it. The geophagist turns back on her mother earth with a desire to
consume. Biologist Hayman Hartman tells Logan that “clay is at least as lively as the so-called
organic chemicals. It may quite literally have been the matrix (the old word for ‘womb’) that
spawned all the creatures now inhabiting the earth” (124). Thus, the geophagist turn toward clay
is not only a turn toward matter, which comes from the Latin mater, or mother, but also a turn
directly toward the womb. This womb need not be an over-simplified, unitary origin point. Clay
is a complex substance; its crystalline structure is made up of small minerals that together take
up a large surface area. A return to this complexity is not a return to singular substance in an
Aristotelian sense. Clay is complex substrate that will not be pared down in the geophagist’s
mouth. Instead of oversimplifying to the beginning origin in the womb, the turn towards mother
Earth, who is devoured and does her own devouring, is also a preservation of literal complexity.
For the lesbian poet Minnie Bruce Pratt, that origin is a queer one. In her poem “Eating
Clay,” a lesbian is asked to explain her attraction to women, to which she responds that it’s a
result of the dirt she ate. Connecting clay-eating to pottery, and both to a lesbian sexuality, Pratt
begins her poem with Beatrice, who is tucked into the underbrush by the side of the highway,
having sex with another woman. From this hidden place, she notices a woman close by,
collecting clay into a small paper bag, maybe reminding the reader of William Carlos Williams’
“Poor Old Woman” who greedily devours plums from her own paper bag. As Beatrice watches
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the dirt collector, she sees that “the woman had a power she did not” (9). She does not envy this
power, “Not anymore, /as she lay back pliant in another’s hand” (12-13). It’s as if Beatrice
would envy the geophagist if it weren’t for a sexual encounter from which she can draw her own
strength. Pratt’s poem thus describes the rituals around clay eating as empowering, rather than
abject; tying the pleasure in dirt to the pleasure of lesbianism. As Pratt begins by aligning the
hidden practices of the lesbian and of the geophagist, as they occur in the same place—off the
main road and out of sight, she shows how both these practices empower their practitioners,
gaining power not through domination, but through surrender to the thing they crave, whether
that be another woman’s body or the body of Gaia herself.
Pratt describes the surrender to clay as a secret act of “tasting that mysterious meal late
at night,” as similar to the surrender to “another’s steady hands” (10, 13). These acts of surrender
are not only surrender to pleasure, but to a god-like act of creation. Referencing Isaiah’s address
to God, when he says “thou art our father; we are the clay, and thou our potter; and we all are the
work of thy hand,” Pratt’s poem turns that potter to a woman who turns her lover’s body “pliant”
so that she, in her surrender, says “though-art-the-potter-I-am-the-clay” (Isaiah 64:8, 14). With
dashes stringing together Beatrice’s words, the address to the lover emerges as a stuttering,
desperate confession that ties sexual surrender to the molding of clay more generally, and to the
Biblical God’s molding of the human more specifically.
In the following stanza, Beatrice remembers the “closest” she had come to eating dirt
“was in the shed” where “grey rows of pots dripped wet, just born” (16). The desire to eat clay
breeds, it seems, the power to form it into new life. Refashioning the narrative of life that springs
from a male god, requiring the fertility of blank female Earth, Pratt gives her lesbian lovers the
powers of creation in the potter’s shed that is “beside a dirt road/miles from nowhere” (18). Just
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as the collecting of clay and the initial scene of intimacy in the poem take place away from the
main road, so too does this act of creation in the potter’s studio occur “miles from nowhere.”
Without male intervention, these women make a genesis of their own, shaping clay in a place set
apart. The shed, located away from the home, and all the heteropatriarchal expectations of that
home space, is a place for the pots to drip wet, “just born.” At the potter’s wheel, Beatrice
watches the power of her thumb, as the slightest movement can change everything. Her thumb
“suddenly would plumb the earth’s core. /Her fingers laid mountains low into glistening bowls”
(29-30). The poem scales up the women’s ability to create from a reproductive capacity to one of
shaping topography. Beatrice shapes mountains in cavernous bowls.
Beatrice’s fingers dig “into glistening bowls,” returning the reader to lesbian fantasy as
tied to digging into the earth for clay. Geophagists don’t tend to eat humus or exposed clay. They
dig down for what they want. One of the first studies of geophagy in the United States was
published by Vermeer and Frate in 1979. The study describes geophagists as digging
“geophagical pits,” usually with spoons instead of garden tools like spades (Vermeer and Frate
105). Geologists and pedologists, too, make pits as a first step toward better understanding the
makeup of a particular piece of land. Robert Bly, in his strange study of masculinity, Iron John,
tells his reader that young Viking men would sometimes lie in hollowed-out areas between the
fire and the ash heaps, remaining there for up to a few years. Languishing in this liminal space
between the burn and the refuse, the men would eat the ashes or chew on the cinders and were
thus called “cinder-eaters” (80). The yonic pit, forged into mother Earth by the geophagist, might
be a similar kind of liminal space. Rather than the pit into the earth being necessarily a symbol of
rape (either of Mother Earth, or of Francis Bacon’s “harlot”) as Carolyn Merchant traces in her
history of Western science and industry, the making of the pit to pull out clay for eating seems to
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be a celebration of an appetite for the yonic (Merchant 39, 171). Pratt enacts this desire over and
over again in “Clay Eating.” The poem begins with sex in the “underbrush” with “the wet dirt
smell” in a “hollow place” (3, 2, 4). Beatrice is both damp-faced “on a lover’s thigh” and cradled
in the dampness of the earth. Thinking of dirt-eating, she remembers the potter’s shed, “cool as a
scooped-out cave” (17). Removed from the “world that went on with no help from her,” the shed
becomes a cunt of the landscape (19). It is a secret, set-apart, scooped-out, place for pleasure and
birthing clay that drips when “just born.”
This place is not protected, though. The world intrudes, and it interpellates the couple
directly. This interpellation comes in the form of the newspaper, from which Beatrice awaits an
address. She knows the intrusion is coming, as the couple sits at the breakfast table, eating off the
plates they have made. Beatrice looks at the paper, waiting for “the next story about women like
her, the same question: / what made you the way you are?” (33-34). Contained in the answer is a
refusal to turn from ground, and its abject connotations. She answers: it is “the dirt she ate” (36).
The couple eats off the plates that are a result of their lesbian desire and their divine creation,
both of which seem rooted in a desire to reach deep into the earth and draw up mountains just so
they could wake up in the morning and have some eggs with each other. Beatrice eats with the
woman who carves into her the way she carves into clay or the way someone might carve into
the ground for a secret midnight snack, fetching something that will be useful later—just as the
passion in the shed is of use to the morning appetite. And the address from the newspaper, the
attempt to ask why, is a question from the world out there. The response is a stubborn
commitment to carving out the hole for clay, an act that disidentifies with the heteropatriarchal
conception of infinitely accessible, feminized landscape and yields instead to a non-procreative
creative process. And from this making, the lovers can satiate their appetites for food at the
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breakfast table. Pratt maintains a deep connection between women and clay. As she describes the
couple fucking in clay, eating it, molding it, eating off it, eating it again, and then returning to
each other one last time, she draws the lines of connection between woman and clay as one
where the power to make, outside a male god, is both maintained and celebrated in the cycle of
surrender to female power.
The contemporary poet Elizabeth Alexander has a poem called “Dirt-Eaters,” in which
she also responds to a newspaper article that fails to understand its subject. The article is a
condescending report on the decline of geophagy amongst Black communities in the U.S. South.
Alexander’s poem responds by mourning this decline. Like Pratt’s, Alexander’s speaker doesn't
simply reject the newspaper that seems to address her in some way, but instead makes her own
use of it. The article to which she responds, published in The New York Times in 1986, regards
geophagy as a backward practice. Alexander quotes the article as it claims that:
“Most cultures
have passed
through
a phase
of eartheating
most pre
valent today
among
rural
Southern
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black
women.” (16-28)
In other words, Southern Black women will catch up soon. Until then, we wait out the
decline. Alexander’s poem resists this characterization by looking back and responding with
nostalgia. She mimics the columned form of the newspaper, digging down in her thin poem to a
richer history and a richer earth where a connection to deep time can be pulled up and examined.
Like Pratt, Alexander responds to an outside intrusion of knowledge production about
marginalized identities that get wrapped up in an appetite for dirt.
The form of “Dirt-Eaters” mimics the task of the geophagist by digging into a neglected
history and bringing it into the body (of the poem) to more closely align the histories it pulls out.
Enjambing her lines, even her words, Alexander not only cracks into the narrative the New York
Times aims to know, refusing the knowledge of the “Ex/pert,” but she seems to crack into
geophagy itself (57-8). As she digs down into the practice, her tone is hushed. What she finds are
short and sibilant lines that depict clay eating as taking part in hushed networks of clay and
advice, networks populated by “gos/sips” and “(Shoe-/boxed dirt/shipped North/to kin)” (40-1,
36-9). This passing is secret, pulled away like Pratt's shed, as it safely nestles into Alexander's
parentheses. But the secret isn't momentary, it stretches out like the hiss of “gos/sips” that are
elongated through the line break. These secret and withdrawn lines of connection from person to
person through clay are repeated in the gos/sips’ rumors about the speaker's mother:
"Musta ate
chalk,
Musta ate
starch, cuz
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why else
did her
babies
look
so white?” (48-56).
The repetition of the first two phrases makes the rumors feel repeated over a long durée.
They seem to be rumors repeated into a sedimentation, into a tradition of their own: this is how
we come to know things. And it seems to be one valid way to know, even if it's also kind of
cruel.
Amongst the networks of people passing dirt, and ways of knowing about dirt, the
speaker tries to forge her own lines of connection to geophagy. She says she
Never ate
dirt
but I lay
on Greatgrandma’s
grave
when I
was small. (8-15)
Interestingly, she ties the memory of lying in the dirt to eating it. People lie on the ground all the
time, especially as children. There is something particular about the grave, perhaps because the
earth is newly upturned or because there is a recognition of significance beneath the top layer of
soil. This child, laid out on the grave, mirrors her Great-grandmother's position. Such a mirroring
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has a temporal dimension, as the child, who directs attention toward the future, mirrors the
grandmother of the past. If, as Lee Edelman argues, the child is “the emblem of futurity’s
unquestioned value,” what does it mean for that emblem to lie on a grave (4)? The backwardlooking child, who also signifies the child as container for the future, lying on the ground as her
Great-grandmother decays below her, participates in the same kind of connection to expansive
history as the dirt-eater. Alexander points to the grandiosity of the “great” grandmother, whose
name is still capitalized despite the fact that she is digested into small bits below the small child
above. Those small bits are travelling, joining the vastness of dirt. So it is in lying on the grave
that the speaker brings her small, permeable body into contact with the vast greatness of dirt, and
into contact with her own ancestry as a particular part of that vastness. Even if she does not
ingest it, this stanza seems to show the ways the speaker knows what it means to have dirt inside
the body and to receive comfort from that fact.
The poem ends with the newspaper article again, quoting an older woman who is
interviewed by the Times. The woman, Miss Fannie Glass, says:
“I wish
I had
some dirt
right now.” (67-70)
In these lines, Alexander collects the deep social and temporal frame of digging for dirt
to eat. The wish extends backward toward a practice that is being lost. The wish also gazes
imaginatively toward a future that is as undetermined as the object of her desire. She simply
wants “some dirt,” and her lack of specificity speaks to the ways in which the desire for dirt
might be a desire for an undetermined relationship between human and ground.
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The small appealing pile of dirt I saw in New Jersey is sedimented with countless
histories that entangle the human organism with her dirty environment. The geophagist makes
her body a container for these deep social and material histories. If eating, as Landecker shows,
is an anticipation of both the organism’s body and those of its offspring moving into future
milieus, an appetite for dirt, in all the depth and indeterminacy it offers, perhaps opens up a
future milieu that puts current social-environmental conditions into relief against a deep temporal
and spatial frame.

Relief: How does dirty accumulate without any topsoil left?
Most geophagists don’t eat topsoil, they dig holes down to the desired clay. But thinking
about the dirt-eating human, I can’t help but think of the global crisis of topsoil loss: a metabolic
rift that has greatly increased since Marx and Engels wrote about it. We all eat topsoil, both
literally, in the sense that it ends up in our food, and figuratively, as industrialized food systems
erode topsoil at unprecedented rates. Industrial agriculture is a fast-paced consumption of fertile
soil. Soil formation occurs in geologic time, that is, slowly. It takes five hundred years to
produce an inch of topsoil. Every year, the United States is using up its topsoil at ten times that
rate, while China and India deplete theirs at 40 times that rate (Lang). Topsoil loss occurs for a
number of reasons. Sometimes it falls away, ending up in waterways and deposited elsewhere,
and then often dredged out of that elsewhere. Sometimes it is crushed into place by heavy
machinery or asphalt. Other times it’s contaminated by the addition of industrial materials or by
salt or acid, or the loss of minerals (Cook et al. 113).
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What does it mean to eat dirt in a time of massive soil loss? 11 Particular sorts of grounds
are being lost. What does it mean to crave in this time of waning? Without answering what,
exactly, is being craved—because it’s different for everyone—one might say our container
bodies can hold dirt, keep it from washing away, if only temporarily. We human organisms can
be, and are, the quite momentary holders of that which falls away at unprecedented rates. Or, we
can be reminded, with a mouthful of anything good, that our bodies can be localized suspenders
of the processes that out-scale our temporal frame and waste away when those practices match
human velocity. This suspension involves an appetite, or a restlessness, for a thing that is not, but
might be.

To this could be added Bruno Latour’s connection between migration and erosion, which indicates that this is a
generalized time of losing ground (6).
11
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WRITING IN THE INTERSTICES: DIRT GETS IN THE WATER

You Have a Little Dirt on You
In medieval Europe, sugar sculptures, called subtleties, decorated tables of the wealthy
during a feast (Mintz 91). They are considered predecessors of the wedding cake (Mintz 132).
But Kara Walker’s 2014 site-specific work in the remaining structure of the shuttered Domino
Sugar Refinery in Brooklyn started somewhere outside the building, in a long line. Walker
erected a giant sugar sphinx and dotted the room with smaller “attendants,” life-size sculptures of
children made out of resin and molasses and named the whole thing “A Subtlety.” When I was
waiting outside to see Walker’s popular show, everyone around me responded delightedly to six
or seven planes using their exhaust to write above us: “Will you marry me?” What the pollution
of hetero-celebration and the skywriting necessary for its execution did was help marriage reach
beyond its frame, bleed skyward and infiltrate the warm-weathered wait outside Walker’s piece.
This excess that reaches beyond the frame is not unlike the excessive sugar industry that splays
out across the world, that helped build the system of slavery with its saccharine product, and that
product’s attendants, webbing their way across the Atlantic.
According to Kant’s aesthetic theory, if the object is going to be beautiful, it needs limits.
Helping beauty along is the outside that is not quite out, that porously extends two ways, both
toward the work and toward the milieu (the place the spectator finds herself). Through the
parergon (beside-work), the ergon (work) is figured, and through the milieu, the parergon is also
figured.
The space was transitioning from sugar refinery to high rise housing and in between,
Kara Walker showed “A Subtlety.” What the pilots of the planes performing the skywriting
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probably saw was half the lot as hole and, to one side of the hole, the remaining edifice and to
the other, a line of people protruding from the pit’s rubble, wrapping around construction
barricades.
The milieu, as the place of encounter, figures the parergon as the material that Derrida
calls the “ill-detachable detachment” (59). As surface that extends outward, the parergon situates
the milieu as the material and immaterial environment from which the subject encounters the
aesthetic object, looking within the frame only because the frame directs the eye. The milieu is
too literal, too ordinary, and it is within this ordinariness that the frame arises both to limit and
make visible the work of art: the thing to be looked at. Derrida writes of the parergon that it
“comes against, beside, and in addition to the ergon, the work done, the fact, the work, but it
does not fall to one side, it touches and cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside.
Neither simply outside nor simply inside" (54).
Walker’s show played outward; both the objects and their frames seemed to eat their way
toward expansion. Perhaps the milieu ingests similarly. The show metabolized its surroundings
beginning with the construction walls built around street signs so that the cars could no longer
see the stop sign, the housing that was eating its way upward, and dirty Williamsburg spiffed up
and still heaving with industrial waste but nonetheless frontier for Brooklyn gentrification during
the Giuliani era, when the aim was to “clean up the city.” The milieu also seemed to cling to a
certain kind of authenticity from the dirt-poor roots of this neighborhood, requiring, on the
fringes, some grime in the form of warehouses and graffiti to ensure the area’s appeal. As the
Domino Sugar refinery exited the scene, coming undone along the riverfront, that place of labor
for refinement became the eroding detachment that hinged Kara Walker’s show.
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The parergon is all materiality. Like wood framing the painting, its surface stretches
around the artwork and when it behaves, its form is, if you will, a subtlety.
The walls of the Domino Sugar Refinery dripped molasses, lifting a scent up that filtered
out the doors toward the street. How many bugs were lured there, with its walls ornamented in
byproduct? How much extermination was needed for this space to hold sugarcoated sculpture?
There were poison warnings on the outside wall next to Walker’s title. Was this wall where the
frame began, with the title facing out? The white-sugarcoated sphinx seemed to grow in
proportion to the story that she attempted to contain but for which she could not grow big enough
(the refinery still has its ceiling). Excess protruded, first with the subtitle that tried to say it all in
one breath: “The Marvelous Sugar Baby, an Homage to the unpaid and overworked Artisans
who have refined our Sweet tastes from the cane fields to the Kitchens of the New World on the
Occasion of the demolition of the Domino Sugar Refining Plant.” I think trying to read this out
loud might yield a desire to keep speaking past the line—a kind of voicing the excess of the
unfinished history this piece steps down into; or the excess of refinement that multiplies as sugar
gets less raw, more pure, maybe more clean in its whiteness, maybe less dirty. The subtitle that
continues is a way of speaking in relief, an attempt to encompass what has not been sculpted—or
what has been left.
Derrida says of Kant that “he admits the lacks, the lacunary character of the work” (42).
The lacuna, in architecture, is related to the coffer: the recessed panel in the ceiling. If Kant’s
architectonics perform his theorizing with him, they also possess an inherent lack, a cavity in the
protective ceiling. Like the iron-rich clay the geophagist craves to supplement an iron-lack, the
parergon, as Kant situates it, supplements the work for what it does not possess. Derrida explains
that “this lack would be constitutive of the very unity of the ergon. Without this lack, the ergon
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would have no need of a parergon. The ergon's lack is the lack of a parergon, of the garment or
the column which nevertheless remains exterior to it" (60).
Kara Walker’s work makes of the literal externality (molasses that drips on the walls) the
frame for the representational work, so that the previous residue necessary for production is
enfolded into the aesthetic object as parergon. This return of the residue is a temporal
configuration. The material externality that arises from the refinement of the sugar is made
ground for the production of Walker’s white sugar sphinx. The residual of the material necessary
for the ergon is then ground for that art object’s figuration. It is both spectral and material, made
into ornament upon the figures of children cloaked in molasses. The sticky substance also forms
the internal frame: the separation between the sphinx and her attendants. The residual saccharine
minerality looms from the ceiling, like the creviced lacuna, like, perhaps, the spectral threat of
bodily deterioration in the movements between sugarcane field and kitchen. If “Framing always
supports and contains that which, by itself, collapses forthwith,” this residue is refurbished
necessarily (Derrida 78-9).
The disruptive parergon extends too far, it interrupts the art object with excessive
material, not simply making up for the lack but overburdening, filling up too much so that it
begins to conceal. The beautiful cannot be discerned amongst the riff-raff. One way the parergon
exceeds its porous bounds is if it “does not itself consist in beautiful form, and if it is used as a
golden frame is used, merely to recommend the painting by its charm, it is then called finery and
injures genuine beauty” (Kant 1.1.3.14). Such a seduction, as in the gilded frame, transforms the
parergon into intrusive ornament.
But what happens at the site of this intrusion? What of the intrusion that swells into the
realm of the ugly? Aside from molasses, sugar refining produces sugarcane press mud that settles
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to the bottom, black, and gets burned off in refineries in plumes of black smoke. In Walker’s
show, laboring children exhumed from molds, cast in resin and hard candy, stood around the
Domino Refinery, dripping molasses puddles around them in a deep black. The children
appeared to be melting as visitors stepped into the drip and then imprinted the ground with
molasses shoe marks. Too much material of the frame draped over their figures, the children
dragged light through their sticky bodies. Two broke on the way to Williamsburg, the security
guard told me “they are the fallen ones.” Their remnants had been tossed with white sugar into
the resin baskets that were settled atop the other children’s backs. The children were excessively
ornamented with the literal grime of the walls, ornamented by the molasses that, as part of the
sugar trade, is packaged and sold down South where it provides the minerals, like the iron that
the geophagist so often lacks, of which white sugar has been cleaned. Or, earlier, sold back to
Europeans to make rum in exchange for slaves.
For Kant, genuine beauty is experienced through the abeyance of concepts, through the
viewer’s disinterested pleasure. In the extended moment of intuition, the subject is concerned
with purposiveness without purpose, and it is from this experience that Kant can explain
universals and eventually, morality. The judgment of beauty becomes configured for Kant as
common sense: a universally valid judgment that finds pleasure in form and not in material or
concepts. This judgment is “therefore pure, only so far as no merely empirical satisfaction is
mingled with its determining ground” (1.1.3.14). Unlike the frame, the subject who pauses to
look is entirely detached so that purity involves expunging that which crops up, mingles, or
lingers.
Kant’s purity has no place in “A Subtlety.” But there was an excess of white. Draped in
purified re-finery, figured against black ground of molasses and the attendants it ornaments, the

68

sphinx was an exaggerated white with Black features. The sphinx was, like her attendants,
melting. But differently. The crevices of her body enfolded the excess leak while her chin had a
stalactite drip. She had forgotten to wipe her feet and they collected crystallized bunches. Her
excess was in excess of itself: a great big failure of whiteness to stick to its body. The
containment of the sphinx's frame within the refinery’s confines mimicked the fantasy of purity
that not only never existed but that wouldn’t even look good.
Like an unwanted accretion, Kant says emotion, like material, pours out through the
ornament, perhaps blotching out the beautiful as it bombards the scene. The ornamental is thus
the wall behind which the possibility of beauty hides. But, as with the gilded frame, the excess
material detracts and this beauty cannot be sensed. What Kant’s beautiful is scared to face is all
the material ground it requires. Purity, as he understands it, is paid for by others and this payment
is not only excessive, it holds a great deal of emotion too.
The production of refined sugar is excessive. Walker couldn’t contain it; she could only
show how it is uncontainable through her big attempt. But she could also make it simple, as she
did by paring down her title. One way to think about institutionalized slavery that created
systems of massive sugar production in the Caribbean, as well as the Deep South, is that it
developed an intricate system of brutal trade across the Atlantic in order for there to be pudding
to eat after the meal in England. This is an oversimplification but perhaps a necessary one. As
more sugarcane ate through more land, sucked up water, took down entire Native populations,
hauled in six million enslaved West Africans to work, and shifted the course of history, more and
more regular people in Europe sipped a sweet something in the tea they got from the East Indies.
Walker's title extends in the way the effects of the sugar trade did, and continue to do. But it's
also simple, like the subtle difference in taste the sugar in the tea can make.
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There is a way to perform depletion gilding by etching the surface of alloys with salt or
acid so that everything but the gold can be removed from the top. This process makes the metal
appear pure, which convinced many colonists in the Americas to believe they were accumulating
great wealth (Grimwade 17). Depletion gilding is a resistant ornamentation; one that perhaps
provides some relief.
Walker brought the ornament in, making brown molasses that ornaments and also
performs a labor for “A Subtlety.” Walker’s was, by definition, site specific work but it was also
gross work. The place was stained with byproduct (do you think the East River ever tasted sweet
with this?), then-mayor Bloomberg gave the developers a sweet deal; Walker’s show was a
hiccup between the breath of capital as it moved from production (factory) to consumption
(creative economy condos). The ornament, historically the feminized and racialized extra that
plays with debased fancies and remains in the subordinate realm of the pleasant, was, for Walker,
the economic externality, the byproduct of the capitalist process. The byproduct—as an everyday
sullying of the factory walls—adorned the piece. Here, art became contingent upon the dirty,
sweet ornament of molasses. Instead of gold excess, here was the excess that necessarily lingers
and stretches into dirty as it moves toward the art object.
From the milieu, parergon, and ergon, Fred Moten extrapolates a fourth space, arguing
“that the milieu (the external world into which one would or must withdraw) is a ground, as well.
So that the parergon could be said to be a figure that stands out from three grounds: milieu,
object, first figure. And to the extent that the parergon has catalytic effects, it reproduces the
milieu as figure. The material figures, re/con/figures, the milieu” (Moten 249). It seems, though,
that the old parergon that Moten now calls the first figure shares a bit of its material out to the
new parergon that becomes the frame of capital flows that figure the whole scene. Just like the
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material that “disappears, buries itself, effaces itself, melts away at the moment it deploys its
greatest energy,” Moten’s parergon prefers to hide (Derrida 61).
Walker called the children the sphinx’s attendants, but who else was doing this dirty
work of ornamentation? Was it the molasses, the excess that sticks? The bugs that followed
sticky sweetness? The East River as merely conduit? The skywriting above it, polluting aerial
milieu for the expectation of the wedding? The dirty money of the sugar trade, New York real
estate and the art commodity? The migration of human bodies in service to dirty money’s
demands? The proliferation of selfies taken next to the sugar sculpture? The fired-up
conversations about this public art, gobbled by the internet? 12
Hannah Landecker looks at how the gobbling body gets reconfigured in the cultural and
scientific imaginary that shifts from an industrial (factory) to a postindustrial (condo) moment.
She shows how understandings of metabolism shift from an industrial model, where the body is
seen as a mechanistic factory coordinating simple input and output of environmental elements, to
a postindustrial model, where the body becomes a “regulatory zone” that is constituted, on the
molecular level, by the environment (Landecker, “Postindustrial” 496). As such, material
ingested into the body as signal becomes “the hinge between the inside and outside” (Landecker,
“Postindustrial” 514). In other words, that which is ingested, as hinge, acts as the parergon that
links the body to the milieu, revealing the ways in which “life becomes defined as immersion” in
which the subject “is one that is always exposed” (Landecker, “Food is Licking” 24). The milieu,

While Walker’s piece was up, selfies proliferated on the internet of spectators posing with the giant sugar
sculpture in sexualized ways. There was also a website (sugarselfie.us), since taken down, that allowed users to
superimpose photos of themselves onto the installation. Disgusted as many were of the ways viewers happily put
themselves into a space that attempted to visualize the violence of the sugar trade, the images also perfectly
encapsulate the frivolity of sugar consumption that requires a casting of its production into the background. The
selfies show the continuity between past and present of the histories Walker displays, which is horrific and also the
point.
12
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doled out and delivered through the mouth, doesn’t merely accumulate in the body, it
reconfigures the body, signaling changes on a molecular level.
What happens when the spectator gobbles up the scene, photographing herself next to the
sculptures, clipping out a bit of the milieu and making a new object for contemplation? What of
industrial particulate left over from a real factory and replicated in these sugar-figures that settles
in the nasal canal for a while? What happens when the ergon is metabolized by the spectator,
extending its dirty towards the skin and entering the body, acting as signal for a new
configuration? Encountering these dripping children involved, not simply gazing toward the
object, but also becoming sullied, inside and out, in byproduct; or, seeing that it was already on
us spectators as we imprinted the expanding scene. Molasses, like every byproduct, clots and
accumulates and is bound to settle unevenly along socio-historical lines that make and remake
humans as they metabolize what is at hand. Walker made her viewer attend to this unevenness;
we cannot unstick ourselves, but we can begin to see to what it is we are stuck that keeps
remaking us, as it gets drawn in from the milieu.

Relief: Is it Dirty?
We’ve been growing sunflowers in the backyard because they lift the lead out of the soil.
Out of the ground, the sunflowers will bloom this summer and their stalks will suck up the lead,
just as clay does. If this ground, this soil, is the parergon which both limits and makes possible
the ergon, sunflower, then this frame does what it always does, seeping its materiality into the
aesthetic object while that object makes of the soil a ground from which we take notice of the
object as figure. But the little backyard we step into, from the house, to the outside, frames the
soil as figure differentiated from someone else’s soil or house. As the subject who will encounter
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the sunflowers in bloom once again this August, I dirty myself with the parergon as I plant the
little seeds with an expectation. In the process of planting, which precedes the aesthetic
experience, I get the soil on my hands, where it becomes abundant ornament to my own figure.
After the sunflowers have bloomed, I will, like last year, pull them out and throw them in
the trash so the lead will go to the landfill and become a problem elsewhere, probably Virginia or
upstate New York next to where my mother milks her cows. Mine is an aesthetic experience that
puts its residual out of sight. If Fred Moten formulates the parergon as what also lies outside the
milieu, then that material frame is that which allows for the slow violence of contamination to
occur outside the subjective experience, outside the garden. The frame is somewhere else,
displacing risk with it. My tomatoes will be lead-free.

Pleasure in the Dirt and the Dirty
Derrida asks his reader to think on pleasure a moment longer: we like to argue against the
Kantian formulation, but what are we also missing? Derrida claims that “pleasure presupposes
not the disappearance pure and simple, but the neutralization, not simply the putting to death but
the mise en crypte [entombement/encrypting] of all that exists in as much as it exists” (46).
Accounting for the elsewhere to which refuse must be evacuated in the purifying process, this
tomb creates a ceiling for the lacuna that is both concept and materiality, a kind of whispered
hiding place for that which everyone must pretend does not seep back.
The Anthropocene marks the time in which the human has become geological agent
instead of merely part of the natural world from which post-Enlightenment thinking has so
successfully extricated many humans. If the concept of nature as independent agent is dead, what
coffin is this concept in? Has it been put to death or entombed? One ornament on the coffin of

73

the always already abstracted nature might be dirt (another water). Looking at the (always
already) specter of the natural world, the stuff that seems untouched (perhaps in a moment of
disinterestedness or willed ignorance, perhaps in plain ignorance), the ocular limit might be the
ground that is sometimes dirt. The limit of the appetite, however, might stretch differently.
Insofar as the aesthetic experience is purely subjective, it creates a different sort of
subjectivity that is “an inexistent or anexistent subjectivity arising on the crypt of the empirical
subject and its whole world” (Derrida 46). Like the parergon that hinges the lack in the ergon,
this adjacent subjectivity leaves some room to lie next to the tomb of that which has been too
loaded, that which has required a burial to mark an absent existence. If "everything will flower at
the edge of a deconstructed tomb,” then the art object that provides a space for pleasure in the
spread of materiality is perhaps in response to the failed purity of both the subject and the object
(Derrida 82). Or, if desire for that earth that ought not to be consumed insinuates a lack, perhaps
that lack is recognition of the smear of the anthropogenic. If Marx turns to soil to talk about
metabolism and finds a rift between the human and the natural realm that indicates an entropy
induced by capitalism instead of the ongoing metabolic process of entropy’s deferral, the
Anthropocene scales up this rift, not only to a global level, but towards an intellectual limit that
finds itself without an exterior (Foster et al. 45). The frame of the Anthropocene, which destroys
the milieu and eliminates an elsewhere from which the human might be freed, perhaps leads to
some desires for the material here.
If appetite for the material is pleasurable, it is also melancholic. The ingestion of dirt and
the dirty in a time of ecological destruction is an act of mourning as it is also stubbornly declared
pleasurable. What Alexander, Oyeyemi, Pratt and Walker show is that loss is always already
ingested in these fairly open things we call our bodies. In response, the aesthetic realm offers a
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way to sense, and think, forms of encounter with the out-there as it becomes an encounter with
the thing already metabolized. The theory of the frame has perhaps done its job of limiting these
readings. But ornamenting them is a desire for the elsewhere to get noticed as something already
here, already ingested as sometimes a contamination that need not always be dirty but often is.
Or rather, a dirtying that need not always be toxic, but often is. The clean and the pure not only
like to create toxicity (clean energy like natural gas and coal newly extracted, cleaning agents
with bleach, soap with phosphates, everything at the car wash, the list goes on) but they are
figured through the production of the elsewhere as necessary dumping ground. The dirty, on the
other hand, envelops its ground and seems to share more intimately with the subject who gives it
a second touch, a taste, a breath, or even a shoe mark on the dirtied refinery floor.
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CHAPTER TWO: WATER

PART ONE

The Wet Fingers of Western New York
The place where I grew up used to be sea but the water made its way, 300,000 million
years ago, into the sky and never came back to the same spot. The evaporation left big salt bellies
in the ground, close enough to the surface to be mined. Since the early nineteenth century,
workers have gone into the salt caverns and sucked up the mineral by adding water to it and then
drying out the salt in big ponds above ground. The salt caves of the Finger Lakes have thus
become increasingly hollow. I’ve never seen them but I think Minnie Bruce Pratt, or a great
many others, might write a nice poem about the yonic caverns. 13 Everybody in New York has at
least once driven on an iceless road sprinkled with this salt from those sea remains. After more
than half a century of mining, the caverns started to look like good places for storage. So, for the
past fifty years, oil and gas companies have stored explosive gasses, like methane and butane, in
the emptied salt caverns. Now, fracked gas from nearby Pennsylvania is sent to upstate New
York to sit, back underground, and wait for prices to rise.
In his book on dirt, the arborist and writer William Bryant Logan writes that “we and the
plants and the microbes are all containers for a fluid that is very like the sea… all of them share a
need for a very narrow spectrum of salt concentrations, derived from the first weathering of
rocks in the Archean Era” (11). One of humans’ special salt components is iron, which helps us
use more oxygen from the air and which may or may not be from the red dirt we eat. Whichever

13

For Pratt’s yonic caverns, see pages 56-60.

76

combination of salty liquid we creatures envelop in order to metabolize our surroundings, we are
all using ancient sea stuff to relate to our environment in a way that keeps us alive. Maybe this is
why the salt caverns that are below the ground in the place I grew up seem like emptied veins or
wombs drained of amniotic fluid but undeflated. Or, because nature is so often referred to as a
raped woman, maybe it’s better to relate the salt caverns to Carl Jung’s Great Mother archetype
with her concave form. She is the model for all holes, and when she behaves, she offers a breast
for nourishment. But when she is bad, she devours. Or, when she is bad, she lets her leak show;
leak of shed cave, bled-out sea veins, or the toxic seep of frack product. She is a container who
can’t hold itself together.

Scales
Human bodies have never experienced as much carbon in the atmosphere as they do
today. But this planet has. The disaster of environment in which everybody here currently lives,
is also a problem about time. The concept of the Anthropocene names all humans geologic
agents, placing them on a timescale they didn’t used to occupy, one that will surely outlast them.
Whether marking the beginning of the new geologic era with the Industrial Revolution or the
dawn of agriculture, the concept of the Anthropocene evokes a sense of human past that irrupts
randomly, causing cherry blossoms to bloom in November or insects to emerge earlier than usual
in the spring only to find there is no food. The carbon that causes climate change today is not
what is currently being emitted; there is a lag time of a few decades. I am seeing the results of
the greenhouse gasses produced around when I was born. The irruptive and haunting past is
paired with a future that is often described as total annihilation—it no longer unfolds into
perpetuity. Climate catastrophe invites anachronism. The Anthropocene names a collective “we”
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who must think on the geologic scale over which that “we” has been assigned agency. But
humans don’t think themselves onto such a scale. Perhaps anachronism, time out of place, helps
humans imagine themselves into the out-of-scale conundrum of too much assigned agency and
not a lot of experienced agency.
In 2006, a group of marine biologists led by Boris Worm published an article that
predicted the population collapse of every saltwater fish humans eat by 2048. 14 The New York
Times and others picked up the news, revealing increasing evidence that the sixth mass
extinction has not forgotten the sea. The problem with predictive statements about all the world’s
oceans is a problem of scale. Scientists argue about Worm’s numbers, but the fundamental issue
is that the oceans are too vast and complex for easy statements that declare an end. The
additional conundrum is that massive loss of biodiversity that results in extinction is caused by
numerous drivers; the cause and effect arguments that scientists and policy makers tend to want
doesn’t add up within the de-territorialized region of marine space, or maybe anywhere.
Scientists witness the sea soaking up more and more carbon, making it acidic enough that
mollusks and others can’t maintain their shells in the deep; overfishing creates population
collapse up and down the food chain; run-off and raw sewage produce dead zones; garbage and
toxic spills poison all life; warming waters lower dissolved oxygen levels so that fish are less and
less able to breathe. But scientists do not yet have the theoretical tools to consider what marine
scientist Jeremy B.C. Jackson calls the “huge numbers of species and different kinds of
perturbations involved, the nonlinear dynamics of interactions among them” (11458).
There is, of course, a framework for thinking in these terms, but it is perhaps not
sufficiently scientific. The title of Jackson’s article on the matter, “Ecological Extinction and

While Worm’s projections have been widely debated, the exponential rate of marine extinction has been
confirmed since 2006. See Comte and and Olden; Payne, et al; and Rothman.
14
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Evolution in the Brave New Ocean,” can’t help but reference it. The dystopic refrain underlying
so much of the research of the end (times) must fall back on familiar storylines: the fish have run
out, Jesus has stopped delivering, the end has come. The U.S. and others continue to add more
fishing restrictions on endangered species such as cod, but population collapse extends beyond
what humans consume, beyond the list of what is missing in the grocery store. 15
Reading about the end of the ocean (whatever that means), I keep a list of nice words
scientists tend to use: hypoxia, eutrophication, abundance, pristine, baseline. I feel like Juliana
Spahr’s “they” in her poem, “Unnamed Dragonfly Species” who trawl the internet for whatever
they can find on melting glaciers, taking notes while hunched in the dark with the gross
computer screen light getting on their faces. I’m accumulating data—putting it in front of me
without knowing what to do with it, forgetting it, wondering how to hold the weight of it,
remembering it again. Research bears excessive results that accumulate daily, reaching beyond
data into the material realm (example: turn on a Google alert for marine extinction, the results for
which might be kept in undersea data storage units developed by Microsoft). The desire to feel
such excess, to make a way for mourning, seems an impossible collapsing of scales into one
small container for loss.
This chapter will try to contain something of how to approach a death humans can’t
always witness but keep eating, directly or indirectly. Sometimes the sentences will try to catch
up with the material by refusing to end. I’ve decided to leave them that way because maybe the
ocean’s erosion of proper structure is a good thing. This chapter is a leaky container that jumps

15

As I write this, many of the restrictions to which I refer are being undone by the Trump administration, including
protections for mammals and endangered fish on both coasts (specifically the withdrawal of RIN: 0648-BG23 and
RIN: 0648-BF96; the revocation of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Director's Order No. 219; the passage of H.R.
200 in the House; the rejection of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s recommendation to limit
flounder harvest; and Trump’s order to open deep sea national monuments Pacific Remote Islands Marine National
Monument and Northeast Canyons and Seamounts National Monument to commercial activity including fishing and
mining).
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across scales and notices how everything eats up in scale: I feed my cat any brand of wet food
and it most likely contains catch from a slave ship in the South China Sea (Urbina). Beyoncé
releases a song lauded for its celebratory portrayal of Black southern culture and address of
racialized police brutality in which she says “When he fuck me good, I take his ass to Red
Lobster” and the next day sales increase across the country at the chain restaurant, increasing
demand for shrimp from factories where a low to no-wage labor force farms in countries like
China, Indonesia and India on coasts that used to be mangrove forests (Riley). The cascading
violence upon humans and marine life that takes place at sea is both far away and all over the
place.
The irreversible death of entire species that currently occurs in the oceans is like Timothy
Morton’s hyperobject: the thing (like every thing) humans cannot think or see in its entirety as it
spills everywhere. Climate change is a good example. It is perhaps too large to conceptualize, yet
its thinkably-sized pieces are ubiquitous. Extinction in the ocean, like the hyperobject, does not
occupy a singular space, the concept and its real particulars land in all the restaurants nearby, the
brackish river down the street, the ocean a little farther—they extend outward and then return in
small and large bits.
The piecemeal ways extinction irrupts, and the anachronisms ecological disaster makes
apparent, present an occasion for different kinds of experiments in interacting with what is
available to read and look at. Sometimes things sit next to each other that used to feel far apart.
What follows in this chapter is a series of thoughts related to material I find difficult. Because
extinction plagues me and also disappears, I address it here through various paths that, while
opening up ways of thinking, also foreclose the possibility of getting out. The following
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explorations that open and close produce very little relief. There is no emancipatory poet in the
following pages. Maybe there is something else.

Breath in the Upper World
When I saw Leviathan, the documentary film from Lucien Castaing-Taylor, Véréna
Paravel and the Sensory Ethnography Lab at Harvard, I noticed that a stingray’s face is not
unlike a cartoon character, only a bit more sadistic. Its mouth widening, looking for a different
medium through which to pull oxygen, the uncanny sweetness of this beast whose eyes and
mouth break the surface of its flat body is, like the film, a little bit horrific and a little bit
familiar. I saw Leviathan at the 2014 Whitney Biennial, two years after the film was released.
Viewers were meant to sit near to the ground on bean bag chairs that were dispersed around the
gallery, a position from which the eighty seven minutes of dizzying close-ups seemed all the
more immersive. Most people didn’t stay around to see the entire thing. A long film like that at a
busy Biennal probably has trouble getting attention. Maybe that’s part of the point, too.
Leviathan, with its big name, refuses to add up to much more than the accumulation of raw
footage. Any associations with its title, or the coast of New Bedford, Massachusetts where it was
filmed, are the viewer’s own to carry.
In Gustave Doré’s 1866 engraving entitled “Destruction of the Leviathan,” the great beast
resembles a kind of Moses figure as it parts the sea. But the surfacing of its coiled body is
momentary, waves are poised to envelop as the sword makes its way down from the heavens.
With its scales rippling like the water that surrounds it, the monster is perhaps destructible
because of its compromised position above the deep. According to the Book of Job, “Upon earth
there is not his like, who is made without fear” so that as Satan’s oceanic foil, through whose
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mouth the damned are sent to hell, the Leviathan seems to help secure the sea as space of
unthinkable power (King James Bible, Job 41:33). The ocean remains segregated from land. and
perhaps the powerful beast finally meets its match when it is above its watery surround. In 1851,
not long before Doré’s engraving was published in an illustrated Bible, Herman Melville
published Moby Dick, his fictionalization of the sinking of the whaler Essex. In it, he writes
“How obvious is it, too, that this necessity for the whale’s rising exposes him to all the fatal
hazards of the chase. For not by hook or by net could this vast leviathan be caught, when sailing
a thousand fathoms beneath the sunlight. Not so much thy skill, then, O hunter, as the great
necessities that strike the victory to thee!” (321). The leviathan is vulnerable to hunters because
its quest for breath sends it on “periodical visits to the upper world” (Melville 320).
In Genesis, the Earth takes form because God first separates heaven from Earth, or makes
a horizon. Before that, “the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of
the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be
light: and there was light” (King James Bible, Genesis 1: 2-3). The surface of the deep might
have been penetrated by the spirit, but, like humans, the spirit cannot seem to penetrate
completely; it speaks instead to the face of the unknown. To the ocean, humans cast what is
easiest kept at a distance so that it is not merely a space to move through but a space where every
day garbage accumulates, where the holocaust of the Transatlantic Slave Trade had the highest
death toll, where the shipping containers that make our global trade networks possible coast on
barges along the top of the unknown. As if also a giant ship, the Leviathan leaves behind him “a
glistening wake; one would think the deep had white hair” (King James Bible, Job 41:32). The
Leviathan, then, like the spirit in Genesis, is able to cast light along the dark of the deep so that
the “hair” of the ocean is made white. But unlike the spirit of Genesis, this beast’s power reads as
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destructive. As force that can help explain the loss of human life at sea, the Leviathan perhaps
continues to represent, as well as haunt, the container for the inexplicable.
Thomas Hobbes, the first social contract theorist, used the Biblical figure of the
Leviathan to help illustrate how, under a social contract and ruled by an absolute sovereign,
people could emerge from the “Warre Of Every One Against Every One” in the state of nature
(chapter XIII, “Out of Civil States”). As he prepared Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power
of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, Hobbes discussed his ideas with the artist
Abraham Bosse, who prepared an etching for the frontpiece of the book, which was published in
1651. With Hobbes’ help, Bosse produced an image of the Hobbesian ideal government as a
human figure who appears emerging from the distant hills that roll as waves might. Atop the
image is the Job passage that claims nothing on earth is as powerful as the Leviathan, making it
seem otherworldly, the power of the social contract state under an absolute sovereign. Hobbes’
reference uses the monster of the sea to represent ultimate power on land, giving a sense of the
ways in which terrestrial society might require its oceanic other in order to emerge from the
nasty, anarchic state of nature. According to Hobbes, the social contract creates the foundation
for “that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS),
which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose
protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as
giving life and motion to the whole body” (“Introduction”). The state, embodied by the oceanic
figure that is reformulated by Bosse with three hundred human figures facing inward, comes to
encompass the citizenry and its territory below.
These uses of the figure of the Leviathan both flood Castaing-Taylor and Paravel’s film
and are kept at bay by, aside from the title and a passage from Job, refusing to refer to them.
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Without narrative, dialogue or overt reference to its title, the film gathers GoPro documentation
of a fishing boat that starts out, like Melville’s big whale story, in New Bedford. In the film, the
monstrous is encountered through the soundscape, and the bloody close-ups of everyday life on a
fishing boat. This film smothers the spectator as the camera is thrown into tubs of fish that are at
first so dark that the viewer can’t get oriented until hands come to pluck out the catch. The view
is chopped-up and a bit impenetrable, even annoying. The film’s darkness is part of how it
produces fear, and how it can create a sense of unknowing while seeing. Leviathan offers access
to a view of life on the boat, but only as mediated through textured darkness, close ups with no
context, and cameras that refuse to angle themselves toward good light.
Every fisherman in the film is wearing a white tee shirt that glows against the black
background. This white interrupts and aligns itself with the boat’s wake that, like the Leviathan,
makes of the deep a white-haired figure. The glowing white creates a parallel between the
fishermen’s bodies and the ocean, emphasizing the relationship between the laboring human and
the sea without making any prescriptive claims about how to consider these connections. Human
bodies are also sometimes twinned with those of the fish. The fleshiness of the film complicates
the notion that a fisherman might be mastering nature as he pulls up a last bite. Like Moby Dick,
Leviathan is so focused on the fisherman also being a vulnerable body that breathes; it can
confuse the body of the fish with the fish’s pursuer. The film does this most often through near
misrecognition. In many shots, the red rain jackets of the fishermen glisten with water, their
faces hidden from view, making them all red form like the fish pulled onto the boat’s deck. A
close-up of a man’s face, for example, lasts for minutes in which, besides the endless rocking of
the boat, the only movement is the sweat that drips down his face. His eyes focus in a near trance
upon the view that is foreclosed to the spectator. His skin is porous, red and fleshy. The drawn
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out encounter with him dehumanizes his face in ways that align him with the fish who, in other
scenes, lie near to the camera with their eyes wide open and their bodies shedding the residual
water of their home.
As one man moves through the bounty that a net has just released on deck, he chooses the
clams and discards the rest toward a chute that will send that which has been refused back to its
source. The sound of shells clinking against each other resembles the jingle of coins being
knocked together. Along with the mollusks, there is a Seagram’s Ginger Ale can and a crab
rising from the pile to walk around a bit. The shot is brief. But the recognizable human refuse
amidst the other bycatch threatens to take the viewer out of the sensory experience the film has
so forcefully imposed. The recognizable logo of the old can invites, momentarily, ideas from
outside the film. The viewer might remember that the ocean is a dumping ground; or that it is a
site of anthropogenic extinction greater than that on land. But the film moves quickly, and if the
viewer is going to follow, thoughts of garbage and mass death need to be dispelled in order to
watch the individualized slaughter that follows the catch. The camera moves against the outside
of the boat, and toward it is flying all that was just released from deck. Crowded out by this
onrush, thoughts must be sparse in this film. Enough films have been made to inspire rage and
what has this achieved? We are here to sense.
One way to think about this film might be to ask about the ethics of its method for
staring—of the voyeurism in which it implicates the viewer, of inspiring nausea in the moving
boat with fish blood dripping against the rusted metal of everything—yet never offering a story
to accompany the sensory experience. Ethics are perhaps too multiple, but one thing is true: the
film is all about class. Watching this at the Whitney Biennial, I was very aware that this film
came out of a project at Harvard, which means a lot and also not that much. The film doesn’t
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present any kind of ethical case, but looking at the fragmented documentation of that dying
industry off the coast of New England, is a class situation. And talking about marine destruction
in which those fishermen participate for an income is also a class situation. Yes, it’s an industry
problem and a problem of consumption and a problem of ideology, but the site of extraction is
still the focus and as long as it is, working people are made to look, yet again, like they are
misbehaving. But to take the blame off people who try to survive by netting a living from the
ocean by scaling up to the abstraction of big capitalist networks, is to also ignore Leviathan’s
focus: to produce sensation that is dizzyingly close up. The film can hold this contradiction
without prescribing a solution.
The many associations leak into the film and make me feel like an anxious eater of the
information it invites. But also, the film is a deep mediation that requires hyper-focus, initiating
an attachment to a series of micro-losses amidst this massive one; or maybe Leviathan is a place
to get stuck in its sensory mechanisms, which envelop.

PART TWO

Returns
Rachel Carson, the marine biologist who warned the world that DDT was creeping up the
food chain, begins her second book on the ocean, The Sea around Us, with a genesis. She writes
that out from “that great mother of life, the sea” come organisms who can persist without her (3).
Compared to the “all-providing, all-embracing mother sea,” Carson assumes “land must have
been bleak and hostile beyond the power of words to describe” (8). This terrestrial desolation,
devoid even of dirt, becomes a metaphor for existence beyond the mother. Unlike some animals,
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who returned to the sea after fifty or so million years on land, evolving into seals and other large
mammals, humans stay detached from our mother medium.
Each human life, Carson tells us, emulates the ancestral separation from sea, the fetus
developing in a “miniature ocean within his [sic] mother’s womb” where it grows gills and sheds
them for life on land (4). Humans are not the only creatures whose segregation from sea is
incomplete; there are many whose lifespans are microcosms of the evolutionary emergence onto
land. The ghost crab begins in water, and its larval stage, for Carson, “is the form in which all the
destiny of the race is symbolized, for it—a tiny creature alone in the sea—must obey whatever
instinct drives it shoreward, and must make a successful landing on the beach” (160). And
though the ghost crab makes its home in the dunes and takes over the beach at night doing its
ghostly hunting, Carson says it only “seems like a land animal” (157). It is, in fact, “not an airbreather; it carries with it a bit of the sea in the branchial chamber surrounding its gills, and at
intervals must visit the sea to replenish the water” (157-8). The ghost crab, unable to breathe
without its mother medium, has found a way to live outside of the sea but must venture to the
surf and wait for the waves to wash over its tiny body and help it breathe again. This, for Carson,
“is another, almost symbolic return” (158). Life on hostile land, for Carson, produces a nostalgia
for mother sea. She ends her allegory with the human coming to stand at the shore to look out
and back at the origin. The curiosity felt in this moment is “compounded with an unconscious
recognition of his [sic] lineage” and drives scientific investigation of that medium in which
humans cannot breathe (15).

*
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The 2006 article that predicts fishery collapse by 2048 defines collapse as a population
loss of ninety percent of the baseline abundance, where one hundred percent means extinction
(Worm et al 790). Scientists heavily debate how to determine the baseline abundance. Some
complain that statistics about ecosystems suffer from “shifting baseline syndrome,” in which
scientists compare today’s population levels to those that were already dwindling because of
human intervention; scientists are also, sometimes, not taking into account the fact that species
grow smaller and live shorter lives than before—so comparisons suffer. The trouble with the
baseline is that it simplifies life before humans. The baseline is calculated in relation to what
scientists call “pristine” population levels, that is, the estimated number of fish that existed
before human intervention. The calculation is, of course, also a calculation of how to return, like
the ghost crab or the human coming to pick up the severed umbilical cord that stretches out to
sea.

Obstructions
The Modernist poet Marianne Moore, because she wrote difficult poems about obscure
animals with thick shells, has been called “armored” (Hall 94). Of course it is men (Donald Hall,
Robert Lowell, Randall Jarrell, and others) who most often call Moore impenetrable, conflating
her with her subjects, particularly the ineffable ones like the pangolin, paper nautilus and
octopus. Like Margaret Wise Brown’s recurring cow jumping over the moon, Moore’s creatures
are delicately child-like, strangely eerie, and unapproachable—maybe mocking any attempt at
conformity. Moore’s armored characters are also sometimes people and oceans.
Her poem “A Grave” is well-known, though the poet Donald Hall and the literary scholar
Lynn Keller have both described the poem as uncharacteristic. Hall writes that “In the work of a
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poet of such typical reticence and restraint,” what he considers “overstatement bears
investigation” (qtd. in Fast 377). Keller, on the other hand, describes the poem as uninterested in
the “fixed moral order” she finds common in the rest of Moore’s work (qtd. in Fast 377). Perhaps
the sea demands an uncharacteristic approach, but I find Moore acting as she often does in her
poetry: making assertions through negation and showing the difficulty of observation through
contradiction, evasive syntax and the rejection of resolution. In “A Grave,” she describes the sea
as a vast, unknowable tomb. But before engaging with the macabre marine space, Moore’s
speaker must first address a man who stands in her way. The poem begins:
Man looking into the sea,
taking the view from those who have as much right to it as you have to yourself,
it is human nature to stand in the middle of a thing,
but you cannot stand in the middle of this;
the sea has nothing to give but a well excavated grave. (1-5)
Beginning with “Man looking into the sea,” Moore identifies the poetic process that is
initiated by man’s penetrative gaze on an outside object wherein that object is meant to reflect
back something interesting about himself, which is, needless to say, something about mankind in
general. Moore’s speaker is not that man. She is the one who, instead of addressing the sea, has
to address the person who is “taking the view from those who have as much right to it” as he
does. Of course, “taking the view” would also connote that the man is examining his
surroundings. But because the speaker is blocked, the man’s taking in the view is also a taking
away of the view from others. The poem can’t be an address to the sea, or a description of it,
because the speaker has to first get the man out of the way; has to begin by addressing an
obstruction. Moore might show her reader that for every man writing a poem about the sea, there
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is a woman behind him who cannot access the view because his body is in the way. But she does
not intend to supplant that man. She remains on the edges and brings every other observer with
her.
Moore’s poem had to contend with a long tradition of poetic reflection on the sea as a site
of mourning—from the Ancient Greek epics to more recent influences such as Matthew Arnold’s
“Dover Beach” and Edgar Allen Poe’s “The City in the Sea,” both of which she had surely read.
In 1915, one year before she began composing the poem that would become “A Grave,” T.S.
Eliot published “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” in Poetry. The speaker in Eliot’s poem
laments his aging body and mind and describes his position as a descent into the sea by
complaining: “I should have been a pair of ragged claws/Scuttling across the floors of silent
seas” (73-4). Moore probably liked his “ragged claws/scuttling” and “silent seas,” though I
imagine she would be uninterested in Eliot’s regretful metaphor.
In the 1990s, feminist critics, particularly Jenn Heuving, Bonnie Costello and Jeredith
Merrin, all wrote about Moore’s position as a woman in relation to literary tradition, including
the ways she influenced poets like Elizabeth Bishop. If, as Heuving argues in her book Omission
are not Accidents: Gender in the Art of Marianne Moore, Moore rejects the “masculine specular
economy” of the lyric tradition, in “A Grave” she does so first by marking man looking into the
sea as an obstruction, and then negating his efforts by asserting “you cannot stand in the middle
of this” (25). Merrin reads “A Grave” as Moore “revers[ing] a convention of Romantic poetry by
relegating Man (who becomes merely one of the ‘dropped things’ in her ocean) to the
characteristically feminine role of objectified and disempowered ‘other’” (162). If feminists of
the 1990s could find in Moore a promising resistance to patriarchy, contemporary ecocriticism
finds her useful for putting to her reader a set of ethical imperatives regarding the natural world.
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Randy Malamud says of Moore that she requires the reader to approach her poems the same way
we should approach animals: with an attentive, rigorous attention to detail (94). Josh A.
Weinstein argues that her poems are ecosystems that provide the reader with an ethical
imperative to approach the natural world with care (374). “A Grave,” for me, provides no
imperatives. Like many of her other poems, it confuses and contradicts. The careful reader can
follow along without deciding to stand in the middle of it. If the speaker is stopped and shows
how to keep thinking in the obstruction, she shows the reader how to do the same, which is a
pedagogical act but it is certainly not prescriptive. I feel I am being shown but one way of
identifying, and dwelling with, the impenetrable—including the poem itself. Or I am being
shown one way to find mournful pleasure in the victory-less attempt to approach.
My attempt to write about the expansive ocean and its accrual of death—both in the form
of extinction and digestion of anthropogenic waste product—is framed by “A Grave.” Moore’s
poem limits my reading of the ocean; it’s the frame I’ve given myself so that I will be able to
stop writing. The limits the poem imposes are obstructions I have placed in front of me at the
same time that I attempt to use Moore’s method for naming the obstruction and continuing to
write in the splayed directions that remain open in the vicinity of that obstruction. By choosing a
singular poem as frame—the doorway to various rooms of thought—I attempt to stay within the
confines of a singularity that unfolds its vastness, perhaps infinitely, when given patient
attention. A poem is not so different from a single spot on this earth that shows its history in its
sedimentation of ground. Poetry is only one singularity worth exploring, one I find particularly
pleasurable. It’s a form that helps consider what happens when a potentially inconsequential
thing like poetry becomes the frame for which one might consider the ocean. If capitalist flows
gobble up marine space in near-complete ways, what happens when a single poem is instead the
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vehicle for thinking around the oceanic? There are plenty of poems about the ocean. All of them
would be nice frames to think about the present state of things. I like Moore’s poem because its
many refusals seem to make it a particularly good place for reframing methods for approaching
the big sea.
Moore models the process of writing in the obstruction by naming what she cannot see
around, but also by working in the poetic form in particular ways. In a time when modernist
poets were breaking with convention: moving into free verse and attempting to get to the thing
itself through bare image unencumbered by what they considered Romantic excess, Moore was
busy writing in syllabics. Perhaps like many of her contemporaries, Moore was inspired by the
haiku form. But her syllabics are particular to her. She creates her own patterns in her syllabic
poems that she then follows carefully (Holley 182). Moore rejects a Japanese and English form
of counting syllables, while, unlike her contemporaries who embraced free verse, creating her
own forms that regiment her poetic output (Holley 188). The inaudible pattern reduces words to
bits—cuts into them in ways that sometimes make her break a line in the middle of a word. The
fractured word might be related to the Modernist obsession with fracture and crisis borne out of
WWI disorientation and death, but it is also is a cut into language that calls attention to the
practice of poetry as occurring in textual, rather than audible, terrain.
Moore’s early poems employed her syllabic structure, but by the twenties, she left that
form behind. A decade later, she returned to counting syllables; this time also incorporating what
had, in the meantime, become her technique of using quotes from varied sources in her poems.
The revision history of “A Grave” reflects this shift. The first version that Moore wrote, between
1916 and 1918, was entitled “A Graveyard in the Middle of the Sea.” It was in syllabic form, but
she never published it. By 1921, she had revised the poem and shifted to free verse. She also
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curtailed the title to “A Graveyard” for its publication in The Dial. She revised the poem only
slightly for her 1924 book Observations, where she further shortened the title to “A Grave.”
I am curious about the relation between the expressed obstacle in the poem and the
syllabic form as its own kind of obstacle. Does Moore need to shed her formal practices to meet
the obstacle of describing that which cannot be viewed because too much tradition is in the way?
“A Grave” does not mark her first move away from the syllabic form, so the ocean is not
exceptional in what might be the object of the poem cracking into Moore’s expectations for her
own form. Perhaps her own measuring, the counting of syllables that she did even in her own
reading practice is the obstacle around which she needed to maneuver in order to acquire the
precision she seeks in her poetry (Green 429). If Moore’s poetry can crack into the poetic
tradition, naming the man standing in the way, and find its own form as well as crack into the
assumption of ocean as knowable or specular, what must the poem retain? What regulation must
be imposed upon form in order to allow for all this cracking elsewhere? Whatever norms must be
retained, or invented, in order to throw other things into question, are also negotiable because
Moore found her way out of her form and into free verse in the revision process.
Moore revised many of her published poems, often shortening them in the process. Her
work of condensing shows an obsession with precision, but always with the rejection of
resolution. Moore revises toward a shorter and more determined way of describing the mediated
objects of her poetry, but never in the service of simplifying them. Bonnie Costello writes that
with Moore, “The experience of the poem is constant revision and ambiguity, suggesting that
human observation is never definitive” (56-57). If Moore’s revision is a compression that won’t
let go of the ambiguity of human perception, her revisions show how some things cannot be
reduced. The expansive view of the ocean, or the enormity of the marine in general, or the
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incomprehensibility of loss in that medium, does not compress into easily-understood bits. If
revision might be a method for finding one’s way around the vicinity of the obstacles of
confronting a so-called object, or a literary tradition, or the poetic form, the revision is also
stopped by that which cannot be reduced—which are sometimes syllables and sometimes facts
that need to be counted.
The way she makes visible the labor of reduction and its stubborn impossibility is
perhaps most obvious in her revision of “Poetry.” The poem was first published, with “A Grave,”
in her 1924 book Observations as a thirteen line poem. She lengthened the poem in her revision
for her Selected Poems that was published in 1935 (the version remained the same in her 1951
Collected Poems). But for the 1967 publication of her Complete Poems, Moore shortened the
poem to four lines and relegated the rest of the previous version to the notes. The poem,
articulating her oppositional relationship to poetry, shows in its revision history the ways that the
desire to compress does not lead to an efficient cutting of material; some irreducible parts are just
relegated to the back.
All the versions of “Poetry” begin with her famous first line: “I too, dislike it” (1).
Bonnie Costello’s reading of the poem focuses on the ambiguity she finds typical of Moore’s
style: after the first line, the poet “immediately begins to retract” from her statement by listing
what a reader can find when exploring poetry (19). Moore’s ambiguity is also paired with the
kind of negation that is found throughout her work. Instead of hating poetry, she dislikes it.
Typically oppositional, Moore writes that she seeks the “genuine” amidst the “insolence and
triviality” of the “half poets,” as she, especially in the shortened last version, starves the reader of
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any immediate satisfaction in finding the genuine (34, 26, 21)16 Moore’s “Poetry” is like much of
her work in that it attempts to represent a thing, but can never get at it fully, nor can it reach a
single conclusion, so the poem is necessarily a container for negation and opposition—for
Moore’s wrestling with her subject, one that is sometimes restrained by particular forms and
sometimes not.
Her desire for precision—what Elizabeth W. Joyce calls “Moore’s abstraction through
particulars”—produces an obscurity through specificity (34). In other words, her poems are
spaces to convey with precision, and in the most condensed form, the process of interrogating the
world with sincerity in a way that produces complexity rather than simplified knowledge.
“Poetry” embodies this approach quite fully. The result is the unintelligibility that she seems to
admonish in “Poetry” but celebrates in her review of Wallace Stevens’ Ideas of Order, where she
writes “poetry is an unintelligible, unmistakable vernacular like the language of animals” (Moore
Collected Prose 329). Again, Moore makes use of the negative to show the importance of that
which cannot be understood but to which one must listen.
Though Moore is read as the armored poet, I think she might be the opposite. Aware that
curiosity is also porosity, she creates a measured and cautious approach to her subjects. So
interested she is in finding out, that she is willing to risk such an approach—documenting the
process as a kind of battle which she marks through series of negations. She too dislikes the
process, but it is a “raw” and “genuine” one (“Poetry” 31, 34). She might not be able to “stand in
the middle” of her subject, but she can wrestle with her subject from the edges—which is a very
womanly position that she reminds man he also occupies.

For further explorations of Moore’s oppositional poetic stance, see: Bonnie Costello, Marianne Moore: Imaginary
Possessions; Christanne Miller, Marianne Moore: Questions of Authority; Linda Leavell, Prismatic Color:
Marianne Moore and the Visual Arts; and Taffy Martin, Marianne Moore, Subversive Modernist.
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*
Like Moore’s speaker, I am also prevented from an aesthetic experience. I am stopped,
not in the first lines, but in the title. For me, “A Grave” lets in a flood of apocalyptic warnings of
a worn-out oceanic abundance. I am stopped at extinction and need to turn away only slightly,
and let in all the associations to read the poem. It is 2017 as I revise my understanding of what it
means to dwell in the moment of being stopped. I am able to go to the sea and not think about
extinction, but not very often. As I write, the largest hurricane on record is hitting my friends in
Florida, spilling superfund sites into the sea, making another of many graves.
Like Moore’s speaker, I am stuck behind a big man of a thing that is extinction. I might
be stuck in apocalyptic abstraction, or nostalgia for what once was (and of course, never was), or
stuck in a small container of human thinking that we are supposed to find our way out of if we
are to ever resolve the problems of this man-made end. Fishery collapse. No, fisheries are for
people. Extinction involves, amongst many other things, one kind of creature with an appetite for
another that has already disappeared—not scarcity, but complete lack of access to that which is
craved. The webbed graveyards in the middles of the seas keep expanding.
How can I not get suspended here, caught in “A Grave” and its associations with loss of
more-than-human life at sea, a loss that was already underway in 1916, when Moore began
writing the poem, but is now recognized as the speediest zone of death in the sixth mass
extinction on this particular planet? The poem, and the occasion of reading it, makes me
associate, not with that ocean that is supposed to be its subject, but with the thing that gets in the
way: an untouchable loss that occurs at the velocity familiar to me from capitalist enterprise but
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catastrophic for an ecological pace. My relation to the obstruction that begins with the title is
exactly the problem of dwelling for a long time in that anoxic zone of the unthinkable.
Martin Heidegger, whose political allegiances in WWII are often obstructions to reading
his books, liked that in Ancient Greek philosophy, there is an attunement to astonishment. He
writes that “In astonishment, we restrain ourselves (être en arrêt). We step back, as it were, from
being, from the fact that it is as it is and not otherwise” (85). Being in stop, or the être en arrêt of
astonishment that pulls one out of the psychic space of conditions sensed in the present, is maybe
just transcendent. Or maybe it’s the description of a specific immobility that produces movement
elsewhere in the body; that is, an ability to restrain oneself from what is in order to sense what
might be. What Moore does is create the stop first and then move to astonishment within the
condition of being stuck behind something. If what tries to create astonishment now—the
sublime or the tireless splendor of late capitalism—is no longer capable of producing awe in
contemporary viewers whose eyes are worn out from having to take in the new and the splendid,
maybe sitting in the stop is the way astonishment comes in a measured and quiet way. Maybe
this is how to be in the stop of extinction. Maybe the being in that stop is not so much a realm of
unthinkable, but a place that requires particular kinds of attunements. If the human brain is outscaled amidst massive geologic and biological shifts, maybe the emphasis on reaching the
intellectual limit needs to be contested, not in the service of imbuing the human with more
intellectual grandeur, but to recognize that being stopped requires looking at that which is in
front of one’s face and has been insufficiently considered. Perhaps the inherent barrier of
thinking this crisis is the stop that can produce astonishment in the small or the obvious.

*
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The Moore family: Marianne, Warner and their mother Mary, were unusually close.
Moore left her mother for a few years in college and afterwards, but she returned when she was
twenty-three and the two lived together, often sharing a bed, until Mary’s death, nearly four
decades later. Linda Leavell’s biography of Moore respectfully restrains from passing judgement
on the family, but the descriptions of Mary’s discipline—forcing the writer to eat, editing her
poems with a strong hand, and advising her on each of her life decisions—is worth noting.
William Carlos Williams described the relationship as “pathological” and Mary herself told
Warren that the family were “peculiar people,” warning him to resist the influence of others,
“unless we become one of them; and that, surely, is too dear a price to pay” (Leavell, “Marianne
Moore” 140, 144). They corresponded in round robin letters on a schedule set by the matriarch in
a system of coded language all their own. They referred to one another using nicknames that
changed over time but consistently adopted childlike language, which Mary encouraged,
insisting that they retain an innocent approach to the world (Leavell, “Marianne Moore” 142).
Mary seems to have cultivated her children’s ongoing dependence on her. I cannot help but think
of the ghost crab who lives in the dunes but cannot breathe ashore and thus must return nightly to
fill its gills with the mother medium.
Mary and her partner, Mary Norcross, took the children every summer to Monhegan
Island in Maine. Moore, in her unpublished memoir, writes that “Endless delight and surprise
attended every step taken on Monhegan” (Coming About). There, the “fresh cod or scrod were a
revelation,” she writes, and “Any tension created by accidents or mistakes in judgement were
offset by” Mary Norcross reading aloud (Coming About). That Moore seems so preoccupied with
the “tension created by accidents or mistakes in judgement” indicates, to me, the ways in which
her mother’s strict rule produced an anxious environment that had to be eased by a second adult.
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But perhaps this is simply my own speculation into the Moore family dynamic. But in any case,
the trips to Maine in the summer seem to have been significant to the entire family. On their last
trip there, while Moore was writing the poem that would later become “A Grave,” the family
experienced an important shift. Warner met a woman named Constance Eustis and asked her to
marry him after a week (Leavell, Holding On 153). Leavell’s biography of Moore reveals the
sense of anger and grief that struck the family following Warner’s decision. The critic Jenn
Heuving reads “A Grave” as the poet’s consideration of suicide at the time (Holding On 97). The
family’s unconventional dependence upon one another explains Warner’s letter following his
engagement, in which he writes “My crime…is that while I would count it nothing to die for
you, I have refused to live for you” (Leavell, Holding On 155). Warner’s “betrayal” is perhaps
the barrier to Moore’s seeing the sea with the old joy of previous summers in Maine. Instead, the
view is a sight of the intimate family structure’s death.

*
Moore composed her first version of “A Grave” between 1916 and 1918, so it is not
surprising that, as submarine warfare in WWI made the sea a human grave, she wrote a poem
saying as much. At that time, the view of the ocean would easily be categorized as one of
unimaginable, and threatening death.17 WWI may have been an obstruction to aestheticizing the
sea, but that view was always one of death. Though war was the background to Moore’s writing
of the poem, the idea of the ocean as tomb is not new to the twentieth century. If Moore’s poem
invites a flood of association, it also recalls the human loss of life at sea across time. What would
it mean for Moore to create a stop in front of the Atlantic, where the most significant loss of

Warner also enlisted in the navy in 1916. But the “betrayal” of his engagement, and thus separation from the
family web, in Leavell’s biography, seems far more important to the Moore’s than Warner’s joining the navy.
17
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human life was that of enslaved Africans brought to the New World? Still, there are only
estimates as to how many people took their lives to avoid what awaited them, or died, or were
thrown overboard to collect insurance. One guess is at least one and a half million people found
their graves in the sea as a result of the making of humans into things to be traded and brought
across the ocean (Eltis 9). This is an obstruction to the blank slate of sea that remains, materially
and figuratively, in the waters of the Atlantic.

*
In 1915, James Earle Fraser, the son of a railroad engineer who laid the tracks for coalburning westward expansion, displayed his famous sculpture, The End of the Trail, in San
Francisco. With the Pacific as marine obstruction to continued colonial devouring, the frontier
was considered closed. The colonial web was stretched to the sea, so it turned back to smooth out
the creases.
One year later, when Marianne Moore began writing her first version of “A Grave,”
Hugo Grotius’ 1608 Mare Liberum, or Freedom of the Seas, was republished by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and Oxford University Press. The new English translation
was supposed to respond to WWI disputes over freedom of the seas. As a lawyer, Grotius
counseled the Dutch East India Company and while doing so, wrote his treatise, establishing that
the sea is unobstructed space for all nations to trade and fish. Defending Dutch colonial
enterprise, Grotius’ book argues that the sea is more like air than land, and is therefore, like air,
“common property of all” (28, 29). In order to argue that a change in medium requires a change
in the nature of property rights, Grotius had to define private property on land, too. Comparing
land and sea he says, “that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been occupied, cannot

100

be the property of any one, because all property has arisen from occupation” (27). Forgetting to
specify human occupation, Grotius writes of the sea as “common to all, because it is so limitless
that it cannot become a possession of any one” (28). The sea thus marks the limit of property
ownership, an obstruction to land that is, perhaps, its necessary foil, as the sea is necessary foil to
Hobbes’ social contract state. As unconstrained space, the sea is an obstruction that helps turn
back to land and define its constraint in terms of a human-invented right to property. It would
make sense that Grotius’ treatise would be republished during WWI, when submarine warfare,
often resulting in civilian casualties, posed a challenge to the separation of carnage between land
and sea. But the notion of the freedom of the seas also ensured the ocean would continue to act,
in the western imaginary, as vehicle for colonial enterprise—that unoccupied territory traversable
in order to find the next frontier. Its “limitless” nature defied property rules but, as land’s foil,
helped ensure them there. Enclosing land with metaphors of unconstraint, the sea was the free
space for unlimited enterprise to develop and stomp its way into new homes on land.

*
While James Earle Fraser displayed his sculpted affirmation of completed genocide on
the west coast, Marianne Moore had just left the Carlisle Indian Industrial School back east. This
is one place with Moore where I am again stopped.
The Carlisle Indian Industrial School was a model for removing Native children from
their families and forcefully assimilating them to white settler culture. The school was founded
in 1879 by Richard Henry Pratt, who had served in the U.S. army during the so-called Indian
Wars. Commanding the 10th US Cavalry, the black regiment known as the Buffalo Soldiers,
Pratt, who was white, led a group of newly-freed black men into war with Cheyenne, Comanche,
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Arapaho and other tribes protecting their lands against white settlement in the southern plains.
As they cleared the way for the expansion of a new nation, the regiment also protected the
railroad workers who laid infrastructure that made such expansion possible. In 1875, Pratt took
Native prisoners from these wars to Fort Marion, a prison in St. Augustine, Florida. There, Pratt
began turning the prison into an assimilationist experiment in education. And so, in a prison
almost entirely surrounded by ocean, incarcerated Native fighters were offered a view of the sea
and told to replicate in themselves the ethnic cleansing of their land which Pratt had helped lead.
As the nineteenth century was drawing to a close, the so-called Indian Wars were deemed
over, though the massacres were not. The Friends of the Indian, who met annually from 1883 to
1916 at Lake Mohonk Lodge in upstate New York to make policy recommendations to Congress
and the president, began discussing how the country could transition from forced removal to
assimilation strategies. This war by different means could be won by interrupting the passage of
culture from one generation to the next, a strategy Pratt was already practicing at Fort Marion.
With support from Congress, Pratt moved to Carlisle, Pennsylvania and began building a model
for boarding schools that, under the motto “kill the Indian, save the man,” would aim to complete
what violent removal policies had begun.
Unlike the missionary schools that focused on conversion, Carlisle attempted to produce
a citizenry that Pratt and his followers argued could become equal to whites. Pratt wanted
Carlisle to be a model of the kinds of reform that can take place when the Lockean tabula rasa of
the Native is recognized. One of the most well-known studies of the boarding school movement
is David Wallace Adams’ Education for Extinction. He ends his remarkable study like this: “And
after all this, the schools. After all this, the white man had concluded that the only way to save
Indians was to destroy them, that the last great Indian war should be waged against children.
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They were coming for the children” (337). But they were also coming for those whose children
would become a lack. Of course, Adams remarks, that after all that colonialism had already done
here, it would start a campaign targeting the future by way of eradicating its past.
The methods for this extinction should not be surprising. Adams identifies the
educational priorities at Carlisle as: language, introduction to “civilized branches of knowledge,”
individualization, Christianization, and citizenship training (8). Students, like the prisoners in
Fort Marion, were heavily surveilled, and the Carlisle campus was redesigned to resemble Fort
Marion for this purpose. A militant discipline system undergirded all the activities at Carlisle,
which were split between the academic and applied skills like agriculture and sewing. As part of
the curriculum, Pratt engineered the “outing system,” which sent children to live with white
families during vacations from school, ensuring they would be kept from their own families and
extended communities. Somewhat like today’s Fresh Air Fund that brings “urban children,” (aka
kids of color) into the country to live with families there for the summer, the outing system was
supposed to complement the assimilation process and also give the families that hosted them the
additional benefit of an extra person working on the farm. The Carlisle School publicized its
apparent “successes” by recruiting athletes like the famous Olympian Jim Thorpe to boost their
visibility and photographing students throughout the assimilation process, showing the ways in
which students appeared to be adopting white ways. Carlisle became a well-known football
school, competing with the Ivy League schools and helping shape the ways the game is played.
Publicity of this sort worked in many respects. But what was largely unrecognized was that few
students actually graduated. Only 758 out of 10,500 students who attended the boarding school
ever did (Rose and Fear-Segal 12).
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Zitkála-Šá, a Sioux writer and musician, taught at the Carlisle School until, upon writing
about the loss of Native identity there, she was dismissed. In her story, “An Indian Teacher
among Indians,” she writes about her experience teaching and coming to understand the brutal
nature of Pratt’s project. She recalls being “in no mood to strain my eyes in searching for latent
good in my white co-workers” (95). She realizes that what she has lost is more valuable than
what she has learned at the school. Referring to herself as a tree that has been denied its
sustenance, she writes: “I made no friends among the race of people I loathed. Like a slender
tree, I had been uprooted from my mother, nature, and God. I was shorn of my branches, which
had waved in sympathy and love for home and friends. The natural coat of bark which had
protected my oversensitive nature was scraped off to the very quick” (97). Scaling up her
metaphor, she describes visitors’ assumptions of the school’s success: “They were paying a
liberal fee to the government employees in whose able hands lay the small forest of Indian
timber” (98). The felled “Indian timber” connects the destruction of culture through education to
the extractivism of the larger set of colonial practices in the ongoing settlement of the United
States. The pillaged forest is not visible to everyone. Zitkála-Šá writes that few visitors “paused
to question whether real life or long-lasting death lies beneath this semblance of civilization”
(99). Notice the language of surfaces and depth. The view produced for white visitors is a nearreflection, or “semblance” of a white culture deemed “civilization.” What those visitors cannot
sense, is what “lies beneath” such a semblance of refection. Marianne Moore will make the sea a
similar surface that cannot be penetrated by an eye unable, or unwilling, to sense the depth
below.
The Carlisle School finally closed in 1918. Congress didn’t want to keep paying for the
experiment, and the rise of the eugenics movement at the time meant that focus shifted from
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culture to genetics, negating the possibility of assimilation. Perhaps most importantly, the Dawes
Allotment Act was putting land into the hands of whites, smoothing out the creases, for the
moment, of the settler colonial war (Rose and Fear-Segal 10). Reservation schools replaced the
boarding school model across the country and the movement for Native citizenship was put to
rest (Rose and Fear-Segal 10). After the school closed, the buildings served as a military hospital
and finally became the campus of the U.S. Army War College. I’ll just repeat: the U.S. Army
War College moved into the buildings of a boarding school built as a model for the violent
extermination of a myriad of cultures.
Moore taught in Carlisle’s brutal experiment for three years. A decade after Zitkála-Šá
was fired, from 1911 to 1914, Moore was in charge of the Commercial Department at Carlisle
(Leavell, Holding On 116). By the time she was hired, Pratt had already left. Moore’s
relationship to the school is contradictory, and there is very little in her archive about Carlisle.
Because she didn’t keep a diary, most of the evidence of her teaching can be found in the roundrobin letters with her mother and brother, and most often when they are talking about her.
Moore’s reactions to the job are most evident, and still only scantly so, in her memoir drafts from
1969. She explains that as she attended Carlisle Commercial College, a call for teachers at the
Indian School was put out, and though she wanted work in a publishing house, she accepted the
teaching job. She writes: “The antipathy from what I thought [sic] but my brother…had been
teaching” and her mother was teaching at a local private school for girls (Coming About). The
sentence, part of her memoir draft, doesn’t have a subject—teaching could be the antipathy of
her thought, or it could be the Carlisle School itself. Either way, she writes without much agency
in the matter, explaining in the curious subjunctive form: “it seemed evident that I would accept
it. With much misgiving I did” (Coming About).
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Moore’s passivity in the decision to teach is evident in her ambivalent relationship to the
work itself. Leavell’s biography of Moore states that she respected the Pratts while disagreeing
with Moses Friedman, the superintendent who hired her (116). Leavell notes Moore was accused
of helping her students make formal complaints about abuses at the school, but when the school
was under Congressional investigation in 1914 for such abuses, she did not speak up against her
boss. She remained diplomatic in her approach to his authority, writing to him stating: “I crush
out disrespect and rancor when I see it” (Leavell, Holding On 118). At the same time that her
letter professes an authoritarian attitude toward her Native students—her intolerance for
disrespect, she asserts, leads her to “crush [it] out”—she also describes them in her memoir as an
“ideal group among which were James Thorpe, Gus Wells, Alex Arcasa, and Joel Wheelock. I
did not know it but they were my salvation. Open-minded and also intelligent” (Coming About).
Elsewhere, she describes them as “some neurotic Sioux and Ojibway boys who were a long way
from home and lonesome and unhappy” (Leavell, Holding On 117). Though characterizing them
as “neurotic,” Moore’s recollection of her students also shows a tenderness toward their
intelligence and loneliness that differs in tone from her words to Friedman. When her department
was closed in 1914, she was invited to teach in the general curriculum. She declined.
While Moore’s conflicted relationship to the school is evident in her archive, her family
was decidedly against her teaching work. Most of their letters complain about the long hours
Moore spent at the school and express worry that teaching was making her sick. There is at least
one instance of her mother taking a stand against the practices at Carlisle, calling the school “a
horrid, not even a good, prison” (Leavell, Holding On 119). But her family’s insistence that
Moore quit teaching arose mainly from a concern for her health. Marianne, ever described by her
family as frail and sickly, did not complain of sickness much; she left such distress to her mother
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and brother. In January of 1912, her brother wrote, referring to Marianne by one of her many
nicknames, L.B. Dog, “It is good news L.B. Dog will anon cease his ‘uplifting of the Red Man,’
I am pained beyond words to hear of his illness. Yes, that is just what made him sick—too much
work. Can’t the commercial school be cut out?”(Moore, Jan 18 1912).18 The quotes Warner
places around “uplifting of the Red Man” convey a sense of removal from the explicit goals of
the Carlisle School. Nowhere in the letters does the family show a belief in such a cause; rather,
they refer to it as if from a distance. Reflective of Mary’s insistence that the family was
“peculiar” and should protect such qualities, the family’s remove from the Carlisle ideology fits
in with their expressed understandings of themselves as exceptional. Mary and Warner’s
suspicion of infection from work at the school, however, demonstrates their lack of remove from
racialized conceptions of contagion. Mary writes to Warner in 1913 about Marianne, whom she
referred to as “uncle” at the time, writing: “Poor uncle, burning with shame brought this [letter]
in from the ‘Indian’ saying he had just caught a boy returning it to the place where uncle had it
concealed. Poor fellow! The letter had been forgotten the evening before” (Moore, 1913). Mary’s
simultaneous mistrust of the students at Carlisle and mocking of Marianne is indicative of the
disciplined, even cruel, approach Mary took with her daughter. The matriarch’s control was,
perhaps, why Marianne continued to work at Carlisle, despite her family’s misgivings and
perhaps her own.
The explicit and implicit constraints put on Moore by her family were somewhat
alleviated by her work at Carlisle. Linda Leavell explains that the income Moore earned as a
teacher “did give her leverage within the family” (Holding On 119). Perhaps this is why Moore
describes her students as her “salvation,” though she doesn’t explain the comment in her memoir

18

The family used male pronouns for Moore in their letters because as a child, she insisted on being understood as
Warner’s brother. Though her insistence abated, the practice of gendering Moore as male in their letters remained.
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draft. What is clear, is that while Moore used her position at the school to gain freedom from the
confines of her home and family structure, that freedom was gained through working at an
institution explicitly formed to restrict the freedom of its students. Ironically, Moore was
involved at the same time in the campaign for women’s suffrage, taking part in a march in
Washington in 1913 that Warner warned would jeopardize her job at the Carlisle School.
The freedom that Moore experienced through her work at the school is not dissimilar to
freedoms claimed by white modernist writers by way of taking up racialized language and
behavior. A family friend writes to Marianne in 1912, asking “Have you been making very hard
with your Indian boys? Our little Indian keeps us busy answering her questions and explaining”
(Moore, Dec 23, 1912). The intended playfulness of the parallel between the white child and
Moore’s Native students, most of whom were, like her, in their mid-twenties, is part of a broader
tendency for racialized language to include the diminutive. Across the ocean, Ezra Pound and
T.S. Eliot were exchanging letters, giving each other nicknames from Uncle Remus stories. The
contemporary poet Kevin Young writes that perhaps these “two architects of modernism required
the somewhat rebellious energy that the plantation tradition, and the blackface of Uncle Remus
in particular, provided” (142). This “rebellious energy” is not unlike the “bit of the Other” that
bell hooks describes in her essay, “Eating the Other,” which she writes “One desires…to enhance
the blank landscape of whiteness” (372). Whiteness, over-produced to blankness, requires a
rebellious enhancement. This is what anthropologist Renato Rosaldo calls “imperialist nostalgia”
(hooks 369). For modernism, such nostalgia perhaps centered on the diminutive in the face of
large-scale societal and technological changes. Or maybe the diminutive is easily racialized in
Western culture, which is obsessed with showing its largeness; but the propensity for nicknames
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amongst all these people is particularly depressing when we remember that one of the first ways
students at the Carlisle School were forced to assimilate was by being renamed.
The fact of Marianne Moore’s work with Pratt’s experiment in cultural genocide is an
obstruction to my reading her. If the big man of a thing in my way is that Moore took a
reprehensible job in her twenties and never expressed regret, I am not suggesting it would be
better to ignore the man, throw him out of the way, or decide Moore is not worth reading. I like
her poems, which means I also like reading in a difficulty. I will say it’s strange that a poet with
her level of fame has not been examined in connection to her work at the Carlisle School.
Leavell’s biography, published in 2013, spends limited time on the matter, and though the author
tries to be objective, she waters down the history of the Carlisle School and decontextualizes it
from the history of settler colonialism in this place. In describing Moses Friedman’s reluctance
to hire Moore, Leavell writes that “he wanted a man to control the unruly Indian boys” (Holding
On 117). With whom is the biographer’s allegiance and for what purpose, here? How might she
have considered Moore’s connection to the model boarding school for cultural genocide
differently?
Much of my understanding of what it means to encounter an obstruction and productively
dawdle in the midst of that obstruction comes from my reading of Moore. What she teaches me
is that difficulty is inevitable and if clear answers are unavailable, the opportunity for
astonishment, the being in stop, is still possible, perhaps increasingly so. If Moore makes me
reevaluate what I know and what the aesthetic decisions are around knowing it, my stopping in
front of her teaching at the Carlisle School is a place to think in expanded ways about the
conditions of her poetry. I am stopped by Moore’s work at Carlisle because the boarding schools
are one of the most heartbreaking weapons of war employed here, but also because her poems
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show such tenderness toward containment. Many of us who love being teachers, also know that
we carry Carlisle tools with us and those tools look really disgusting. Today, the descendants of
students at the Carlisle School and others committed to healing are gathering to tell the history of
cultural genocide at Carlisle and other schools like it. Reclaiming history and spaces of cultural
violence, groups like the Native American Boarding School Healing Coalition (NABS) and
others have convened at the Carlisle campus to mourn together and reclaim what has been lost.
Perhaps the act of stopping, or being stopped in a place that is too encumbered with history, is
also a chance to expand the terrain for healing, and multiply the ways to mourn. Reading “A
Grave,” in the following pages will require a series of stops, ones in which to gather up what the
poem carries. Of the many stories it contains is that of Carlisle, as well as, perhaps, the urgency
for a proper burial of what it killed, but didn’t kill out.

In the Distance
In “A Grave,” Moore’s speaker is not blocked from the ocean itself, the man in front of
her is “taking the view,” not the thing itself (2). View is a strange word here; it is more or less a
background, or a flattened ground that forgets to let in the particular. The speaker is trying to
reach a mediated goal: not the sea itself, but the sight of it. Further separating the speaker from
the sea, the view creates a distance that is also an obstacle. If one aim of Modernism was to strip
away, or at least make visible, the ways the object world is mediated, stripping down the
superfluous language of their predecessors and finding they still didn’t have access to the
proximity craved, “A Grave” shows that some don’t have the distance needed for a Romantic
view and then the poem finds something else to do.
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People pay a lot of money for views of the ocean from places that used to be sites for
dumping the poor. In New York City, the neighborhoods of Far Rockaway and Red Hook are
good contemporary examples of more expensive views produced by real estate devouring. One
exception among many is Cancer Alley in Louisiana, which follows the Mississippi down its
path of accumulated refinery and production waste. Good views need distance, so do the
pastoral, the landscape painting and the concept of nature. An elsewhere is good for dumping
refuse with deep temporal implications, but it is also good for the aestheticization of places that
can’t get too close if they are to stay pristine.
Victoria Bazin, focusing on Moore’s poetic engagement with the commodity object,
argues that “Moore’s observations are not of things but of the way things have already been
commodified” so that her response to Modernism’s obsession with representation “is not to
lament the absence of the real thing but rather to foreground the pleasures of reproductions as
reproductions” (96, 106). Though “A Grave” might not find pleasure, per se, in the
representation of the sea, it does remind the reader to stop kidding around: poems don’t let in real
objects, but that doesn’t mean mediation has to look just one way.
In Fish Story, the artist and writer Allan Sekula connects the railway with the shipping
industry, reminding his reader that the first steam boat was called the Great Western, named after
the British Great Western Railway that came before it. When railroads moved to the western
regions of what is now the United States, they would offer a view of wild land to be conquered-conquering that was actualized through the creation of a view from the train advancing westward
on newly-laid track. But the deep sea ocean liner only offered “monotony and malaise and
occasional terror of pelagic space” (Sekula 45). The ocean refused a good view, so the ship had
to make up for it with “opulent inter spaces…to compensate for that lack of external ‘tableaux’”
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(Sekula 45). Views can get boring at sea or in poems, perhaps that’s why some male poets might
prescribe—or be read as prescribing—a turn inward to produce a value for what is seen out
there. Maybe similar to Pratt’s strategy that to finish the colonial wars off by hollowing-out the
inner life in children where culture is reproduced, the poem has to finish by turning away from
the landscape and back into the human. There is only so much time man can stand looking at the
horizon.
Moore’s speaker tells her obstruction “you cannot stand in the middle of this; / the sea
has nothing to give but a well excavated grave” (5). The sea, or rather the view of the sea, does
not refuse the human’s desire to get in the middle and know; the view merely has nothing to
give. The representation of the sea has been well excavated, it is worn out. If a grave is supposed
to be a final resting place, Moore’s marine tomb has been disturbed repeatedly—it is well dug
out to produce cavernous space that has nothing left to give a man who wants to be in the middle.
Excavation produces caves. Its Latin root, excavare, is to hollow out, or produce the noun cavus,
or cave. The process of digging down to the cave might look a lot like salt mining in the Finger
Lakes or the extraction of buried fossil fuels, which are literally ancient compressed graves of
plants and animals. While the excavation of resources resembles the repeated uncovering of
remains, Moore refers to the figurative way this process is repeated with the concept of the sea.
The sad attempt to uncover anything from a well excavated grave yields only a recognition of the
futility of the act. And yet, it seems that the poet returns to uncover whatever possible. Maybe
there’s a market for whatever can get pulled up. The first sentence of the poem ends here, at the
end of the fifth line, punctuated by the finality of grave and an end to the speaker’s address.
Moore dedicates only the first sentence to expelling the romance of the male poet, and from here,
the sea becomes the main actor of the poem.
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Trawling is a fishing practice that covers a lot of distance. The bottom trawl pulls
everything up in one large gulp, erasing dimension and flattening seabed habitat. Using a long
metal beam that scrapes the bottom of the ocean, the bottom trawl indiscriminately lifts from the
depths and gathers more bycatch than the desired fish. By 1900, the ocean’s biodiversity was
waning, due, in part, to the efficient otter trawl that was invented in 1860. The otter trawl was
compared to a plow and therefore deemed productive of future fertility. Fishermen confirmed
this idea by describing the fish they would see chasing the trawl for the last scrap of food the
region would produce after the beam’s destruction (Berger 635). Trawling in other contexts is a
sorting, but here, everything is brought to the boat, everything meets the deluge of oxygen; some
get thrown back in a post-mortem sorting.
Moore’s address ends after the first sentence, but men don’t leave the poem altogether.
They look and the sea looks back, outlasting the human in its capacity to hold the gaze:
There are others besides you who have worn that look—
whose expression is no longer a protest; the fish no longer investigate them
for their bones have not lasted:
men lower nets, unconscious of the fact that they are desecrating a grave,
and row quickly away—the blades of the oars
moving together like the feet of water-spiders as if there were no such thing as death. (1015)
The ocean wears down humans so that not even “their bones have…lasted.” But men continue to
“lower their nets, unconscious of the fact that they are desecrating a grave.” The penetration of
the sea with nets, or the netting a profit off the sea, is also a desecration of sacred resting place.
Remember the desecration that frontierism requires when the U.S. looks for new places to pull
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into its belly in Moore’s time and now. Or remember that desecration is the undoing of
consecration, which makes sacred and, in the Eucharist, turns ordinary objects into the body and
blood of Christ. So the desecration of a grave might be considered also the demotion of a body
into a mere thing. It seems poetry has netted, again and again, that well excavated grave of sea
representation and taken away the materiality of the ocean itself. Like men’s nets, poetry lowers
itself to repeatedly trawling for what can no longer be found. Perhaps this is Moore’s rejection of
her male predecessors, or a rejection of female abundance lying in wait for the male net, but this
poem tells us we do not get to enjoy the poetic profits of the abyss any more.
The destruction produced by the trawl is not visible from the boat. The photos of the
ocean floor after the trawl are available on the internet. They are blurry and pixelated and mostly,
they do not reveal what it seems they are supposed to: that kelp forests, and sea grass, and coral,
and everything else that creates dimension, is flattened by the trawl. And like Moore’s men who
lower their nets, the trawls return again and again to the same places, smoothing out the creases
of their destruction. Trawling levels approximately one hundred and fifty times more area per
year than the clear-cutting of forests on land, or, if it’s easier to envision: an area the size of all
the continental shelves is trawled every two years (Gershwin 130). Jeremy B. C. Jackson
describes it as an act that “reduces the three-dimensional structure and complexity of sea floor
habitats to bare sediment,” reduces, in other words, a three-dimensional space to a twodimensional one; or reduces the forests of the sea floor to the bare earth that Rachel Carson’s
primordial creatures clamber out of the ocean to meet (11460). The trawl’s demolition in one fell
swoop reminds me of the “master builder,” Robert Moses, who plowed through, and segregated
the city of New York, with highways. He often called the work “slum removal,” which helped
justify his razing of neighborhoods, including coastal homes of Far Rockaway. Slum removal,
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like trawling, is the flattening of what Moses’ knowledge was never designed to understand. And
what can’t be understood is presumably of very little value.
Representations of the sea might no longer deliver the expected for poetry, but neither
does the real sea. Humans’ finite appetites cannot be satiated for much longer by repeating old
methods of demolition. Or, to get away from the constant attention to the human, neither can the
appetites of other beings. Currently, most ocean life is having trouble metabolizing the sea: they
are starving, consuming toxic food, suffocating because of lack of available oxygen, or getting
pummeled by some large ship or piece of machinery. Extinction at sea does not mean that all life
will be destroyed, but that the ocean is becoming a trawled-out space, undergoing what scientists
call “simplification,” the extreme reduction of diversity in ecosystems. The ocean, unlike
Moore’s poems, might not be compressible, but it is becoming increasingly simple.

Containers Are Boundaries
“A Grave” sets up the expectation that the view from which Moore’s speaker is blocked,
should be accessible to all. The obstruction is “taking the view,” according to the speaker’s
address to him, “from those who have as much right to it as you have to it yourself” (2). The
right to see out to sea might not be granted to the speaker, but it seems the inevitable tomb to
which the view refers is equally accessible to all. Even if equality only comes in death, the
speaker’s appeal to her obstruction, through a rights claim, lets seep in political associations of
the rights rhetoric that can flood the whole scene.
Moore’s right to the view might look like those fought for in Moore’s Bryn Mawr social
circle, but they fall, for me, more into the category of a Lockean inalienable right to property—or
Grotius’s rights to free trade and unlimited extraction at sea that preceded Locke’s by a little over
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half a century. Grotius’ rights, with some minor limitations, were still in operation when Moore
began composing her poem. Thomas Jefferson, when he was not planning the forced removal of
Native populations while promoting the assimilationist ideology that produced the Carlisle
School, attempted to clarify the law around coastal territory. Writing to the French ambassador to
the U.S. in 1793, Jefferson summarizes how the international community has decided how much
of the coast belongs to the nation, saying “The greatest distance, to which any respectable assent
among nations has been at any time given, has been the extent of the human sight…and the
smallest distance, I believe, claimed by any nation whatever, is the utmost range of a cannon
ball” (302). Geographer Philip Steinberg, in his book, The Social Construction of the Ocean,
understands Jefferson’s letter to summarize the Western construction of oceanic space at that
time, illuminating the ways in which “territorial sea was defined not by its existence as a place in
its own right but rather by its ability to be controlled from land” (Steinberg 136). In other words,
that ineffable place that was not yet a place, but a medium lapping onto land, could be contained
with the eye or the cannon (maybe you’re thinking about Leviathan and the eye of the film or the
eye of the fish captured up close). The view and the weapon are, according to Jefferson’s
summary, two good units for measurement when some people want to add more territory to the
lands they’ve already claimed. Yes, and Jefferson goes on to ensure that everyone is on the same
page about other watery spaces whose status might be uncertain: “For that of the rivers and bays
of the United States, the laws of the several States are understood to have made provision, and
they are, moreover, as being landlocked, within the body of the United States” (303). One way
water is contained is by the law; another is by claimed land that encloses; and yet another is just
by some guy’s eye.
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The view might be conflated with the thing itself when it comes to the law, but Moore
stops her reader from confusing the two. Through the distance that Moore creates between the
speaker and the sea, layers of separation spring up. The sea is only a surface in its categorization
as a view. The fishermen can “lower their nets” into the deep, but they cannot understand the
medium from which they are separated. The separated deep is perhaps as unintelligible as poetry
and the language of animals; but its tone is much more menacing. The fishermen remain
“unconscious of the fact that they are desecrating a grave,” unaware that they are gliding upon
the surface of a collector of dead matter (13). Their oars graze the ocean’s surface “like the feet
of water spiders” while the sea works beneath (15). The surface of the water is a physical, ocular,
and conceptual limit. Moore’s surfaces wear expressions so that the surfaces of things, and the
ocean in particular, seem to indicate the presence of an inner life being subsumed by appearance.
Entry is limited. With Moore, it is possible to get awestruck in that limit: to be in the stop until
the view is sufficiently diffracted to produce something else. Robin Riley Fast writes that “in ‘A
Grave,’ meditation on the sea becomes meditation on the limits of human power and human
language, and immersion, literal or figurative, threatens dissolution” (369). Instead of the
moment of Kantian sublime, where the experience of the incomprehensible is folded neatly back
into human reason, only to show the power of that reason in its ability to contain an
uncontainable experience, Moore’s seascape further overwhelms. It is a fragmented scene whose
layers are bordered, sometimes such that they are impenetrable to one another.
Though John Locke said the ocean was that “great and still remaining common of
mankind,” land was for the taking (sec. 30). The way to access this right to land was through
labor. He wrote that when man “removes out of the state that nature hath provided” and “mixed
his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own,” he “thereby makes it his property”
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(sec. 27). This rule didn’t apply to hired labor, or enslaved labor, of course, both of which Locke
used in his colonial plantations in Ireland and Virginia (Dawson 49). For Locke, whatever nature
had not been tamed was lying waste, awaiting a colonial hand to mix with “it something of his
own” so as to produce private property.
As Moore documents the cracks in the view that become layers to penetrate with oars, if
not eyes, she describes those layers as guarded. As Melville conflates land and sea in Moby Dick,
describing the ocean as a prairie, Moore’s speaker lines the view with “firs [that] stand in a
procession, each with an emerald turkey-foot at the top, /reserved as contours, saying nothing”
(6-7). The turkey foot might be in reference to the pine tree tops, or the big bluestem grass of
Midwestern prairies that is often referred to as turkey foot. Whatever Moore is referring to here,
the land imagery marks a line of separation between the marine and its other that is marked with
trees standing, like soldiers, “in a procession.” They seem to guard the borders, recalling also the
tree lines that delineate property. These lines of belonging, of spatial segregation, also
distinguish the trees from humans both in space and demeanor. They “stand,” presumably on
islands, as man cannot “stand in the middle of this,” and they are “as reserved as their contours”
(4). As markers of the surface boundary, the firs keep out those trespassers who are not able to
stand in the middle of this unknowable space that is represented as merely a view. The firs in
procession are not the only militant figures in the poem. Later, waves “progress among
themselves in a phalanx,” and the ocean “advances as usual” (16, 21). The macabre deep might
continue to advance, but the shore, lined with a procession of fir trees, seems to guard against
any further advances. Perhaps WWI is enough context for Moore’s metaphors, or a fear of death,
literal or figurative, that the sea can elucidate, but the militant language between land and sea
does not exhaust the possibilities for engagement between the two mediums. Moore keeps going.
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And in so doing, seems to ask what might happen if the borders between the two were no longer
patrolled.
The age of acceleration that followed WWII imperiled the ocean, just as it did the land.
Wartime technologies applied to commercial fishing enterprise started to make economists
nervous as they foresaw unsustainable depletion. Already, in the 1930s, the Japanese and U.S.
governments were arguing about fishing rights to a dwindling stock (Steinberg 138). Harry
Truman tried to address the issue in 1945 with two proclamations that expanded US authority
over the sea. The beginning of U.S. enclosure in the ocean both ensured further exclusive fishing
rights and helped develop deep water drilling for oil, which had begun in Louisiana in 1937
(Steinberg 139). That first well was most-poetically set up by two companies: Pure Oil and
Superior Oil. What Grotius had written in 1608, that the sea cannot “be built upon, nor inclosed,”
no longer held true (31). Enclosure found its way to sea, and so did oil rigs.
Maybe writing a poem is also a labor that can produce property from the blank slate of
untamed illegibility. Maybe Moore, handling whatever view she has, can turn what she sees into
her own, giving her particular access to the sea, that thing she sees, by applying her words to it.
But, of course, the ocean, or its representation, cannot belong to Moore. Her poem not only
attributes to the sea verbs of refusal, it also documents Moore’s own refusals. The descriptions
don’t add up to a whole; her poem is a diligent attempt to keep the untamable as such. In a
review of H.D.’s Hymen that Moore published in the avant-garde magazine Broom in 1923,
Moore writes: “H.D.’s work, suggested by the absence of subterfuge, cowardice and the
ambition to dominate by brute force, we have heroics which do not confuse transcendence with
domination” (Collected Prose 82). What Moore admires in her contemporary, she accomplishes
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in her own poetry. Moore’s poem won’t possess by trying to stand in the middle, even if her
refusal requires an additional labor—a labor that Locke’s imagination was unable to contain.
In 1954, an economist, Scott Gordon, argued that fisheries were being exhausted because
there were no property rights in the ocean. In 1968, Garrett Hardin, the economist who wrote
“Tragedy of the Commons,” which undergirds much of the anxiety about overpopulation and
unregulated, that is not-owned, property that gets in the way of what could be good
environmentalist work, blamed the freedom of the seas and the assumption of inexhaustibility for
bringing “species after species of fish and whales closer to extinction” (1245). In other words, by
mid-century it was generally recognized that fish stocks were endangered. The commonsense
logic for addressing this loss, at least for economists and people who listened to them, was to get
rid of any commonly-held space and bring it into private ownership. The same year Scott Gordon
sounded an alarm about fishery exhaustion, some bored American soldiers stationed in Iceland
decided to kill a pod of whales. Michael McClure wrote a poem about it called “For the Death of
100 Whales.” The poem, which he read at his first reading in 1955, describes the whales’ bodies
as “turned and twisted” (15). McClure might be referring to the last lines in “A Grave,” where
the sea looks “as if it were not that ocean in which dropped things are bound to sink—/in which
if they turn and twist, it is neither with volition nor consciousness” (21-22). And a year before
Garrett Hardin echoed Gordon’s cry, W.S. Merwin published “For a Coming Extinction” in his
book, The Lice. Amidst poems in protest of the US war in Vietnam, Merwin turns to the grey
whale, addressing the animal as it goes extinct and blames human exceptionalism for the loss. So
in the middle of the twentieth century, as poems opened up ways to mourn deep sea life on the
brink of extinction, the borders around pelagic space were being closed.
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Moore’s speaker doesn’t get a complete view, but she gets to describe the ocean anyway.
Maybe it’s for the best, since the view of the ocean turns out to be deceptive. It “advances as
usual, looking as if it were not that ocean in which dropped things are bound to sink” (21). The
view of the sea is familiar, the water advances as usual. But Moore reminds the reader that the
view is specious; below the surface to which human eyes have access are the depths into which
things are bound to sink. The segregation of what can be seen from what lies within the oceanic
depths is the segregation between two kinds of perception. Just as Rachel Carson’s contemporary
human who gazes upon the ocean with only an “unconscious recognition of” oceanic “lineage”
perceives some ancestral origin while looking at the sea, Moore’s poem shows where the eye
meets its limit and the mind keeps going.
Following the logic that the commons was destroying the oceans, the United States began
its Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1958. Over the following two decades, the
UN agreed to extend national rights to resource extraction 200 miles off the coast. The UN also
established Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), giving coastal states exclusive rights to fishing to
the same 200 mile area. That movement toward enclosure led to state control of coastal waters,
and for the U.S., this meant that the neoliberal obsession with privatization led to the state ceding
control to private enterprise beginning in the 1980s. Geographer Becky Mansfield argues that
neoliberalism works differently at sea than it does on land, but open access is nonetheless
deemed irrational. The rationalization of fisheries is an effort to make the industry more efficient,
which generally includes giving fishing rights in enclosed waters to a limited number of fishers
(Mansfield 321). There is debate amongst those who study fisheries, about the extent to which
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this neoliberal model can even be applied to the sea. In the meantime, fisheries dwindle fast,
which may or may not be an obstruction to naming the ways they do so. 19
Moore’s poems, maybe all good poems, are irrational. The students in my class talk about
her poem, “The Fish” and the more they talk, the more incomprehensible the poem becomes.
How does the ocean “grow old” (40)? How do barnacles “encrust” a wave (8)? The students
seem frustrated and we’ve run out of time. I say something about giving ourselves the gift of
time to close read carefully. It is not the right thing to say. Next class, maybe I’ll ask them if
their brains feel good in the realm of the irrational; in the realm of what Moore calls the
“unintelligible, unmistakable vernacular like the language of animals.”
Ultimately, what Locke wants to do to land, cannot be done to water. Locke urged his
readers to domesticate nature in order to own it and make it profitable. But the movement toward
enclosure, either for economic or conservationist reasons (if those two can be separated), doesn’t
work the way it’s intended, especially on the high seas where regulation is too difficult. The
ocean withdraws from the desire to domesticate, hopefully emphasizing that everything, in its
own way, withdraws from expected modes of domestication.

Abundance Envelops Lack
The toxic brine produced by hydraulic fracturing in North Dakota is injected deep into
the ground, in the same way that Pennsylvania’s fracked gas goes to salt caverns in the Finger
Lakes. The ground is a good container that also leaks. But in the 1980s, the wastewater from oil
extraction in North Dakota was left in open ponds that continue to leach into the soil (Sontag and

For more on the debate about neoliberalism and ocean enclosure, see Kevin S. Martin, “The Difference That Class
Makes: Neoliberalization and Non-Capitalism in the Fishing Industry of New England;” Julia Olson,
“Understanding and Contextualizing Social Impacts from the Privatization of Fishing: An Overview;” and
Rőgnvaldur Hannesson, The Privatization of the Oceans.
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Gebeloff). A photo in the New York Times article about it shows a farmer bent over, tasting the
salty dirt that means no more crops: brined infertility. The article doesn’t mention that one reason
for the collapse of civilization in ancient Mesopotamia was excess salt in the fields. Marking the
end of civilization is just one way to categorize human history, but it might be worth
remembering how salt sometimes unsettles.
Though the Malthusian approach to reproduction that Hardin revived to blame poor
people for making too many babies and thus causing resource shortages has long been applied to
people, there has also been the romance with the idea of the sea that does not tire of producing
for human consumption and wonder. The nineteenth century French historian Jules Michelet
wrote short natural histories for laypeople after he finished his exploration of French history. The
one entitled La Mer (The Sea), first published in 1861, synthesizes personal anecdote, poetic
wanderings, and natural history. Michelet never allows the sea to leave behind its French
homonym: la mère. The sea, he concludes, must be an organic element—complete with a salty
circulatory system—that is not only tied to the feminine by the French language, but turned into
mother figure in Michelet’s hands. Sea foam is her “life’s milk” that is absorbed by the creatures
who rely upon her (62). Michelet describes the ocean as mostly calm, otherwise, it “would be
unfit to fulfill its crucial role as mother and wet nurse to living things” (63). A hysteric mother, it
seems, is not a good one. Therefore, oceanic turbulence, the unexpected storms that arise from
her depths, become configured as inexplicable female rage that Michelet argues should not be
held against her. After all, “it would be ridiculous to judge a person’s temperament based on a
few bouts of fever” (64). “This is the sea” Michelet writes, “she is the great mother of the earth,
who is tirelessly desiring, permanently conceiving and unendingly giving birth” (106). 20

Michelet’s description of fecund nature is emblematic of the thinking in his time. Particularly in the United States,
where westward expansion contributed to an American organicism that considered nature as a continuously
20
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Michelet was not alone. In 1883 the biologist Thomas Huxley said the ocean stocks were
inexhaustible. But by the beginning of the twentieth century, this assumption had been
discredited (Berger 635). The notion of inexhaustibility is related to a logic where abundance
should be contained and used up. In his environmental history, Changes in the Land: Indians,
Colonists, and the Ecology of New England, William Cronon describes colonists in the New
World burning wood at unprecedented rates, felling the forests of the east coast within decades to
feed inefficient fireplaces; abundance leading to frenzied destruction (111). Huxley’s favorite
scientist, Charles Darwin, wrote that nature produces abundance so that whatever works best in
its environment will stick around as long as the conditions are right. Darwin thought extinction
moved slowly and could be considered positive, since it made space for new forms to emerge.
Darwin dismissed the naturalist Georges Cuvier’s explanation of espèces perdues, like the
mastodon, as results of catastrophe. The journalist Elizabeth Kolbert points out that while
everybody believed Darwin for a long time, Cuvier’s catastrophism is closer to our current
understanding of extinction than Darwin’s (“The Sixth Extinction?”). Cuvier’s catastrophes,
which, in the early nineteenth century, were explained by referring to Biblical events like the
flood, were taken back up again in the late twentieth century. In 1980, the geologist Walter
Alvarez produced the theory that the dinosaurs were killed by a meteor, an idea he got to by way
of a study of clay he found on limestone fossils. And throughout the 1980s, scientists David M.
Raup, J.J. Sepkoski and David Jablonski published papers showing evidence of five mass
extinction events and many small ones in between. By then, the results of human frenzy against
abundance were already showing evidence of our being in the midst of a sixth mass extinction.

changing and unending resource. See Joshua Schuster, in The Ecology of Modernism, for further exploration of
nineteenth century conceptions of nature and their impact on modernism.
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Michelet praises the ocean for what he deems a strange, but abundant, fertility. Using the
example of herring in his chapter “Fertility,” he writes: “In this world, that is not familiar with
fixed unions, pleasure is an adventure. To love is to sail. All along the way, they pour out
torrents of fertility” (99). The liquid medium of the ocean helps Michelet with his sexual
metaphor as he sails off on his own descriptions, letting his sentences do the work of limitless
fecundity for him. It’s fun. Pleasure is an adventure. And since adventure is also affair in French,
Michelet’s pleasure is also a bit sordid as he enters the unknown of oceanic space. Herring
become a repeated “they” that exhausts the referent as the chapter proceeds. It doesn’t matter.
Pronouns, like “fixed unions,” become unhinged in the outpouring of sexuality. The herrings
surface from the deep and accumulate into dune-like masses. They make a “volcano of milk—of
fertile milk—that erupt[s] and flood[s] the sea” (100). Michelet’s torrent can’t stick to a singular
metaphor; it needs breast milk, ejaculate, and some mix of the two to express the adventure that
is the pleasure of the sea.
In Michelet’s realm of “extreme fertility,” humans aren’t the ones who net too much from
the sea. Instead, cod, sturgeon, and other big fish overeat their surroundings, and come to
dominate the human realm (101). As if entranced, humans build ships to go after the big fish and
bring them up in abundance with nets. And still, the rapacious fish multiply. They have a “fury
for eating” and only humans can stop them (103). As Moore’s sea takes on destructive
characteristics usually associated with the human realm, Michelet lends voracious human
appetite to sea creatures, assigning the kind of greed Melville had given Ahab, his antagonist, to
that which was being fished out. Like Locke, Michelet shows the hunting human as that which
tames the excesses of the wild. Michelet’s expression of wonder at the voracious appetite of
large fish was published in 1861, ten years after Melville published Moby Dick and Thoreau
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published Cape Cod. In the time people have been reading how those New England writers
ponder the relation between man and sea, Atlantic cod populations have gone down by ninety six
percent (Jackson 11459).
The scarcity that overconsumption produces is good for capitalism. James Maitland, an
Earl of Lauderdale, wrote in 1804 that scarcity is a necessity for the production of value on the
market (Foster and Clark). In other words, capitalism hates abundance. Commodified abundance
is abundance made scarce. One example might be bottled water in places where the reservoirs
are full. As I revise these pages in 2017, scarcity is still profitable at sea, though only for a few.
At some point soon, the life that is most frequently eaten will be too scarce to find its way to the
table.
Long before anybody was writing any of this, Lucretius wrote a poem, called De rerum
natura, to explain the Epicurean theory of the atom. 21 The poem is most famous, now, for its
theory of the swerve wherein atoms crash into each other in the void and produce matter. But it
is also a beautiful exploration of what it’s like to be in an entropic universe; an exploration that is
obsessed with water and its metaphoric ability to flow out and away, as well as erode. For
Lucretius, the Earth is a mother who, as Cyril Bailey translates it, is “eaten away, and again
increases and grows” (119). Sometimes the devourer is the sea which “gnaws away the walls by
the seashore” (266). In William Ellery Leonard’s 1916 verse translation, the sea is an “eater-out
of walls/Around the coasts” (6.926). Notice how much trouble is taken to make the ocean into a

Stephen Greenblatt argues, in his book The Swerve, that the fifteenth-century re-discovery of Lucretius’ text
sparked the renaissance in Europe, moving medieval culture toward a new acceptance of pleasure and secularism.
The text became immensely popular, including with Thomas More and Niccolo Machiavelli. Later, Thomas
Jefferson claimed De rerum natura was one of his favorite books and declared “I am an epicurean” to a curious
correspondent (Greenblatt 70-1). It is a sad contradiction that a text so entranced by the ability for the small atom to
create the majesty of this world—a world in which humans are but another accidental part—inspired a Western
modernity that continues to inform the destruction we all see around us.
21
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noun that contains its verb instead of the easier, “ocean who eats out walls.” I think there is
reverence in allowing a verb to devour the noun like that.
The Earth, for Lucretius, is also the “universal tomb of things” that does not regenerate
completely (Bailey 194). Lucretius doesn’t forget about waste, making the Earth a woman who is
both site of birth and disintegration, figure of infinite production and steward of an accumulative
death. His poem ends with war and disease, reminding his reader of the entropic Earth whose
womb becomes progressively more tomb-like. The philosopher Michel Serres’ contemplation of
Lucretius in The Birth of Physics makes watery entropy into an actor that eats away at the earth,
much like the philosopher Henri Bergson’s description of “the invisible progress of the past
gnawing into the future” in Matter and Memory (150). Serres writes, “If, from the beginning to
our own times, the earth tires and does not create any new species, it is because the downstream
flow, devouring, has stolen away a share of atoms” (128). If Gaia isn’t entirely consumed, the
future contained in her babies will be. The menopausal mother of the globally-warmed present,
suffering hot flashes and all, descends in a frenzy from womb to infertile tomb. In the end,
Lucretius asks his reader to shed the fear of death so as to dispense with the gods that only exist
to help cope with the anxiety of mortality. He does not say anything about dreading the demise
of others.
After the news about fishery collapse spread to places like The New York Times, there
were articles everywhere about the pot running out. What’s it like for that abundance to be over,
for the collapse of the expected? Does poetry teach about this? Abundance is a number that
shouldn’t run out until much later. Jeremy B.C. Jackson writes, in reference to the effects of
climate change on the oceans, that “warming and acidification of the pelagic realm due to the
rise of CO2 comprise another uncontrolled experiment on a global scale” (Jackson 11461). The
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sea has too many variables, in other words. The menopausal planet—drained of her purpose—is
acting out unpredictably. Or, human interaction with the mother is an experiment. Or, the sea is
an experiment and this particular moment is uncontrolled. Whichever way the exceptionalism of
the present is construed, extinction in the ocean is but one way the mother is acting out again,
perhaps always and only in relation to some petulant child.

Pace, or the Cause of Death
In 2015, Governor Cuomo of New York finally vetoed a proposal for an offshore
liquefied natural gas transfer station off the coast of Long Beach. At the hearings that preceded
his decision, the local Recreational Fishing Association advocated for the environmentally
destructive project, arguing that there are no fish left in the ocean anyway, so we might as well
industrialize the coastal waters (Robbins). Extinction might be a way to get a frontier back: a
blank slate. Or, extinction produces a new Lockean tabula rasa that awaits an informational
imprint, maybe like how the Carlisle School tried to produce a blank slate for a white imprint. 22
I’m wondering where poetry has already offered an idea about the uncontainable frenzy toward
the blank slate and the language that is afforded in a trawled space,
Moore’s poem also moves in a kind of frenzied entropy. The sea is “quick” bones do not
last and neither does the expression of protest; men “row quickly away;” wrinkles “progress” and
“fade breathlessly,” as if both without life and out of breath from excessive movement; the birds
fly at “top speed” and the ocean “advances” (9, 11, 16, 17, 18). Everything seems to both get
used up and move rapidly, as if those who descend into the grave of the sea do so hastily.
Meanwhile, Moore’s lines are long. They advance too far, needing to be tucked in order to fit on

In thinking about a blank slate awaiting a white imprint, it might also be worth considering Mary Douglas’ barren
purity discussed on page 37.
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the page. Like the sentences I write here that have trouble being contained, Moore’s verse
threatens to spill out of its form into prose. In her oppositional manner, Moore is revising and
condensing her representation of the sea at the time that she shows the ways in which it evades
resolute conclusions and forces the poet who describes it to keep going, to lap onto the next line
as the sea laps further onto shore.
Collapse happens at an ever-increasing pace. Permafrost is no longer permanent in the
fall of 2017 (Fountain). And as it melts, it emits methane into the air, the same methane that is
stored in salt caverns in upstate New York or pressurized in pipelines and liquefied natural gas
ships that crisscross the planet. When methane leaks, it traps warmth eighty six times more
efficiently than its hated cousin, carbon dioxide. So carbon emissions from mid-century are
currently helping uncover a more potent gas that has been contained by ice. That which is
underneath is revealed at fast rates that have exponential results. As western notions of progress
continue to invent better ways to extract and destroy, the impacts of progress lead to faster and
more abundant collapse.
In “A Grave,” the ocean, despite the “pulsation of lighthouses and noise of bellbuoys,
/advances as usual” (17-8). Human artifice looks awfully unimportant and minuscule next to the
sea. The lighthouse seems only an attempt to keep time with the sea’s pulsation, instead of to
preserve human life. Poor human things don’t advance, but the sea does. Did the ocean also
borrow some human verbs? After all, it advances as if finding a new frontier and its “wrinkles
progress among themselves” (16). Man might be looking into the sea, trying to find his own
image or claim what’s his, but the sea not only looks back, it dons the logic of human
destruction: advancing and progressing and swallowing up bodies for a big grave.
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Meanwhile, the cause of death can also be slow. The Great Acceleration produced
container ships, conceived in the U.S. in the 1950s and exported globally in the sixties (Sekula
49). Container ships have mechanized ports, making the pesky port workers who have
historically liked to strike, less of a problem. The ports have moved away from the center of the
city. My container ship goods—which are almost anything manufactured and food processed or
grown outside the country—come into Elizabeth, New Jersey near good red dirt, instead of into
New York City. Though the ships’ encounter with land is increasingly hidden, we all still see the
human-made leviathans. They glide out there, getting bigger and bigger and looking like they are
maybe not moving. The Panama Canal needs to be dredged more than ever to accommodate the
ships’ growing size. Here in New York City, the Army Corps of Engineers continues to deepen
the harbor, using dynamite to remove bedrock so that ships can make their way to the port. The
larger and larger container for more and more uniform boxes that fit perfectly on trucks that can
drive along more and more uniform highways makes for rapid cultural, economic and
environmental changes. But the ship is slow. It moves at the same pace it did in the midtwentieth century. Environmental scholar Rob Nixon describes much of ecological damage as
slow violence that, because of its pace, isn’t easily narrativized. He urges his readers to think
about violence across timescales. It is important to consider how bombs cause catastrophe in the
present, but that they also poison life for generations as they deposit depleted uranium into the
ground. The slowness of violence may be hard to put in a narrative, but the ways in which it
contradicts the shock of other kinds of violence is significant. Perhaps the slowness of this
chapter, and my attempt to meander in the vicinity of the stop, are attempts to narrate that which
slowly moves under fast-paced collapse. My attempts are shaped by Moore’s ability to make a
poem contain the process of slowly turning a thing over and over until its contradictions are
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satisfactorily surfaced. The container ship is a slow and violent thing that is also in tension with
the speed of the economy it undergirds. The container ship is also too removed for most to care
much about its presence. Enumerating the ways these slow boats move around weapons of war,
obscure which nation is protecting which other nation this time, or carry people trying to move to
safer places, but who end up spending long, tortured months on container ships, Allan Sekula
writes, “At their lowest depths, capitalist labor markets exhibit a miserly patience” (50). The
cause of death is paced, even if it produces rapidly-tumbling effects. The last whale that washed
up dead on a beach near me was killed by a container ship.

Rapacious Appetite
If man takes the view, Moore describes the sea as “a collector, quick to return a rapacious
look” (9). Perhaps Moore lets the sea try on a human form of desire, always too greedy and too
destructive. Sekula writes that “The psychology of the panorama is overtly sated and covertly
greedy, and thus caught up in the fragile complacency of disavowal. The tension is especially
apparent in maritime panoramas, for the sea always exceeds the limits of the frame” (43). Moore
reverses this tension by making the sea a greedy viewer. But rapaciousness is also an intense
urge; the word describes an urgent and unattractive pull of an object towards oneself. Calm down
big ocean, you are too immense to look so rapaciously at the human realm. The sea “returns,” as
in it turns back, just as the human at the shore turns back to an origin and Moore turns back to
her poems for revision. Or, the sea sends back a look and it does so quickly—reflecting human
desire back onto the human, keeping a distance from the greed of the anthropos by returning it
immediately. Or, the sea can, like us, have a bit of an aggressive appetite; it can also want us
back. Maybe the ocean is greedy for the very words of the poem that, like things of the human
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realm, drop down toward the sea. Maybe the sea is greedy for space in the human realm or on
land in general, so it calls for attention, nudging into the center of the poem and taking over all
the verbs. Whatever object the rapaciousness is directed at, the ocean that does the wanting gets
to be the subject from now on. Moore gives up all human desire and lets something else want for
a while. The reader doesn’t need to know toward what the want is directed.
Maybe as sea levels rise, the oceans could also be anthropomorphized and categorized as
rapacious. Marshlands, homes, trees that can’t take the salt, human infrastructure, all shoreline
existence are being gobbled up by salt water. In Louisiana, land is measured in terms of football
fields, estimated to be lost at the rate of one of those Carlisle Indian School-inspired fields per
hour between 1932 and 2010 (Couvillion et al). The dread of immanent land loss pervades much
of the anxiety of this beginning of the twenty-first century. In New York City, like many other
places, engineers keep reinforcing sea walls to keep out our watery periphery, keep building
barriers to touching the surround. The ocean is coming and is so far away.
Moore’s man looks at the sea and it looks back, rapaciously. The sea’s look seems
indicative of its inevitable greed for dead things. Those who, like the addressed man, have “worn
that look,” end up back at the oceanic origin point, joining the democracy of death, losing their
“expression” of “protest” (11). The sea and its contents are ruthless. “The fish no longer
investigate” those who have worn the unspecified look, perhaps like the ethically-ambiguous
look Leviathan invites. Humans and their appearances, their hunger for seeing, lose importance
even to the fish below. In the depths of the ocean, some of the objects of greed get collected,
while the waves, “beautiful under networks of foam,” conceal the grave below, bifurcating the
oceanic space into desirable view and macabre deep (16). The returned rapacious look makes the
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sea into a “collector” who does the work on land that the trawl does in the sea, amassing
innumerable bycatch in one gulp.

How We Count
The oceanic and the human realms are segregated in Moore’s poem, interacting through
an unequal exchange of looks and things. As man takes the view of the sea, excluding everyone
else, the sea responds recalcitrantly. It might return a rapacious gaze, but it has “nothing to give”
besides empty space into which the dead can be placed (5). And as the poem continues, the sea
becomes that body who fishes out; rapaciously taking, not a view of the human realm, but of
human bodies themselves—or bodies de-anthropomorphized, that become “dropped things,” like
everything else that sinks into the sea.
One method of quantifying, of reducing the more-than-human to a human currency, is
through naming. Remember how James Baldwin, in his essay “Stranger in the Village,” gets
stuck in the position of using words to say “the root function of language is to control the
universe by describing it” (166). Currency is another medium for exchange whose root function
is always to minimize by assigning a limiting value. Naming “ecosystem services” is one such
method for controlling unwieldy places of abundance by deciding how they contribute to human
life and then quantifying that contribution. Officially developed over the last decade, scientists
and policy workers use the term to describe how ecosystems can be assigned a monetary value
based on their benefits to humans. These benefits are placed into categories such as provisioning
of food and water, supporting crop pollination, and creating opportunities for recreation. Serving
to bring the biopolitical into the realm that used to be called nature, scientists quantify the value,
for some kinds of humans, of a living ecosystem as opposed to the one that is allowed to die. Or,
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to put it another way, scientists can determine if an area is worth more money alive or dead, and
this quantification undergirds many conservation arguments. Some sturgeon might be sacrificed.
And also those who were not yet counted—those who exceed the value.
If man first possesses the view in Moore’s poem, the sea comes to be the actor who
possesses in the end. The ocean not only contains the sunken “things” at the end of the poem,
but, like a spirit, it moves them about so that they “turn and twist” with neither “volition nor
consciousness” (22). Things of the human realm, dropped into a below, trespassing the border
between the oceanic and the human, become subject to a fluid movement, to the will of a new
medium. These dropped things “are bound to sink” (21). They will definitely sink. Or, they are
tied up to their own sinking, netted to falling through the depths. Men might “lower nets,” but the
sea is the last to take. Bottoms are often for death: we could think of a greedy Hades here, or Leo
Bersani’s question of bottoms, “Is the rectum a grave?.” He writes that the rectum is both “the
grave in which the masculine ideal (an ideal shared—differently—by men and women) of proud
subjectivity is buried” as well as, during the AIDS crisis, a harrowing location of viral spread
(222). The subjective dissolution, which the position of the bottom invites, is also part of
Moore’s macabre depths. They destroy the human, perhaps to keep its pieces for something else.
Ecosystem services are a reminder of the us (inside) that is reliant on an ecosystem
(outside). The inside gets to eat the outside and grow bigger with it. For nature to be
instrumentalized, to be written on or used up, it must be an outside to be apprehended: an outthere to be taken here, with hands or tamed into a category with words. The ecofeminists say that
nature, because it is associated with woman, is understood to be a passive entity with cycles of
reproduction that serve man’s needs. Nature and woman, as instruments that get put to use, are
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still in operation together in environmentalist discourse that encourages stewardship (or even
worse, saving) of weakened Mother Nature.
I have been writing about the ocean as a site of mass death as well as limited human
access. But the poem has been moving this chapter in the uncomfortable direction of the sea
becoming an agential killer. Perhaps this is just a poem, like so many others, that is working
against human mortality, wondering what to do if one’s own death is always looming. Perhaps it
is not so different from much of the writing on the Anthropocene, under which flows the anxiety
of a collective death in which one is part, instead of removed. How to square the idea that those
who prepare for the apocalypse, on the right and on the left, forget that there is life worth
preserving that is uncontained in their individual bodies? As the ocean becomes increasingly
agential in Moore’s poem, I am reminded of sea level rise, which is the sea’s metaphoric appetite
for land. I am also reminded that as the sea becomes more acidic, it becomes caustic, corroding
the hard surfaces it used to just slowly erode. Maybe the ocean is becoming, to borrow Lucretius’
words, an “eater-out of walls” with sharper teeth.
Moore’s ocean isn’t just a rapacious consumer, it’s also called a “collector.” If the
beginning of the poem sets aside the figure of the male Romantic poet, the sea as “collector”
addresses masculine Modernism. Literary scholar Victoria Bazin argues that Moore’s poetry
takes up the Modernist themes of collecting, in all of that verb’s association with the commodity
culture with which the Modernists were trying to contend, but Moore does so in her own way.
Bazin uses Moore’s propensity for quoting as an example of collecting without the expectation
of a unified whole, and her object poems as examples of Moore’s desire for “collecting rather
than consuming” (5,7, 9). Ultimately, Bazin believes that Moore “revises the dominant and
masculine motifs of modernity, of the flâneur, the prostitute and the collector, by expressing the
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Arcadian pleasures of a specifically feminized and modern form of desire” (9). Like the ocean in
“A Grave,” Moore “turns and twists” objects over in her poems. With a desire distinct from what
might be considered a masculinized mode of wanting, Moore pockets her things into a collection.
But the pocket isn’t a final resting place. Moore’s poems, which are both contradictory and open
to revision, and the stuff dropped into the sea—or dropped dead in the sea—continue to “turn
and twist.”
If the sea is coming to envelop land, corrode durability of which humans are familiar, it is
also bringing its burden of mass death. To continue the metaphor, it is bringing up its belly of
dead things on to land, and this, in my mind, is where the responsibility of mourning takes over.
The trawled-out notion of value might be expanded in the destruction of human artifice, but I’d
prefer not to wait for a messianic and misanthropic annihilation. There are many, many places to
stop.
Moore’s ocean collects that of the human realm, and perhaps specifically the products of
the human gaze on the oceanic. Or maybe the ocean’s hoarding of dropped human things is like
the hoarding of currency—keeping someone else’s referent for value in one’s possession. Or the
sea is a flâneur, wandering into the streets and picking up things, de-anthropomorphized and
made dead, for its entombed collection. There are, I’m sure, other ways to think of the sea as
collector. There is also the fact that the collection keeps on expanding regardless. And the ocean,
as collector, is in excess of the definition humans, or Moore, can give it.

Return
In Moore’s time, it was believed that when objects sank in the sea, they didn’t necessarily
fall to the bottom. In his exploration of Western culture’s relationship to “the deep,” James
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Hamilton-Paterson explains that it was believed, into the twentieth century, “that as pressure
increased with depth, seawater grew more and more solid until a point was reached beyond
which a sinking object would sink no further. Thus, somewhere in the middle regions of the great
abyss, there existed ‘floors’ on which objects gathered according to their weight” and then
“forever drift[ed] and revolve[d] in timeless suspension” (168). Paterson explains that the
families of the victims on the Titanic believed their loved ones were suspended in the water,
occupying a bloated purgatory that held no promise of release. In other words, they were thought
to “turn and twist” in perpetuity. If bottoms are sometimes for death, but exist on many unsettled
levels, perhaps drowned things were bound to a private abyss that surrounds, that includes no flat
end, no ground, to break up the abyssal opening of space on every side. To turn and twist, then—
or to be suspended between land and sea as Moore does to her reader—is to be, like the camera
the viewer has to follow around in Leviathan, without ocean floor: to levitate unsettlingly in
water and risk dropping.
The levels of settlement in the sea might resemble the levels of settlement, colonial and
otherwise, on land—each settler belonging to its own level within a larger system. The
understanding, in Moore’s time, of the marine medium stacking things on top of each other also
resembles Moore’s long sentences that switch from subject to subject, piling on adjectival
phrases to each independent clause before moving on. “The firs stand in procession, each with an
emerald turkey-foot at the top” and also “reserved as their contours” and also “saying nothing”
(6-7). Separating subjects with a semicolon, Moore moves on to “repression” and then to the
“sea,” which “is a collector, quick to return a rapacious look” (8-9). The stacked nouns and
descriptions do not create hierarchy, but they do accumulate—stretching the boundaries of the
sentence. The view Moore describes is also made up of vertically-stacked images that don’t
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clearly add up. Tortoise shells are “beneath the cliffs,” and the ocean is “under the pulsation of
lighthouses and noise of bell-buoys” (20). Even the bird “swims through the air” so that, though
it flies, it is likened to water creatures, as if its reliance upon the sea drags it into the verbs of the
deep (18).
Hypoxia, the choking out of the dissolved oxygen, might lead to death (red and green
dead zones, like the one in the Gulf of Mexico that expands and contracts but covers, with
hungry algae, more region than we’d like to think). Hypoxia is the condition of being beneath
oxygen that, unlike Moore’s stacked clauses, does not lead to complexity. In her book on
jellyfish, the marine biologist Lisa Gershwin warns that “marine ecosystems will undergo radical
simplification” but that simplification doesn’t mean all life is eradicated (343). Microorganisms
will continue to thrive as shipping containers crash into the last whales. And jellyfish and algae
are also happy to flourish in the current conditions. As algal blooms digest the abundance of
nutrients (in the form of agriculture run-off, nitrates and phosphates—shampoo), their
decomposing bodies budge out breathable oxygen. This is one way fisheries collapse. When
nutrients become too abundant, in other words, when the sea has consumed too much, it begins
to lose its constitutive parts—this is eutrophication, which simply means “well-nourished.”
Nourishment can get excessive and turn into contamination. Or, the fecund womb can turn tomblike.
Jeremy B.C. Jackson claims that “Mass extinction of multicellular life will result in
profound loss of animal and plant biodiversity, and microbes will reign supreme” (11463). What
reigns supreme in “A Grave” is the will of the sea that outdoes the will of the human. Those
men, later made “things,” that lose both “volition” and “consciousness,” that even as they come
close to the surface of the water, remain “unconscious” of its true nature as a grave, seem out-
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done by the sea.23 In this deep, consciousness erodes, and outsiders to the ocean’s belly,
outsiders to ancestral beginnings, lose agency. The return to primordial roots, then, is also a loss
of consciousness as well as a return to what, in psychoanalysis, might be the primordial deep, or
a past trauma, which is subject to “repression” (8). Diving into the layered deep—as Adrienne
Rich will explore in her 1971 poem “Diving into the Wreck”—does not have to be death so
much as loss of consciousness, or perhaps that which is so often understood to be constitutive of
the distinction between the human animal and others.
In Moore’s poem, the sea’s taking seems to be a negation of human attempt to control it
through naming. If the ocean is a medium in which human lack is made obvious through an
inability to breathe as well as control (by way of knowing), it is a limit that negates what humans
think is possible on land. A lot of what humans know about the ocean is frustrating and
incomplete. Most of the information is drawn out from the ocean’s recalcitrant medium using
military money. The knowledge humans might aim for is a kind of consuming, an eating in order
to digest and spit out: name the thing, or make it a view as Moore’s speaker does. But the sea as
grave conceals itself at the same time that it comes to master the human, both now and in the
poem. The ocean offers “nothing” and thus refuses the instrumentalization of an elsewhere with
extractable abundance. The sea’s recalcitrance infiltrates Moore’s descriptions so that, as is so
often the case in Moore’s poetry, negation pervades: “neither,” “nor,” “not,” “nothing,” “not
lasted” (22, 22, 8, 5, 12). The view, then, becomes a view into an abyss that usurps (there is
never a factual abyss: the sea’s more teeming with life than this, our current medium, despite
massive extinction). As the sea takes over Moore’s poem—like jellyfish and slime also
supposedly take over the ocean now—the sea, and the view in which it gets entangled, also

That which “turns and twists” without consciousness might remind one of Wordsworth’s Lucy poems, as it does
Judith Merrin in her essay “Re-Seeing the Sea: Marianne Moore’s ‘A Grave’ as a Woman Writer’s Re-Vision.”
23
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withdraw. The “reserved” firs stand guard, “saying nothing” (7). The sea also seems silent,
refusing not only to speak but also having “nothing to give.” One “cannot stand in the middle of
this” because it pulls away at the same time that it takes. What the speaker sees is “not that
ocean” that is expected. The sea is recalcitrant and deceptive; ushering in a return to Lucretius’
womb-tomb (21).
Marianne Moore is the jellyfish of this chapter, eating her way into the space intended for
the investigation of ocean creatures and their home. I wanted to budge her out, but she came
back to set the limits of an exploration that could be infinite. Her limits are not ends, they just
redirect into alternate directions for thinking and hearing; they produce the strange, mournful
pleasure of the suspended approach to the inaccessible. Like her ocean that repels the advances
of the human, she too repels—in part because she refuses to be legible and in part because her
biography, like so many biographies, shows the entanglements of everyday life and the ways
settlement advances in this country. The ocean is too hard. Moore makes sure its impenetrability
doesn’t go away. If there are ways to mourn a massive loss of that which cannot easily be seen, it
seems one good way to do so is to feel out the space of obstruction—to “turn and twist” in the
experience of a figurative appetite whose purpose is never satiation.
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WRITING IN THE INTERSTICES: JELLYFISH INVASIONS

Jellyfish are the most widely discussed “invasion” in the ocean. They digest the
byproducts, like nitrogen-rich fertilizer and raw sewage, of hyper-accelerated human
metabolism. They reproduce and grow faster in warming waters. The scientist Lisa Gershwin
explains that jellyfish both take advantage of and exacerbate the problems that arise with climate
change, pollution and over-fishing (103). As competitors are fished out, suffocated or toxified to
death, scientists believe jellyfish are taking over the ocean, leaving a trail of goo and feces that is
favorable to microbes who use up a lot of oxygen, making jellyfish like contemporary humans:
productive of little carbon factories (Gershwin 109). Because of the way jellyfish reproduce, they
can wait until the right moment to bloom. Their larvae settle on a hard surface and grow into
polyps, and unless scraped by the trawl or eaten by some other hungry thing, those polyps
reproduce and form colonies that await the right conditions before breaking into sections and
entering the medusa phase in which the creature looks like the jellyfish with which humans are
most familiar. The behavior of the jellyfish who come to colonize the sea and choke out all other
life might look a lot like frontierism, but like all invasives, jellyfish take advantage of disturbed
ecosystems. In other words, to whom can one apply agency for the jellyfish takeover if it is a
result of the destruction of the ocean? Is it poor fishermen, regulators who can’t regulate much
anyway, people who eat seafood, those who own stock in companies, like Trident Foods, Marine
Harvest or Moruha Nichiro, made wealthy from the exhaustion of fish stock?
Jellyfish gum up human enterprise. Gershwin writes that jellyfish are drawn to human
obstruction, that they “have the uncanny knack for getting stuck…even the gentlest flow leads
them toward artificial structures, such as screens, pipes, and nets” (13). In a 2012 article in
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Nature, entitled “Attack of the Blobs,” science writer Mark Schrope explains how “swarms of
gelatinous monsters” forced a Florida nuclear power plant to shut down for fear the creatures
would clog the water-intake pipes (20). This is not uncommon; they have stopped nuclear power
plants all over the world, often for days. In 2006, Queensland jellyfish successfully stranded the
USS Ronald Reagan, a 97,000 ton war ship, by clogging the engine. (Please don’t read too
quickly to notice that the ship is called the USS Ronald Reagan.) They have shut down
desalination plants, and coal plants. They have killed entire farms of salmon by blocking the
salmons’ gills with their stinging cells (Gershwin 17). In many ways, the jellyfish’s invasive
tendency toward artifice has been more successful in monkeywrenching tactics than humans who
more expressly attempt to sabotage environmentally destructive practices.
The jellyfish takeover is also a class problem. Schrope explains that the anthropogenic
degradation of the oceans is “reducing numbers of larger fish and promoting populations of
organisms from lower down the food chain. Among the beneficiaries [are] algae, toxic plankton
and jellyfish—in other words, there [will] be a sea of slime” (21). Here, Schrope deploys a
rhetoric that mourns the loss of a pristine past, laments the low-class masses gaining control of
the oceans. These slimy monstrosities swarm the sea after the human hand has sullied its
distanced, maternal sphere, after humans have failed to be proper stewards. Jellyfish Watch, a
project out of Monterey Bay Research Institute, calls for citizen scientists to report jellyfish
sightings around the world. Their tagline is “what’s in your ocean?”—reminding humans to be
selective with what is deemed “ours.” The deep is a possessed category that is being intruded
upon. Invaders in “your ocean” must be met with a shoring up against them, a solidification of
the boundaries of what is “ours.” Again, this is a familiar story.
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I think Marianne Moore’s friend H.D. (Hilda Doolittle) wanted to be consumed by
jellyfish. Her book, Notes on Thought and Vision, outlines H.D.’s conceptualization of
consciousness as distinct from a Freudian configuration. Here, the triad of the mind are the subconscious mind, conscious mind and over-mind, or universal mind. H.D. writes that the “overmind seems a cap, like water, transparent, fluid yet with definite body, contained in a definite
space. It is like a closed sea-plant, jelly-fish or anemone” (18-19). Repeatedly returning to the
jellyfish, H.D. configures the over-mind as embodied within the sea creature whose tentacles
wrap down and “through the body” (19). The erotics of the invertebrate who pulls her into a fluid
surround that blurs her vision and activates a state of mysticism is both agonizing and creatively
productive (19). The aphoristic prose in Notes pulls examples together. When H.D. writes that
“the body…like a lump of coal, fulfills its highest function when it is being consumed,” I think
of that which consumes as the jellyfish she uses to describe the over-mind. If coal is consumed
for the benefit of humans and to the detriment of everyone, who experiences the function of the
human body consumed, either by jellyfish or someone else? Perhaps both examples are
misanthropic, but the kind of creative transcendence into a universal over-mind that H.D.
describes by way of being eaten seems better than most methods for moving toward universality
or transcendence.
If jellyfish are considered overabundant, taking over the ocean in giant blooms, they are
not unlike Moore’s sea that takes over as primary actor in her poem. We, humans, are also
understood to be invaders. Those who follow Garrit Hardin’s logic see humans as, like jellyfish,
excessively reproductive. We need a limit. Dangerously close to eugenics, this analysis points at
poor people with babies rather than at economic systems. But those who negate the literal
misanthropic approach can still preach a conceptual one. Scholars of the “non-human turn” urge
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others to decenter the human, arguing that the human crowds out the center, takes over the
visible realm so that it is all anthropos. Like the jellyfish who eats up the food chain and
monopolizes entire ecosystems, or the sea in Moore’s poem, the human is understood as
dominating the view.
Part of the academic project of decentering the human has involved recognizing agency
in other actors, just as Moore seems to have done with the sea in “A Grave.”24 In Moore’s poem,
the sea might be a character, or a medium, that has agency, if negative, but all the sea’s negation
produces a nagging feeling that the sea doesn’t care too much about Marianne Moore’s poem. To
me, this is the best way to anthropomorphize. I can think of the sea as absorbed in its own being
and not its description in the poem. Agency is fine and good but it doesn’t need to be granted. It
is a human concept, and if the agency that historian Dipesh Chakrabarty claims is attributed to
the human in the Anthropocene is daunting, and inviting of human-made remedies like
geoengineering, perhaps assigning agency to the natural world leads to actions like naming
jellyfish the enemy. 25 Since assigning agency feels uncomfortably anthropomorphic, it might be
good to remember that Moore’s sea often says “no.” Does everybody else find as much pleasure
in a “no” as I do? I think I like it is because a “no” makes another “no” possible. Negation can
exist beyond the place of opposition; it can expand the realm of the imaginable. If what used to
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From actor network theory to recent scholarship on ecology and the digital, scholars have been stretching the
definition of agency beyond the human. Theorist Jane Bennett writes that she wishes to push the concept of agency
“sometimes to the breaking point” (x). Physicist Karen Barad’s exploration of agency is all verb, rather than static
position. She writes “Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world. The universe is agential
intra-activity in its becoming” (141).
25
An increased understanding of agency is not just discussed in regards to non-human actors, but humans as well.
Dipesh Chakrabarty, in his widely-read theses on the Anthropocene, scales human agency up to the geological,
making agency something humans want to ignore in themselves. The freedom from nature that freedom has
historically insinuated, pushes Chakrabarty to ask, “Is the geological agency of humans the price we pay for the
pursuit of freedom?” (210). Chakrabarty makes agency unappealing, makes me want to crawl back into an atavistic
shell, but of course withdrawal doesn’t do anything. It seems too easy to attribute agency to non-human actors at the
same time humans are told they have more agency, despite the fact that humans experience drastically different
forms of it.
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be called nature withdraws when humans try to assign domineering language to it, then maybe a
dwelling in the “no” is the best, even the most pleasurable, place to be.
Like Moore’s sea, the sea in contemporary poet Vi Khi Nao’s novel, Fish in Exile—
published by Coffee House Press in 2016—takes and gives back a mournful residue. The book
tells the story, from multiple points of view, of a couple mourning the drowning of their children.
Part of their mourning process involves jellyfish and inappropriate eating. Though I’m more
interested in the inappropriate eating, I think it is worth noting that mourning sometimes needs
the invasion of water or the invasion of a species that is proliferating in the hollowed-out spaces
of loss. In Nao’s novel, the grandmother of the dead children watches her son refuse to eat the
haddock she has prepared because the fish might have eaten the bodies of his drowned children.
She thinks:
He may have realized he didn’t want to be part of the food chain his children were on.
Eating the thing that may have eaten his children. I ate the whole thing, child-eater that I
am. I am the grandmother who turns to cannibalism for closure. I chewed the haddock
slowly and deliberately. Its thick, dry, white chunks feel like the sound of a timpani. So
what if the fish was bloated and unwell. I took my grandchildren into me. Insulating them
temporarily from the icy waters of the North. They should view my stomach and my
throat as the mouth of a harbor. A place they can call home. Built from the ground up and
fifty-seven years old. (103-4)
Offering her body as home for those who seem prematurely lost, who seem doubly so because
they are in the vast sea, the grandmother offers safety by way of consumption that becomes
cannibalistic when she remembers how matter circulates. The children get to return to the
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(grand)mother figure by way of her ingesting them with reverence to the webbed ways
everything eats around the food chain.
The ocean is also returning to an origin point. Hypoxic, or without oxygen at all, and
teeming with single celled organisms and jellies, the “sea of slime” about which Schrope warns
is a future of radical simplification that returns the sea to one of many origins before higher
levels of oxygen entered the sea 750-800 million years ago (Gershwin 344). The viscous waters
scientists observe now, and expect to increase dramatically in the future, seems too easily related
also to amniotic fluid. Maybe better to consider what Rachel Carson writes, that “young cod,
haddock, and sometimes other fishes adopt the great jellyfish as a ‘nurse’ traveling through the
shelterless sea under the protection of this large creature and somehow unharmed by the nettlelike stings of the tentacles” (88). The invading jellyfish as mother is perhaps analogous to the
more general return of the sea to its primeval state, but Carson’s sheltered haddock might also be
related to Nao’s haddock who consume children and bring them back to land by way of the
fishing boat and the dinner plate. And Carson’s cod that nestle into an invader’s safety might
remind us that cod are severely depleted, or that they are still sold at McDonalds.
Shelter in the tentacles of H.D.’s erotic over-mind, or scientists’ invader, might be the
best place to stay suspended. I don’t stop here because the maternal tendencies Carson assigns to
the jellyfish absolve it of something. The way of thinking that necessitates absolution, or assigns
uncomplicated blame, is not fit for dwelling in the disasters. But I will stop here because shelter
in the gelatinous creature that signifies a return to the primeval might be a good place to sit with
obstruction.
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CHAPTER THREE:
VERBS WITHOUT SUBJECTS AND INSTANCES OF PRAISE

I’ve never met him. But in my dream I took a walk down some verdant residential block
with the writer Hilton Als. He said the key to good form is to make a strong declaration but omit
what seems to be the most important noun. He advised not to name it until a few sentences later;
to suspend the expected and leave room for whatever else could arise.
I’m in the woods in Georgia, where lichen and rain drip off everything and the red clay
matches the remaining oak leaves that won’t shake off. But I’m thinking about the hawk that
comes by my apartment in Brooklyn—sometimes eating its prey on the edge of the building
across the street so that small-bird feathers rain down on everyone below. That city is not built
for a hawk’s survival. What does it mean about habitable form that the predator lives there
anyway? What imagined Hilton Als noun is suspended by the Japanese honeysuckle that girdles
the uncomfortably-scaly winged elms around here in North Georgia?

A Few Stories
One beginning is that we are being devoured by plants. I won’t start that way because
who is this we and why shouldn’t it be eaten by the vegetal? Another way to begin could be with
description of non-native plants colonizing native ecosystems. But people colonize. Plants
follow.
*
A different way to begin is with destruction: maybe a toxic spill or the clearing away of
land for things like pipelines and parking lots and houses. Often what results in the uprooting of
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ecosystems in process, is that life moves into the interstices that destruction leaves behind. But it
is life with a difference. This chapter will focus on plants, but my generalizations are not
confined to that category. That which first comes into the site of destruction, which is, of course,
in process as well, is usually less diverse than what existed before. And much of the time, that
which thrives in the interstices works to assuage the destruction. Take, for example, the
phragmites that monocrops its way through the New Jersey Meadowlands, which the poet James
Schuyler described as being on fire. It is everywhere—that tall grass import from England that
cuts whatever bare hands try to pull it out. And because, in its obstinacy, it is doing its own
pulling from the marsh it grows in—a pulling of the chemicals that other plants will leave in
place, and a pulling of the heavy metals that seep into waterways if not contained in something—
those miles of lonesome phragmites are, in their own time, sucking up industrial byproduct in
expert ways. And because species like phragmites can persist where others cannot, these species
look to crowd out others. Except all the red-winged blackbirds. Have you seen them?
*
Another version of the story is rooted in the ways that plants exceed the work humans
assign them. Maybe because of the cottage house poem, or John Locke’s prescription to tame
nature, a garden with plants that differ from those in the surrounding landscape started to look
beautiful to some. And this beauty necessitated seeds from elsewhere. In places where colonial
power was, and is, centered, the ability to bring these elsewheres into the here of the garden has
signified a lot of power. But those plants don’t always stay ordered. They spill out of their
containers—the fences that frame them—and sometimes proliferate as they spill, unencumbered
by the pests and predators of the milieus of the elsewheres from whence they came.
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In the 1930s and ‘40s, when the little remaining topsoil in the so-called U.S. south was
threatening to wash entirely into the rivers of everyone’s favorite blues and country songs,
making farming even more difficult than it already was, the newly-created Soil Erosion Service
(later the Soil Conservation Service) paid people up to fifty dollars an acre to plant a vine from
Japan that had been displayed at the 1876 World’s Fair (Blaustein 57). That vine was supposed
to prevent erosion; to keep mud from becoming sea. Kudzu, as everyone knows, became the vine
that ate the south. It also became the “drop it and run vine,” the “typical government gift,” and,
beginning in 1997, a “noxious weed,” according to the federal government (Blaustein 58, 57).
But doesn’t it look pretty mid-bite, as houses get enveloped into its big green mouth? And isn’t
that easy for me to say, as I am not trying to live in that gobbled house? It is fitting, however, in
a place that is so easily named the site for this country’s violent foundation, often at the
exclusion of naming that site in places equally foundational, that there can be a plant that is more
of a force, each vine able to devour evidence of human past at the rate of one foot per day.
*
The ones who want to manage complex ecosystems with carpets of monolithic life, are
often, but not always, ones whose ancestors travelled far from where they were born and brought
with them the methods for managing in this way. When those ancestors came to new places, like
what is usually now called the United States, they brought with them the bugs and plants and
diseases and animals of the places from which they had most recently originated. And because of
the way the European origin places of these people had been deciding that abundance should be
tamed and turned to profit, the places new to them became contaminated with that same
approach. A frenzy of destruction followed. And of course, that destruction made a space for
species to swarm into the disturbance. Now, when people advocate for killing off species that
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have arrived more recently because newly-arrived plants are threatening big crops and big ideas
about what the wild means, those advocates use language of colonialism to make their case.
Ecosystems “we” need are being invaded by pioneering and colonizing species—usually from
Asia—who must be kept out at any cost.
*
There are many stories to tell and of course, they are all too general. There are boats that
move, and people who bring with them something of home to a new place, and cars—tons of
cars—carrying seeds and eggs with them everywhere they go. These stories are generalities of
the particular ways the flux of species, the propensity for proliferation wherever possible, come
to move into a new sphere and condition it. That which conditions my environment is social and
historical and destructive and abundant and political and colonial and personal and economic and
probably a very many other things. I cannot get out of the condition, for example, of living in a
land that has been parceled out to a small number of crops who grow sadly by themselves with
the help of chemicals that have been made to be indispensable to profitable growth. That
condition is not unlike the condition of the city I live in, which is quite close to those commodity
crops that tend to feed livestock more than people. In that city, we are quite monocultural in our
human species landscape that is also sustained by chemicals that have been made to become
indispensable.
I am also conditioned by cycles. As I edit this, I’m waiting for the moon to begin waxing
so I can get to planting in my little garden. Then I’ll wait for the sun to get low in the sky so I
can dispense some water from the rain barrel onto the seeds. These are all conditions I want to
keep sitting in—cycles of the Earth that are rapidly changing, and yet continue to work upon me.
Hannah Arendt’s philosophy on the human condition begins with the first satellite that “dwelt
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and moved in the proximity of the heavenly bodies as though it had been admitted tentatively to
their sublime company” (1). She sees this technology as evidence of a human desire to become
unhinged from the Earth that conditions us. She notes the reporter who unexpectedly, upon
seeing the satellite, marks its success as a “step toward escape from men's imprisonment to the
earth” (1). Arendt had escaped the Holocaust, theorized the totalitarianism out of which that
event arose, and watched Cold War politics engulf much of the globe. From that experience, she
asks her reader to resist fleeing, both literally and figuratively, the Earth that conditions us, and
instead to “think what we are doing” (5). Let’s proceed with Arendt’s instruction in mind.

Appetite is an Impulse to Bring Closer
Read Lisa Robertson’s The Weather in June on a rock nestled into a slope with mossy
squish and uncertainty of bottom. When the sun is direct enough, get too warm to pay attention
to words and go down to the road, which is lined with wild grapes, poison ivy, and garlic
mustard. Find grape leaves who aren’t touching poison ivy. 26 Pick the biggest ones who also
don’t have holes. Steam them a little in the house until they’re bright and pliable. Take them out
to the porch where Heather is making her watercolors. Stuff the leaves with the rice and pine
nuts and spices made last night and roll them with the edges folded in—method from that night
kitchen in Maryland, or the one in Texas, preparing all the wraps for somebody’s could-havebeen-better lunch the next day. That acid flavor is vitamin C, which helps the human body better
make use of the iron that’s also part of the leaf. I bake the dolmas in oil. Other people steam
them.

I slip into anthropomorphic language in this chapter, referring to other-than-human actors with “who.” There is
something to be said for utilizing the language we have differently in order to reorganize thought. And also,
sometimes a “who” feels better.
26
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Disorder
The writer Jamaica Kincaid draws no distinction between her garden and what lies
beyond. Instead of keeping out the local to show off the majestic import of species cultivated for
backyard beauty, she brings closer the plants of the woods around her. When the forest near her
home has enough to spare, she brings herbs and flowers to her yard and gives them space to
proliferate. She describes her desire for a disordered and foraged garden in her essay “Alien
Soil,” part of her mid-1990s “In the Garden” column in the New Yorker. In the essay, Kincaid
experiments with form. Her garden will not stand out from its surroundings by way of
exceptional beauty, nor will her gardening column be circumscribed by the expected:
instructions paired with anecdote. Her experimentation honors both that word’s Old French root,
esperment, which among other things, means to perform magic, and its Latin root, experiri,
which means “to try.” Far from the empiricist model of proving a hypothesis, Kincaid’s
experiment is a playful attempt to make magic with what’s around. Science has these roots too:
look, for example, at how Lucretius’ verse form shapes his exploration of the atomic. Kincaid
lets the conditions of place limit the possibilities of her garden, a limitation in which she finds
pleasure.
But her essay begins with an opposite approach: that of the British in her native Antigua.
Reading the land in relation to its social history because, of course, the two are inseparable,
Kincaid writes that the British “obsessively order and shape their landscape to such a degree that
it looks like a painting…while a painting never looks like the English landscape, unless it is a
bad painting” (47). Despite colonization, she writes that Antiguans are “blissfully lacking” the
landscaping values of the British (47). They do, however, live in an ecosystem largely conceived

152

by that European mind. Kincaid lists some of the plants that are strongly associated with the
practices, eating choices, and identity of the island, describing how each was brought from one
colonial context to another: mango from Asia, hibiscus from Asia and East Africa, allamanda
from Brazil, the poinsettia from Mexico, etc. (48). She sits with breadfruit for a bit longer,
explaining that the child’s distaste for the bulbous, starchy fruit must arise from a sense of its
history on the island; from the fact that it was brought by the British from the East Indies to
cheaply feed slaves in the Caribbean. The British masterminded the landscape, moving plants
from one continent to another to increase profit (usually by way of the metropole and its
warehouse of plant life: Kew Gardens, but I’ll get to that later). As Kincaid points out, what is
sacrificed for the British appetite for tobacco, sugar and cotton, is hardwood forest that kept fresh
water on the island. Drought-ridden and simplified, Antigua came to more closely resemble the
bad landscape painting with a laboring frame.
Life on the island is conditioned by the remains of colonial vegetal ordering, but not
entirely. Imported food might help make identity, but the British approach to plant life isn’t, and
was never, fully adopted. Kincaid contradicts the British colonial assumption that people of the
tropics did not garden, asking: what if those who are not Euro-descended “are contented with
their surroundings, are happy to observe an invisible hand at work and from time to time laugh at
some of the ugly choices this hand makes; what if they have more important things to do than
make a small tree large, a large tree small, or a tree whose blooms are usually yellow bear black
blooms; what if these people are not spiritually feverish, restless, and full of envy?” (51). Yes.
There is something to being conditioned by, rather than resisting, the wild that is more invested
in the land as it is than how the rather limited human mind decides it should be. There is also a
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curiosity about what is here, rather than a “restless” attempt to import what is over there.
Kincaid’s gardening is an improvisation without this thrust of envy. And she is not the only one.

Magic for Stopping and Starting Again
Everyone here is sick of trying to get arrested and calling it a fight against the tangled
beast of fossil fuel extraction, transport, refinement and burn-up. So we go do magic at the spot.
We’re not the only ones who want to fight with ritual. There are many. But I, and most of the
others present, don’t have ceremonies long-rooted in this land to draw from. So we make our
own ritual together. There’s a circle of us. I’m suspicious of the whole thing, but I’m more
suspicious of my own belief because it’s a little too earnest.
An image of a heron comes to my mind while we all sit doing the ritual. The bird is
laying a protective sheet over the whole area, stabilizing the edges into the ground with her beak.
The next day I go onto the river that they’ll dry up for this power plant, and the nests of herons
are clustered together as I didn’t know they would be. The birds move around above my head—
graceful and pretty; sloppy, too. Their lanky legs sometimes hang awkwardly with nowhere to
go.

Praise with Those Who Cannot Be Seen
The eighteenth century British poet Christopher Smart wrote his rather disordered theory
of natural science, Jubilate Agno, through praise and rejoicing. He was confined to a mental
asylum while he composed his verses about a natural world to which he was barred access.
Smart was sent to the asylum because he prayed too loudly on the streets of London; or because
he fell into a feverish state that made him delusional; or because he drank and spent too much—
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angering his publisher and father-in-law John Newbery, for whom the Newbery Medal is named
(Sherbo 109-116). Or maybe it was some combination of those factors. In any case, Smart was
committed to the madhouse, and to his acts of exaltation, and to offering an alternative to
Newtonian science. From these various commitments, he wrote his antiphonal poem of praise,
only fragments of which remained by the time the text was first published in 1939. The book is
conditioned, not only by Smart’s various commitments, but also by form and procedure. The text
exists in five major fragments of which only some still contain their two sides: one whose lines
begin with “Let” and the other whose lines begin with “For.” Much of the writing that remains is
dated, showing that for many of the fragments, Smart wrote a consistent number of lines per day.
In other words, Smart’s particular natural science is conditioned by an accounting of passing
days, perhaps more specifically, days spent in confinement. His accounting of time is also an
account of the natural world as he understands it, but not as he is able to freely learn. Instead, he
is conditioned by his form and the specific yield of a passing day.
Smart’s lines fluctuate in form between parts. In the first, his “Let” verse commands
various Biblical characters to “bless,” “praise” or “rejoice” with something of the natural world.
Often, that thing is diminutive. Worms of various varieties return again and again, as do toads,
for, as he writes of the mole, “he [sic] that looketh low shall learn” (A.54). Smart does not
command the various Biblical figures to praise the things of the Earth directly, but rather to do so
with them. Like my dreamed-up Hilton Als, Smart withholds the object of blessing, praising and
rejoicing, and instead focuses on the shared verb between human and creature. In this activation
of the verb with the human and the other-than-human, Smart learns something of the latter. The
system of knowledge produced by this collaborative act is too varied to summarize; summary
would only diminish Smart’s system of classification. His observations extend to, and beyond,
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numbers, humans, geography, physics, plants and language. Sometimes the diminutive offers a
moral lesson, as with the mole who teaches to look down, or in Smart’s line: “Let Job bless with
the Worm—the life of the Lord is in Humiliation, the Sprit also and the truth” (A:51). Often he
produces, not a system like Linnaeus, but a series of observations whose lack of accrual into
larger scientific generalizations seems to be an argument for specificity and observation. His
findings are those of one who has rejoiced in what knowledge he has gleaned from the world, or
perhaps more accurately, rejoiced with the world in such a way that knowledge makes its way
into him. It seems that Smart himself has “rejoice[d] with the Skuttle-Fish, who foils his foe by
the effusion of his ink” and also “with Scolopendra, who quits himself of the hook by voiding his
intrails” (B1.125; B1.210).
Smart’s aphoristic paeans seem to produce systems of knowledge incidentally. Smart’s
lines emphasize praise so that if he blesses “God in all gums & balsams & every thing that
ministers relief to the sick,” it is only through that blessing that the reader sees how gums and
balsams are categories of trees that are both medicinal (B1.110). Because each living creature is
filled with rejoice and praise just by doing what it does, if one is to rejoice and praise with it, one
learns the nature of that creature (Walsh 14). Refuting many of the philosophers significant to his
time—Hobbes, Locke and Newton—Smart commands the human to be active with the creatures
who often go unnoticed, and it is in that way that a conditioned and incomplete knowledge of the
world emerges.

Directions without Nouns
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Give someone directions without street names or other obvious nouns. You might think
about slant, feeling, plants, voices, quality of light, shape, or smell as replacements. Try omitting
as many nouns as possible.

Storm Soaked Self
Poems are supposed to be little sanctuaries for language to be contained in what feels like
a sacred form. But the contemporary poet CAConrad (and many others, too) makes them part of
a larger material practice into which the reader is invited. Conrad’s most recent books, A
Beautiful Marsupial Afternoon (2012), Ecodeviance: (soma)tics for the future wilderness (2014),
and While Standing in Line for Death (2017), all published by Wave Books, have printed
instructions for the exercises that have produced the poems that follow. The instructions, which
Conrad calls somatic exercises and rituals, are themselves poems, ones that let poetry seep out of
the usual containers of page and speech to be a physical practice in the world. In A Beautiful
Marsupial Afternoon, Conrad tells the reader, amongst other things, to lie with the trees in the
medians of shopping mall parking lots, steal dirt from the Emily Dickinson Museum, and save
all the week’s garbage to distribute it in rich neighborhoods with good messages like “OIL THIS
WAR!” and “YOUR SISSY CHILDREN SAVE THE WORLD FROM YOU!” (94). Conrad
makes the body an instrument for poetry—earnestly encouraging the reader to do the same by
replicating the poet’s procedures.
In “Storm Soaked Bread,” Conrad tells the reader to get in the rain and enjoy it; to ignore
the ones who run for cover—because “you are a poet with a storm to digest” (18). After
remembering that humans are eighty percent water, after acknowledging that a little extra water
on the skin shouldn’t be a big deal, after writing in the midst of this dermal and spiritual intake of
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rain, the reader is meant to hold a slice of bread into the storm. From here, Conrad instructs to
begin chewing the bread “With deliberate SLOOOWNESS” and in that slowness, think of “how
this water has been in a cycle for MILLIONS OF YEARS, falling to earth, quenching horses,
elephants, lizards, dinosaurs, humans. They pissed, they died, their water evaporated and
gathered again into clouds to drizzle down AND STORM DOWN into rivers, puddles,
aqueducts, and ancient cupped hands” (18). Rain water, and all the deep time enfolded into its
molecules, are invited to enter the reader’s body: “your lips, your stomach, to feed your sinew,
your brain, your living, beautiful day” (19). Conrad is producing an appetite in the reader for
nourishment by way of what has been deemed unsafe and emphasizing how it cycles through the
human body as it cycles through other parts of the Earth. Conrad’s experiments assume that
organisms on all levels are open systems that can be experienced as such.
But along with all that deep time and acidic precipitation, there is the missing dash
between “storm” and “soaked.” I dwell for a while on dash lack—deciding that if Conrad let that
punctuation creep in, the storm would be reduced to aiding an adjective for the properly edible,
human-made food item. Without the dash, each word has some autonomy and remains in
process, rather than serving as a description of finalized soaked product. This individuality is
maintained amidst Conrad’s larger call to experiment with interdependence, enmeshment,
entanglement, or whatever other buzzword there is to describe the expansive connection amongst
all things. The individuality of each word de-emphasizes that which is deemed edible and
perhaps serves as a reminder that storms and soaking are significant outside of their relationship
to bread. If the body is an open system through which storms cycle, so is the bread. And
Conrad’s punctuation helps to take attention from bread as already storm-soaked and places it on
the converging processes of wet weather bloat.
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Conrad’s exercise demands the ingestion of this convergence of storm and bread in
process together and thus cultivates an appetite for process over product—process that is
inclusive of deep time and the wildness of the world. In an interview at the back of A Beautiful
Marsupial Afternoon, Conrad writes that:
The last large wild beasts are being hunted, poisoned, asphyxiated in one way or another,
and the transmission of their wildness is dying, taming. A desert is rising with this falling
pulse. It is our duty as poets and others who have not lost our jagged, creative edges to
FILL that gap, and RESIST the urge to subdue our spirits and lose ourselves in the
hypnotic beep of machines, of war, in the banal need for power, and things. With our
poems and creative core, we must RETURN THIS WORLD to its seismic levels of
wildness. (88-9)
To that, I would add that the small creatures of this world are also disappearing, and their
magical wildness goes with them. That magic is perhaps even more of a loss because it has gone
largely unnoticed by humans and therefore is more difficult to learn to mimic, or learn to praise
into being-in-some-other-kind-of-way. If what is being lost is a wildness that the poet can return
to this world, storm soaked bread is one way that wildness can enter the poet’s body so that it
might be reproduced. Conrad cultivates wild appetite for water, rather than the tamed tap or the
containment of privatized, plastic bottled water from an elsewhere that is supposedly less
corrupted. The command to ingest in this wild way initiates a process of physically and
consciously connecting to basic planetary cycles. Eating the storm through the bread, Conrad
doesn’t invite the rain to come down, but sits in the wet conditions that are. Conrad’s exercise
does not will rain into the “desert [that] is rising,” but rather encourages a willing of oneself into
the wildness that is increasingly replaced by lack.
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Experiment with Better Lines
Day One: Gather three things that are unwanted.
Day Two: Draw four lines in four very special places. Do your lines with reverence and
take your time.
Day Three: Find six things on the street who have secrets.
Remaining Days: Begin the conversations (physical, linguistic, auditory, spiritual, or
other) between the items in your collection of unwanted ones, special lines, and street things with
secrets. Keep going. Change locales, revelations and participants for each conversation.

Dislocated Listening Self
The experimental composer Pauline Oliveros’ practice of deep listening does not concern
itself with producing particular effects in the listener as much as it does with proliferating
methods for paying attention to sound. Her suspended dwelling in the permeations of the act of
listening expands the verb’s meaning so that soaking up sound also becomes a form of making.
Deep listening is an experimentation with sensing everything in the tangled soundscape with
equal measure. If hearing is passive, and listening is more active, deep listening is a participation
with all sound, not just by using the ear but by activating the entire body.
Oliveros developed the practice in the late 1980s, after more than twenty years of
experimental composing in various institutions and settings. She led deep listening workshops
around the world and in Kingston, New York at her Deep Listening Institute until 2016 when she
died. Her workshops, insofar as they have been documented in her published work, ask
participants to experiment with her in ways that don’t determine an outcome, but rather, through
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somatic instruction and questioning, push participants to expand their experience of the
soundscape and their place in it. I never got the chance to do a workshop with Oliveros, but my
reading of her has led to a practice of seeking out barely-perceptible sounds and weaving them
more fully into my attention. If Freud writes that the body shuts down in shock, I hear Oliveros
urging instead for radical openness (Freud 5-24). So when I feel anxious and superior in the parts
of the city where I live that have lost their character almost entirely to global capital and streams
of people spending or making money, I practice absorbing everything around me. I seek out each
sound, intentionally bringing them all into my body. When I first did this, I was surprised that the
practice calmed me down immensely. It is comfortable to be situated in a place, rather than
attempt to ignore it—even when that place looks pretty evil. It is a bit like mimicking, with the
body, Jamaica Kincaid’s garden. I cannot be in the over there, so I suspend nicely and
consciously in the here; which is also perhaps quite similar to how the dirt-eater keeps eating
toxic earth. The body can be a leaky sensing vessel that attention continues to fill.
In her 1998 book of essays and compositions, Roots of the Moment, Oliveros imitates
with the written word the simultaneity of the soundscape to which she urges people to pay
attention. Sometimes four different pieces share the page, concurrently printed across multiple
pages from start to finish. Her sound pieces, essays, and grant applications all collaborate to
make the book. They speak to each other and form a little community of meaning to be
experienced in multiple ways. The reader can choose to ignore the clues in typeface and spacing
that each piece is different and instead wander. Oliveros makes it easy to let the practice of
reading mimic the movements that attention makes; to stop reading from left to right, top to
bottom and instead jump around and break the linear rules of writing.
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Deep listening breaks with expected orderings in ways that the individual works mirror
through both the equalization of sound in deep listening and the simultaneity on the page break.
Her sound pieces are often printed as big lists with short lines that are two or three words long
and seem to be arranged in no particular order. “Dream Horse Spiel,” for example, lists “horse”
phrases for forty-four pages. “Horse” is repeated over a long duration, each time with a
difference in what feels like both playful and quite serious free association. Because the list
doesn’t have an easily-recognizable logic to its order, it reveals no hierarchy. Like deep listening,
Oliveros’ enumeration lets everything in without classifying in expected ways, and then
continues to seek out more.
Oliveros’ “Listening Meditation” is subtitled “In the Ears of Others” and begins “Inside
the ear/Outside” (Roots 82). In it, she commands the reader to “Bring what is outside inside” and
“Bring what is inside outside” (Roots 83). Her exercise can help make the boundary between
those two locations porous, or make the self into what she calls a “porous membrane” (“The
Earthworm” 37). But deep listening also breaks the distinction between inside and outside,
initiating a process wherein the listener is “becoming what is heard” (Roots 121). Deep listening
is thus a receiving of the world that makes the attentive self merge with the surround. The
method by which this occurs puts any prior singular receiving body into question. Oliveros asks,
“Where are the receivers for these tiny, mysterious signals? / Inside? Outside? Cells?” (Roots
46). She makes that which senses separate from her, either exterior or differentiated as cells,
rather than a discrete self. As such, she makes the listener multiple, but also expanded. It can also
move to other listening bodies—a process Oliveros provokes through analogy and questions that
are similar to Zen kōans:
What if your ears could be located at any distance from your body?
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What if you could hear from another body—from an animal or a bird?
What if you could hear like a tree or a rock? (Roots 83)
Her questions are instructional. The reader does not need to answer with words, but can enact the
simile through the practice of deep listening. The simile is chremamorphic—the human is made
to be like stone. But Oliveros’ emphasis is not on rethinking the nouns involved in the
soundscape; she instead focuses on the practice of making those nouns fall malleably into simile.
As listening expands, Oliveros displaces sound receivers from the ears, or even the listener’s
body. If Conrad experiments towards making the body a receptacle for the world, Oliveros
experiments towards displacing the sensing self into another body. The perceiving entity shifts,
away from the ears, and into the “over there” of the rock, or tree, or bird. If the listening entity is
displaced from the body, the cognitive function of listening is put into serious question. In fact,
everything about that which does the listening is in question. The simultaneous invitation of the
soundscape to enter indiscriminately and the active distribution of the listening self, make that
self so stretched and displaced, that it begins to fall away. Or, it at least gives over its importance
to the verb—maybe to process in general. The verb’s nature is to be active but Oliveros’ focus on
refining the verb makes it the constant of the experiment. The verb might expand, but it doesn’t
shift like the listening self that is made subitaneous or like the sounds coming in and out of
awareness. It seems that the nouns are replaceable in the presence of a strong enough verb.
The enacting of the strong verb of listening does not rid the world of binaries entirely, but
it does suspend the binaries that produce nouns in the relation: subject and object, inside and
outside, listener and sound. In “Just Listening” Oliveros recounts an experience one of the
participants had in a workshop she led about the ecology of sound. The participant has a vision in
which he encounters a figure that he realizes is a wound of the place where he lives. The wound
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is so expansive, he has trouble interacting with it. He then imagines a voice and bright light that
welcomes him into the trouble with calm. It tells him, “I will place great peace in your hearts...It
will appear to you at times that you are engaged in a battle, but do not allow the perception of
conflict to draw you into polarization. Act always out of peace and you will not know duality
will never be beaten down or vanquished” (Roots 122-3). Duality is not eradicated, but he is able
to suspend himself in a willed ignorance that helps him believe in its possible demolition. In
other words, it is through practice that one can reach, not the promise of a utopian end, but the
promise of understanding the fragility of the thing wished to be destroyed. Deep listening, it
seems, is a way to experiment one’s way out of the categories Western thinking has established
as real. And if you’ll allow the conflation of getting out of duality and coming out: if one can
practice one’s way into a hope of coming out of duality isn’t it great to think that Oliveros, who
was a lesbian, writes that coming out is on the horizon—an impossibility that one can practice
toward seeing as possible?
Oliveros’ emphasis on the verb, varied displacement of the self, and equalizing of the
soundscape, all contribute to a privileging of process rather than nouns. Her prompts, as they are
written, make the verb more active in defining the relationship between things than the relata
themselves. Oliveros’ focus on how listening actively transpires, makes little space for human
exceptionalism. The plethora of ways a verb can occur between two things emphasizes a
suspension in process rather than the causation that empirical science aims to learn from
experiment. Her exercises promise no changes to their practitioners, not because that’s
impossible but because it’s beside the point. All the mess of naming how one thing affects
another—a naming that must assume a prior stasis—is left alone when process is the focus. For
the human who is taught to amend the landscape to the will, or to consider how the environment
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is imposed upon the self, this switch to praxis limits such approaches. Because causality has no
place here, listening doesn’t happen in order to achieve anything or to measure anything. It is a
practice for its own sake.
Both CA Conrad and Pauline Oliveros experiment with Eastern thought. Conrad is
influenced by the Indo-Persian meaning of soma, which is the divine, and by a Taoist
macrobiotic diet; Oliveros works with Zen practices (Conrad 1, 163). Later, I’ll refer to Ralph
Waldo Emerson, whose ideas were informed by Hindu philosophy that British colonialism had
made available in the West. These influences are varied and I will not reduce their use to
appropriation. I will say that ideas are historically-situated and they travel, like seeds or people,
for historically-specific reasons. Experiments without good intentions are never going to produce
new forms. No westerner’s expensive meditation retreat in Bali, for example, is saving them
from the malnourishing conditions that help pay for such vacations. Methods need ethics to
initiate them. The writer Grace Cheng told me her Buddhist practices are never going to heal
white people from the plague of their histories or their present. Switching the container of
thought from West to East will not pull apart all that needs to be examined and remediated. But
if Oliveros shows that one can practice one’s way into the idea that duality is destructible, it is
because she begins with the idea that duality should be destroyed. I think with the maxim from
prison abolitionists that no life is disposable—and of course, that life is not confined to the
human. Or, to employ an idea from the East again, the environmental activist Vandana Shiva
writes about the principle of Earth Democracy being first that “all species, peoples and cultures
have intrinsic worth. All beings are subjects who have integrity, intelligence, and identity, not
objects of ownership, manipulation, exploitation, or disposability. No humans have the right to
own other species, other people, or the knowledge of other cultures through patents and other
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intellectual property rights” (Earth Democracy 9). To Arendt’s reminder to stop escaping the
Earth that conditions the human, let’s add this reminder that all life has intrinsic value and should
not be owned.

Appetite for Unwanted Things
I go out in the boat with the high school students I’ve been working with. We’ve come to
New Haven to meet Bun Lai, who took over his mother’s sushi restaurant and renamed it Miya’s
Sushi. He got worried about marine species from elsewhere proliferating in Long Island Sound.
Instead of serving catch from other places, he decided to go looking for the species he wished
wouldn’t budge out the ones who have been here longer, and to serve those so-called invaders in
his restaurant.
We anchor and dive in. We’re all pulling stuff up and messing with our goggles and
laughing about eating snails when one young person tells me her legs feel weird. I suggest she go
back in the boat and rest. While she does, one of Lai’s friends who had come along with us starts
shouting that he’s been stung by a jellyfish. Pretty soon, we realize we all feel stung and we
swim quickly to the boat. We look down and see we had dove directly into a swarm of East coast
sea nettle—seeking one so-called invasion but getting in the way of another.
One way to make room for more diverse growth amidst a simplification of the ecosystem
is to develop an appetite for the prolific. In May, the garlic mustard comes up near me, twirling
in its first year close to the ground and in the second year, reaching higher and producing little
white flowers. It is sly. It doesn’t just cover a lot of ground and crowd out others who want sun,
but it sends out chemicals to stop other plants from growing. It is allelopathic, like black walnut
or chinaberry or tree of heaven. The word combines the Greek allelon (mutual) with pathos, but
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wasn’t used specifically for plants until the Czech-Austrian botanist, Hans Molisch, coined it
right before World War II, while he was vice president of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. He
died in 1937, before his work on the subject was published, and before the war broke out. But it
might be significant that shared pathos would be both applied to the other-than-human world and
instinctively pejorative at that time and in that place.
The allelopathic garlic mustard feels good in the human mouth, communicating, at least
to my gums, that something curative is entering the system. It’s been used as medicine for a long
time in Europe, where it has grown for longer than here. It’s good for asthma and eczema. Its
leaves help circulate the blood, aid in digestion, and provide vitamins A and C as well as
enzymes. Alfred North Whitehead says organisms destroy their environments by eating into
them, and in turn, their environments restore themselves. What eating into garlic mustard does, is
give more space for other things to grow in the understory of forests or, maybe, on the sides of
the road it loves so much. In other words, eating into the abundance of garlic mustard makes the
body an instrument for making room for difference, both in the environment that might crave
more diversity, and in the stomach that gets healed by the medicine the plant has to offer. The
conditions of abundant garlic mustard, then, make for conditions of freely-available food with a
strong, good taste and high vitamin content. I go looking for it, which doesn’t take long, not to
rid it from my environment, but to feed myself with what’s abundant. It is probably going to
spring right back up again. After all, it is growing in conditions that are right for it. But moving
so-called invasion—rather than intentionally-produced monocultures—through the body for
nourishment is a nice way of changing appetite to make the human body a tool for a different
kind of destruction.
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Praise, Proliferation and Use
If eating can be a form of filtering through the body that which supposedly invades the
milieu and if not all life gets space as long as there are species who monocrop their way into the
wild, then eating them seems like a good use of the mouth to make niches for more diverse
growth. But many of the plants that scientists and land managers are concerned about getting
ejected by those plants that come in and proliferate after destruction, become more abundant
when harvested. Think of the various kinds of mushrooms, whose harvest often helps it spread
further. The assumed equivalence of protection and leaving alone is a sad result of human
separation from the vegetal surround, one that makes humans reliant on food grown and
processed by other people. The idea that life is best preserved by avoidance assumes that the role
of the human is always destructive. I hear this being said to children all the time—to leave
something alone. Or later, if they are a part of a class that goes camping, they might be taught to
“leave no trace.” I was taught, by my wild mother, who dropped out of a Botany PhD program,
to eat my way through the woods. While pleasurable and nourishing removal can make space for
other things, it can also be a tending of that upon which one wishes to remain reliant.
The biologist Robin Wall Kimmerer (Potawatomi) writes a praiseful account of
reciprocity between the human and more-than-human realms in her 2013 book Braiding
Sweetgrass. Her chapter on that plant takes the form of a scientific paper—with an introduction,
literature review, hypothesis, methods, results, discussion, conclusions and acknowledgements—
but it isn’t confined to the expected material for each of these sections. The acknowledgements,
for example, poetically and carefully thank grass, and the conclusions end with the assertion that
“All of our flourishing is mutual” (166). The experiments that Kimmerer makes before these
conclusions, are “conversation[s] with plants” wherein “plants answer questions by the way they
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live, by their responses to change” (158). What Kimmerer learns through this kind of dialogue is
what her friend’s grandmother “always said: ‘If we use a plant respectfully, it will stay with us
and flourish. If we ignore it, it will go away’” (157). Watching her graduate student harvest
sweetgrass in some areas while not paying attention to it in others, Kimmerer sees what
grandmother knowledge didn’t need vindicated: that those fields gathered with care proliferated
far more than those left alone by humans.
For Kimmerer, human use of plants must be done, not through the obliteration that most
forms of agriculture teach, but through abiding by the rules of the honorable harvest:
Know the ways the ones who take care of you, so that you may take care of them
Introduce yourself. Be accountable as the one who comes asking for life.
Ask permission before taking. Abide by the answer.
Never take the first. Never take the last.
Take only what you need.
Take only that which is given.
Never take more than half. Leave some for others.
Harvest in a way that minimizes harm.
Use it respectfully. Never waste what you have taken.
Share.
Give thanks for what you have been given.
Give a gift, in reciprocity for what you have taken.
Sustain the ones who sustain you and the earth will last forever. (183)
Kimmerer and her student give humble and praiseful attention to plants in ways that put the
vegetal and human into a shared exchange so that both can thrive. The conditions that Kimmerer
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puts on the harvest are a reminder that changing forms of relation are not without specified
guidelines. The rules require that which is used to implicate mind, body, language and physical
practice in the field—grabbing attention on all of those levels in ways that stretch the meaning of
praise as valuing beyond a linguistic act to one that is physical.
Vandana Shiva similarly advocates for honoring local knowledges that put humans in
reciprocal relation to their environments through particular kinds of use. Like Kimmerer’s
resistance to the empiricist model—one that she shows through putting the form of scientific
papers to a different use—Shiva condemns the “monoculture of the mind” that separates the
spheres of food cultivation and the wild. This mind sees other-than-human life as divisible
resource and that which cannot be commodified as disposable. As a result, “nature” becomes an
assembly line, and human practices based in traditional ways of being with the wild are often
destroyed. The Green Revolution only exaggerated the monoculture of the mind, helping to
expediently turn regenerative systems into exhaustible resources. Nutritional foods were replaced
by commodity crops, further binding the attrition of biodiversity of other-than-human life to that
of humans. This approach, which eats its way into the global sphere, especially by way of the
pervasive influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, defines use in
restricted ways, ignorant of the ways all life is connected by multiform relations involving use.
As the monoculture of the mind eats, it “destroys the very conditions for alternatives to exist,
very much like the introduction of monocultures destroy the very conditions for diverse species
to exist” (Monocultures 12). If this dominant knowledge system “perceives only one value,
based on the market” it quickly “creates an alienation of wisdom from knowledge and dispenses
with the former” (Monocultures 27, 60). Shiva calls for a redefinition:
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of knowledge such that the local and diverse become legitimate as knowledge, viewed as
indispensable because concreteness is the reality, and globalization and universalization
are more mere abstractions that have violated the concrete and hence the real. Such a shift
from the globalizing to the local knowledge is important to the project of human freedom
because it frees knowledge from dependency on established regimes of thought, making
it simultaneously more autonomous and more authentic. (Monocultures 62)
If Shiva demands a resurgence, and valuing of local forms of understanding the other-thanhuman realm, what happens when the local looks to be gobbled up by something from
elsewhere? Newly-introduced plants seem an abstraction as Shiva defines it—both a result of
globalization and a force within it. As such, they seem to necessitate an abstracted, or more
generalized knowledge. But how can lessons from the particular elsewheres of these plants’
origins also be transported? What local observation and experimentation can be put to use for
developing concrete ways of knowing about the surround? After all, the local is not unchanging,
it is simply specific.
Kimmerer and Shiva honor forms of knowledge that resist dominant ones and activate a
practice of reciprocity and praise. In his perfectly-titled book, Eating the Landscape,
anthropologist Enrique Salmón writes that the “lessons from [his] Rarámuri heritage” include an
approach to the natural world “not as one of wonder, but of familiarity,” one that emphasizes a
“kincentric relationship to everything around us” (155, 156). The kinds of use that familiarity
over wonder offer seem to, in part, follow the conditions of the responsible harvest by refusing
the binary between human and “nature.” All of these modes turn to traditional and local
understandings that aim for human and other-than-human kin to flourish together. Use becomes
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an interactive invitation for collectivity, one mode of which is the cultivation of an appetite for
that which one wants to sustain.

Experiment with Appetite
Within the limitations of a single day, find something that probably has an appetite for
another thing with which it hasn’t yet come into contact. Spend some time with each.
You might find this involves first looking for whatever has a strong appetite. What about
their form makes you draw this conclusion?
Repeat with sounds instead of things.
Remember the small can have an appetite for the large, etc.

Plans for Extirpation
Note that extirpation, in a general sense, is from the Latin exstirpare (to root out) and
means to eradicate completely. For ecologists, the term signifies a local extinction of a species,
but not a global one. Extirpation often leads to extinction. One common example is the gray
wolf, who, because of its appetite for livestock, was hunted to extirpation on the east coast and
most of the rest of the continent. The “War on Wolves Act” of 2017 aims to eradicate them
completely. I’ve been postponing a discussion of the logic that produces life, like that of the
wolf, as pestilent. I have tried not to settle on the simple definitions for native, non-native and
invasive that science has given the other-than-human world. Unlike people, who might claim the
term native as a political tool to organize themselves and gain power within oppressive systems,
plants and other kinds of species are given these names to establish their value in an ecosystem.
Native species are to be protected against those non-native invasives, who, without the
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conditions that restrict their livelihoods in their places of origin, are understood to proliferate in
such a way as to outcompete native populations. While some non-natives are not seen as
invaders, and instead nestle into a place in the ecosystem without disturbing it much, the socalled invaders are thought to take over extensively. I’ve held back the history of these categories
because it is not in response to this language that a human relationship to ecosystem dynamics
can tend toward praise of the wild rather than the urge to enforce order. I wanted to begin by
describing modes of experimentation that enact such praise, not categorized as simply in
resistance to managerial approaches, but as significant in their own right. But now that some of
these experimental approaches have been somewhat established, I want to consider the ways in
which a praiseful approach rebels from dominant language and practice.
Before there was “invasive,” there was simply the weed—what Ralph Waldo Emerson
called “a plant whose virtues have not yet been discovered” (“The Fortune of the Republic”).
Agriculture produces the conditions for constructing the category of weed as the other to that
which is desired. Weeds do not exist together in the system of classification upon which science
now depends. The varied plants that tend to be categorized as such are described as rapid
proliferators who outcompete others. In his book, Ecological Imperialism, the so-called “father”
of environmental history, Alfred W. Crosby, reminds his readers that the weed follows the plow,
coming into disturbed areas and “doing what many of them evolved to do when the Pleistocene
glaciers retreated: grow profusely in miserable micro-environments” (168). Though agriculture
created the idea of the weed, colonialism created its fervent spread. The massive migration of
people and things helped send animals, plants and diseases into different lands. But, as Crosby
explains, the ways colonialism restructured the landscape produced conditions for “weeds” to
thrive. In what is currently called the United States, colonial disruption invited Old World
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“weeds” to take root and cover the disturbed land. The reason plantain leaf was called
Englishman’s foot was not only because everywhere the British walked, their shoes transported
the seed, but also because the English foot was creating good conditions for plants that had
evolved to amend disturbed earth.
It wasn’t only the approach to earth as mere substrate for extraction that encouraged some
plants to proliferate; sometimes new species were intentionally introduced in the so-called New
World. But first, botanical specimens were brought back to colonial centers of power, helping to
establish new fields of science that followed in the footsteps of the medieval English enclosure
movement by instilling the idea that with knowledge came the ability to best use “nature” as a
resource. In his book Nature’s Garden: Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the
World, historian Richard Drayton argues that, beginning in the sixteenth century, the
development of the Western sciences—especially botany—was entangled in imperial enterprise.
Drayton writes that the introduction of plants from the colonies to the metropole produced new
economies and “new cultures of ornament and order” (Drayton xv). And “Beyond this practical
impact, the sciences with their premise of insight into, and control over, nature, lent potent
ideological help” (xv). Drayton traces how apothecary plant knowledge was subsumed by an
attempt to master nature, exemplified by the late eighteenth century belief in “improvement,”
that began in England and was exported to colonial lands (xv). It was then that Kew Gardens
came to be a storehouse for the world’s plants and the means by which the sciences and the
colonial state could together flex their power (Drayton 45). At the same time, a market for plants
from the colonies was developing and “exotic” species were becoming items of diplomacy—“a
living equivalent to royal art collections” that contributed “to the aestheticization of power”
(Drayton 45, 33). The belief that knowledge about equated to dominion over “nature” was
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justified by the Adamic tradition and made possible by various systems of classification that
were emerging at the time (Drayton 45). At first, plant specimens were sent back to Kew
Gardens from the colonies by any of those hired to travel there, but by 1770 gardeners were sent
by the royal court to do such collecting (Drayton 46). At the same time, plants from Kew
Gardens were propagated in the colonies with the express purpose of increasing commerce,
agriculture and “improvement of nature.” Drayton writes that by the nineteenth century, “The
natural scientist, as he named the natural riches of new territories, and mapped the uses of the
world’s things, was allied with” the modern imperialist, and with the still-fashionable, liberal
argument that world trade would lead to abundance for the many. The colonial mission to devour
lands and leave its well-ordered waste product behind, was aided by Kew Gardens in making
“Nature under British government as fruitful and ornamented as possible” (270). The breadfruit
and mango, whose origins Jamaica Kincaid traces, are evidence of British attempts to order, are
woven not only into the colonial history of the Asia, Africa and the Americas, but also
contemporary everyday life.
The colonial expansion that gobbled up landscapes previously far less managed by
humans produced the idea of wilderness as that which, unlike the weed, is agriculture’s other that
must be saved. As the environmental historian William Cronon explains, the U.S. idea of
wilderness as desirable, rather than disordered evil, emerged in the late nineteenth century as a
conceptual marrying of the frontier and the sublime (70). In order for wilderness to be preserved,
it first needed to be properly invented, which necessitated the forced removal of people who
lived on those lands. Cronon writes that once the human occupants of the land were pushed out,
“tourists could safely enjoy the illusion that they were seeing their nation in its pristine, original
state,” a fact which “reminds us just how invented, just how constructed, the American
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wilderness really is” (79). This trend would continue through the twentieth century, as more
swaths of land were enclosed in the name of preservation and enjoyment for the rich to take a
break from daily life dictated by capital-heavy demands.
In the late nineteenth century, when the conservation movement was seeing its first
successes with parks like Yosemite that demarcated the lines between wilderness and settlement,
the borders of the United States were also being more cleanly drawn to demarcate who could
settle. Anti-Chinese sentiment and waning profits from the gold rush led to the Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882, the first piece of U.S. legislation that denied entry to people from a
specific country. So while the wilderness was being invented as static and pristine by way of
human erasure, the West was beginning to extirpate much of its labor force in an attempt to
preserve an idea of the white frontier. That extirpation was not always in the form of barring
migration, but also involved exclusion from recognition within the borders, so that while Chinese
immigrants made up much of the workforce in mining, agriculture and railroad construction,
they were excluded from citizenship and participation in the state (Lowe 8-18).
The twentieth century brought these exclusionary principles to plant and animal life. The
British biologist Charles Elton was the first scientist to categorize as invasive those species who
are understood to thrive excessively in a place other than their origin. In the 1920s and 30s, Elton
took part in the burgeoning field of succession biology, studying how ecosystems change over
time as they adapt to varying conditions. When WWII broke out, Elton set aside his research on
Arctic rodents and went to work for the military on, as he explains “the immediate needs of
protecting food from rabbits, rats, and house mice as part of national defence” (qtd. in Davis et
al. 99). Scientists Davis, Thompson and Grime argue that the war was a pivotal turning point for
Elton because the “pests” he was working to eradicate were all introduced species. Not only was
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he trying to protect human food supplies from becoming small animal spoil, he was also living
under threat from German invasion. Davis, Thompson and Grime write that “For Elton, invasion
was at the centre not only of his work but also of his country’s psyche” (3). Perhaps as a result,
Elton abandoned his ideas about succession ecology and began warning of a group of invasive
species who “successfully invades another country” (Elton 18). He first condemned this
threatening spread in a 1957 radio program entitled “The Balance and the Barrier,” and then in
his book, Ecology of Invasions, that was published the following year.
Largely made up of examples from around the world (though notably, predominantly
from the settler colonies that Alfred W. Crosby calls the Neo-Europes), Elton formulates a theory
of invasion that relies heavily on military language. In the second part of the book, he
summarizes his previous ideas:
I have described some of the successful invaders establishing themselves in a new land or
sea, as a war correspondent might write a series of dispatches recounting the quiet
infiltration of commando forces, the surprise attacks, the successive waves of later
reinforcement after the first spearhead fails to get a foothold, attack and counter attack,
and the eventual expansion and occupation of territory from which they are unlikely to be
ousted again. (109)
If Elton understands himself to be a war correspondent documenting foreign invasion, it is no
wonder he advocates a militant response to other-than-human spread. He writes: “You can tackle
[invaders] before they get in or while they are trying, so to speak, to pass through the guard—
that is quarantine. You can destroy their first small bridgeheads—that is eradication” (110). And
if that doesn’t work, he encourages chemical control.
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From Elton’s ideas emerged the field of invasion biology, which is devoted to studying
the effects and extermination of “invasive” species. This line of research assumes that all species
compete, a misunderstanding of Darwinian natural selection that has been refuted by many
scientists.27 The field interprets invasion as a threateningly unstable interruption of a pristine and
static native ecosystem and ignores the importance of process in biology. From these
assumptions, comes the imperative that bioregions must be secured from invading foreigners.
One very big problem with the conceptualization of species that supposedly invade is that many
humans have such a well-practiced language for describing those people who do not belong,
contaminate and take over. This language, perhaps inevitably, is easily turned onto plants, those
foreign bodies sullying a “native” purity—perhaps especially because “invasive” species so
frequently contain their Asian origins in their common names. Echoing the panic over
immigration in the two countries where invasion biology is most studied Australia and the
United States, the language of invasion biology creates a facile exchange between state policy
and conservation efforts.
Despite the fact that only .5% of the species in the so-called United States are considered
invasive, invasion biology is a well-funded and growing discipline (Scott 10). Davis, Thompson
and Grime argue that the field focuses on “headline invaders” and ignores successive biology
because, in their opinion, “funding and publication pressures prompt ecologists to promote new
and exciting research themes” that ignore pre-existing knowledge (3-4). In order to differentiate
the discipline, scientists write with floral language, employing metaphor to shock readers into a
fear of invasion, as well as call to action against it. The environmental scientist Brendon M.H.
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Though the links have long been made between Social Darwinism and the struggle for survival, language of
competition in nature remains. Paul Keddy argues that this is in part due to competition in the sciences, and to the
fact that the field is male-dominated (161–165).
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Larson analyzes the language in Biological Invasions, the leading journal for invasive biology.
He finds repeated metaphors that reflect cultural “fears of invasion, an emphasis on competition,
and prevalent militarism” (“Entangled Biological” 169). Larson writes that this language, which
is of course not specific to invasion biology, conflates the body, bioregion and the nation in a
“container schema” in which the container is attacked by invasive species whose personification
gives them agency so that they appear to colonize native space intentionally (“Entangled
Biological” 173). If plants, through personification, are given such agency to destroy, they are
equipped with human morality as well—able to be “noxious” or good. With the necessity for
extirpation galvanized through such language, the equally militant and colonial methods for
getting rid of invasives are justified.
Invasion biology’s facile metaphors inform practice. All over the country, environmental
“stewards” are chemically eliminating what they call invasives, felling them, introducing new
species to eat them up, and burning them down. This experiment is one that stewards death to
bring (back) biodiversity. I’m not naïve about this, I know destruction is inevitable. But this kind
of stewarding is only the managerialism of European colonizers that reduces other-than-human
life to that which must be controlled and understood rather than honored for its difference and
ineffability. If you’ve volunteered, good-naturedly, to help a local conservation project, most
likely you’ve been tasked with removing these species because it is annoying and thankless labor
that yields few results; and yet, such work is often deemed important because invasive species
are said to reduce ecosystem services and biodiversity, eventually causing extinction. I’ve
worked on teams tasked with invasive species removal and I know the attention such work
promotes, focusing on that which should be uprooted, rather than what should be nurtured or
used. I taught children to see that way in my years as an environmental educator. We removed
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plants like Japanese knotweed, threw them in the garbage and lay down mulch in their stead.
How sad that we could have been thinking about Lyme disease, which is spreading throughout
the country—trailing behind the spread of human development that inhibits predator populations,
like those of wolves. Without predators, deer, mice and their accompanying ticks pervade the
suburban “country” life in which nature is supposed to be a cure-all and an escape from the
urban centers of capital from which people gain the money to acquire country homes. Country
escape is not supposed to be pestilent. The backyard is not supposed to be a gateway to immune
compromise. I could have studied, with my students, how Japanese knotweed follows the path of
Lyme disease and also helps cure it. We might have made furniture with knotweed’s bamboolike stalks. We might have eaten it in the spring. But I hadn’t learned all that yet. So we just tried
our best to pull it up, which is hard.
While volunteers around the country try to remove seeds before they spread, land
managers use a range of herbicides to fight the “war on invasives” with stronger and stronger
weapons. The most popular ones are 2,4-D and glyphosate-based herbicides like Monsanto’s
Roundup. 2,4-D was developed during WWII, while Elton was creating the category of invasive.
The U.S. Army contracted botanists to develop the defoliant that would later serve as one of two
main ingredients in Agent Orange. After the war, British and American military forces worked
together to test herbicides in places like India, Tanganyika, Kenya, Australia and Florida for
future weapons of war. Content with the results, the British used herbicides in the Malayan
Emergency to destroy food crops and drive insurgents out of hiding. Not long after, the U.S.
sprayed Rainbow herbicides, especially Agent Orange, in Vietnam in a similar strategy.
Manufactured by the usual suspects—DOW Chemical, Monsanto, and DuPont—these herbicides
were responsible for the death, disfigurement, and illness of millions of Vietnamese civilians and
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fighters, as well as the U.S. soldiers who conducted the spraying from 1961-1971 as part of
Operation Ranch Hand.
Just as the leftover nitrogen and phosphorus from WWII were brought home and made
into fertilizer, and the organophosphate the Nazis used in the Holocaust were later applied as
pesticides, the rainbow herbicides developed with military money were brought home to help
maintain the monocultures of industrialized agriculture and lawns—those sad expanses of
“exotic” grass that the journalist Michael Pollan calls “nature under totalitarian rule” (48). The
many books, manuals and websites devoted to eradicating “invasives” recommend, like Elton,
chemical control in most situations. The “Big Greens”—The Nature Conservancy, The Sierra
Club, and The National Wildlife Rehabilitators Association—have all received extensive funding
to fight so-called invasion by these means (Scott 79). If these organizations restore habitat by
applying herbicides designed by the military to suppress decolonial, agrarian and Communist
movements—particularly in Asia—to Asian “invasives,” the Big Greens continue the work of
colonial science, the production of U.S. wilderness, and the same industrial approach to the land
that conservation is supposedly against. This is perhaps unsurprising. Current conservation
efforts have been criticized as new enclosure movements that promote green capitalism. Still, it
is disappointing to read that The Nature Conservancy drills for oil on its land; or, since 2011,
works with Dow Chemical to assess ecosystem services the company might want to think about
as they poison the planet; or since 1983, works with Cargill in South America to help farmers
grow commodity crops, like soy, “more sustainably” and cut down rainforest to do so (Gillis,
Max, “The Nature Conservancy”). If invasion is a verb to be kept in operation on conserved
lands, maybe the multi-million dollar organizations and companies that attempt to manage
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“nature” might be making better use of it than the plant world whose ineffability makes it
appealing to personify as simply bad.

Relief: Forms Who Keep Out
Let’s take a break.
How have you been keeping out? I’ve been keeping out the rain—somewhat
unintentionally by living in a house; somewhat more intentionally by closing the windows. Make
a long list of things that help you keep other things out, or stop spread (like a garbage bag that
prevents the spill and smear of refuse onto a can). Draw their forms. How do they look? Are they
straight lines, right angles—or are they more complicated? Lay the forms on top of each other
and play with various arrangements for a while.
Back to It
The “Big Green” and scientific concern about invasion helps dictate policy and the use of
public funds. While in the twentieth century, U.S. agencies like the Department of Conservation
and the Office of Plant Introduction responded to the Dust Bowl and increasing desire for
commodity crops by introducing non-native species as erosion control and food staples, there
was also concern about the impact of such species on agriculture. Beginning in 1912, with the
Plant Quarantine Act that helped regulate the movement of plants, laws began to reflect concerns
about “non-native” species. The Plant Pest Act of 1957 and Federal Noxious Weed Act of 1974
added to this regulation. But in the ‘90s, as the debate over genetically engineered plants aroused
public concern, the fear of invading species reached new heights. In 1997, 500 scientists and
“resource managers” sent a letter to vice president, and later environmental advocate, Al Gore
complaining that: “We are losing the war against invasive exotic species, and their economic
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impacts are soaring. We simply cannot allow this unacceptable degradation of our Nation’s
public and agricultural lands to continue” (Bhowmik 263). Two years later, President Clinton
issued Executive Order 13112 on Invasive Species, which formed a team to develop a
framework for improving the strategy for the “war against invasive exotic species” as well as
commit all federal agencies to, where deemed possible, restrict invasive species from entering
the United States. With this order, billions of dollars were, for the first time, allocated to “rapidly
respond” to “an alien species whose introduction does or is likely to cause economic or
environmental harm or harm to human health” (Scott 10). Under George W. Bush, the “war on
invasives” came under the domain of U.S. military bodies. In 2003, he created the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), whose subagencies include U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS)—which is tasked with invasive species management. Perhaps this helped
APHIS adopt both the anti-immigrant and counter-terrorist practices of DHS. In 2010 the agency
released an official factsheet stating:
The United States is under attack from alien invaders, but they’re not from outer space.
They’re foreign plant pests, disease, and weeds, and they’re feasting on and infesting
America’s agricultural resources…These hungry pests grow and spread rapidly,
disrupting the areas they invade by: Pushing out native species; Reducing biological
diversity; Killing forest trees; Placing other species at increased risk of extinction;
Altering wildfire intensity and frequency; Damaging crops; Closing foreign markets to
U.S. products from infested areas; and Costing millions of dollars in treatments to
industry and government. (“Attack of Invasive Species” 1)
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Not only do the fears inflamed here relate to all the old fears of outsiders, they also reflect the
panic over genetic engineering and cloning that marked the turn of the century and put into
question the role of the human in new ways. The hungry, swelling force reaches science fiction
heights through negation: it is “not from outer space,” but it sure is “alien.” Notice that so-called
invasives have too much of an appetite and what they want to devour is nature as resource. Those
outsiders are eating up all the profit.
While the factsheet recognizes that increased trade helps spread “invasives,” the billions
of public dollars devoted to control and quarantine do not work to transform the practices that
cause spread. Global flows of goods by way of container ships make such transport of species
inevitable. Climate change accelerates ecosystem shifts to which some plants can more easily
adapt. People move a lot and carry seeds along with them. Somebody worries about how
highways look, sadly accelerating across a landscape that doesn’t matter, so that somebody fills
it with phragmites. Invasive species are part of the imperialized world. They cannot be prevented
from spreading without the simultaneous prevention of rampant imperial capitalism that invades
this world. As the settler colonial United States puts itself into the category of invaded native, it
simultaneously utilizes colonial management methods to extirpate the so-called invader. As 34
billion public dollars are used annually to fight off unwanted species, the U.S. subsidizes the
growth of “exotic” monocultures like wheat, corn and soybeans, many of which are dumped on
poor countries to create appetites for cheap goods and put farmers in those countries out of work,
with forty seven billion dollars (Plumer).
Descriptions of “invasives” are analogous to those of the capital flows that create the
conditions for their “take-over.” They move and accumulate, but not indefinitely—seemingly
devouring everything in their path, but actually leaving room for other stuff to happen, too. So-

184

called invasives borrow capital’s metaphors—rapidly expanding, eating up and destroying.
“Invasives” also mirror the human, as it is conceptualized by the term Anthropocene—which
makes the war on invasion both a linguistic and practical war against oneself.
Invasives, like weeds, come into areas that are disturbed by humans. They are curative,
taking root where others cannot, holding in place and amending the soil for future growth. While
part of the problem with invasion biology is its propensity for generalization, I have had a hard
time not doing the same. Perhaps for the assumptions of invasion biology to be questioned,
attention needs to be paid to how plants behave in their context, not in the abstract. What are they
doing that “we” don’t understand? Where do they remediate water and soil? 28 Where do species
like jellyfish choke out human infrastructure?29 When can they be used for biofuels? 30 How are
they medicines?31 How do they act as bioindicators, warning that a region is toxic? 32 Most
importantly, how can a relationship with them be cultivated that is based on the assumption of
worth, regardless of use-value? Have you seen that as goldenseal is choked out of its home,
barberry, which has the same medicinal properties, has begun to “invade” in its place? Or that
Siberian elm has come to where slippery elm used to proliferate? Crosby writes that in European
colonies, “weeds, like skin transplants placed over broad areas of abraded and burned flesh,
aided in healing the raw wounds that the invaders tore in the earth. The exotic plants saved newly
bared topsoil from water and wind erosion and from baking in the sun” (170). The plants that
came with the colonizers, in other words, worked against the colonial impacts on the land. Socalled invaders do the same. Instead of fighting back what has been deemed excessively
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productive, what modes of observation and use can refuse the militancy of destructive attempts
at restoration and instead work with existing conditions to remediate at plant speed? Larson
writes that “When we dislike something as much as we dislike invasive species, we have
something to learn from that response” (“Friend, Foe”). The anger about, and fear of, invasion
could get directed at the systems that produce this current disaster. These responses could also
get applied to a daily mourning for the now quotidian extinctions that are occurring. What kinds
of plans will be made when the focus shifts to the production of different sorts of relations with
that which is lost and that which proliferates?

If Hoa Nguyen’s Poems are also Instructions
Tease out that which is impossibly entangled. Get distracted by crows. They recede
toward indistinction and then emerge again—loosely dangling on some sky.
Find out what the day is doing. Find out how you are acting upon it and how it is acting
upon you. What are you still worried about, is it with you now, and still now? Did you invite it or
did it invade? What is the difference and what does that difference look like? If you’re a woman,
what’s it like to use the word invade? How about as a product of war, which everyone is—but
some more than others? What’s it like to let the word roll around knowing you are such a
product? What’s it mean to be a product? List the products next to you. Cross them off if they
have no significance larger than themselves. Did you cross anything off?
Parse moments of experience from this day, or maybe yesterday. Perch them on top of
each other. Separate them. Get distracted. Remember a task that should get done.
Make a punctured poem form—Gaia gasping—or just the day, which is a punctured
thing. “Write fucked up poems” (Nguyen “Write Fucked up Poems”).
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Leave the house with a container of everything you know about meadows.

Inundated Quadrants
The contemporary poet Hoa Nguyen composed the poems in her 2012 book, As Long as
Trees Last, in Austin, Texas, where she lived for over a decade. The collection, published by
Wave Books, is perhaps an accumulation of possible supplements to the title’s lonely clause.
One way the poems respond is by saying that as long as trees last, there will be breath. The
poems are spacious. Nguyen uses very little punctuation, but she disperses spaces along her lines
that give pause before the break, making her words look like they are in relief on a blank page.
Even still, her lines are very short, usually consisting of no more than five words each. Her
language is literal; she uses many more nouns than adjectives. Her concrete lines don’t add up to
clear narratives. Instead, they appear as notes on the every day—a recording of what is
physically at hand. Nguyen observes and listens, documenting processes in action rather than
trying to interrupt or manage them. Her poems record varied directions of attention. Sometimes
they read like a naturalist’s account, sometimes notes a person might make to familiarize
themselves with land before cultivating plants there, sometimes lists one—usually a woman—
would include in a daybook. Sometimes she seems desirous of cultivating something new,
sometimes she is content to report back on those findings on what the poet John Ashbery, in his
poem “The System,” describes as the “clotted sphere of today’s activities” (54). In all modes,
place conditions the work. One could say this is because she’s read so much of Charles Olson’s
poetry, but there are many roots for remembering to “come back to the geography of it” and let
place move through the poet’s body (184). The poems map a quotidian that quickly scales up,
and up. And the book, as a whole, does the same, showing what recurs—what builds a life in
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time and ripples into a vast expanse. To be clear, when I say a life, I don’t mean Hoa Nguyen’s
life. Her poems don’t claim universality and their particularity is quite divorced from any attempt
to get deeper into Nguyen in a confessional sense. The poems, like any good record of
observation, are both conditioned by the observer, and able to say something about that which is
observed. In Nguyen’s case, what is watched is larger than herself. The day opens widely.
In a 2011 special issue of the poetry journal Interim that was devoted to environmental
themes, Nguyen published some of the poems that would end up in As Long As Trees Last. She
introduces them with a short essay entitled “On Austin, Texas.” She begins by describing how
the city is a quadrant. North and south are divided by the Colorado River, which is not the
famous river of the same name. Austin’s greenbelt follows the waterway, along which volunteers
regularly pull out “invasives” like Chinese ligustrum. Maybe Nguyen uses that word, volunteer,
to also remind her reader that weeds are volunteer plants—those who grow without being sown
intentionally by humans. Nguyen is perhaps showing where humans and plants get aligned in
language—even as one tries to extirpate the other.
The city is also divided by east and west, but through the human intervention of a
highway whose construction entailed the demolition of an important black and Texano arts
district. That highway also helped the city divide itself more clearly along class, and often racial,
lines. But gentrification has since blurred that boundary. Capitalism is good at erasing borders,
only to make more. Anyway, Austin is also divided into two distinct ecosystems: Blackland
Prairie and the Edwards Plateau. Nguyen has lived in each and has observed the differences
between what emerges in the clay of prairie and limestone of the plateau.
In Blackland Prairie, in the backyard of Nguyen’s first house, the following so-called
invasive trees are growing: mimosa—have you seen this tree? It has pink flowers that look like
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fireworks and they make a sweet syrup or tea or ice cream. They’re an antidepressant and
wonderfully soft. Also tree of heaven, which were brought from China to New York City, along
with the tree of heaven silk moth, in order to give poor people the chance to gather their cocoons
for wild silk. The plan to uplift the poor and gain a nice alternative to cotton didn’t work out
because the moths didn’t take. But the tree grew easily. It is the kind of tree that famously grew
in Brooklyn. I have two in my yard in that borough. They grow out of cracks in the concrete next
to the mulberries, who silk worms also like to eat and whose kind were brought from Italy by
those, like my ancestors, who feared they would miss home. They also grow next to chinaberry
(more on this later). She calls all three trees “fast growing feral imports from Asia” (85). In the
backyard of the poet’s second house, on the west side, grows another chinaberry tree. In other
words, that “fast growing feral import” is unbound by ecosystem distinction. As is the case with
her previous yard, the place where the “invasive” thrives is described as “neglected” (85, 86).
But it is only neglected by humans. Nguyen tracks the activity in the chinaberry: butterflies flock
to flowers with a “lilac smell,” “on March 10, 2010, Cedar Wax Wings suddenly swarmed and
fed on the fermented” berries of the tree, and “insect seeking birds love their limbs in the fall”
(86). That to which humans have not paid attention is still in use by others.
After reporting her observations of chinaberry, Nguyen ends her short essay by
introducing her own role in the places she’s been describing by asking: “Where am I in this
landscape: import, displacer, gulping too much water?” (86). She gives herself the same
characteristics as those of “invasive” species—though the description is in the form of a
question. Like the eucalyptus, whose thirsty taproot helps beat out other trees to the dwindling
offerings of the aquifer in desert places like southern California, Nguyen is perhaps “gulping too
much water.” Like the plants whose common names in English—Japanese honeysuckle, oriental

189

bittersweet, Japanese knotweed, etc.— contain the species’ Asian origins, Nguyen might be an
“import.” She was not born in Texas, but in the Mekong Delta—closer to the imported trees in
her backyard than to the native chaparral or live oak. And like the chinaberry, she could be called
a “displacer.” She describes the house she bought on the east side of Austin—that side where
poor people were relegated for a good part of the twentieth century. Maybe she helped displace
them. “Invasives,” though they come to disturbed areas, proliferate in changing conditions—like
warming weather—to which natives haven’t yet adapted, conditions that are caused by, amongst
a great many other things, some of the activities she describes herself doing, or watching
machines do. She writes: “I drive my car,” “a machine washes my clothes,” “I marinate beef for
Vietnamese steak,” and “I write this” (86). Unlike the sentences that describe the chinaberry and
include phrases like “Chinaberry greens and ripens,” when she is the subject, she always works
upon an object with a transitive verb (86). The paragraph that describes her observations of the
chinaberry use mostly intransitive verbs, gerunds, and dependent clauses. Birds don’t seek
insects, as “I marinate beef,” instead, “insect-seeking birds love” (86). The hypotaxis of the
chinaberry tree paragraph nestles birds in tree, lilac smell into butterfly—everything is woven
together so that any singular agency is subservient to relation. Poor human with her
individualized form: subject, verb and object. She marinates, writes, watches, drives and writes
again. Perhaps part of the problem is that she doesn’t fit into the dependent clauses. She just
watches them.
Nguyen concludes the essay by asking if Waxwings will return, if it will be another
drought year, if “invader and native [will] interplay” (86). Meanwhile, her “son collects fossils
from the creek, rock shells from ancient inland seas” (86). As she asks what will happen amidst
fast-paced environmental change, he goes looking at the evidence of a marine ecosystem: what
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remains after climate change, after water has dried up. Her son does maybe what Olson did
amidst the glacial moraine in Gloucester, Massachusetts when he wrote “I hunt among stones”
(“The Kingfishers”). Nguyen isn’t giving her reader a cheesy hope for the future by referring to
the child. Her conclusion doesn’t feel cheap; it feels simultaneous. Her kid is down in the creek
playing while she writes. Maybe there is something enviable about his activity, but she’ll find
her own place to play in the poems. Her word toys will also be ancient and quotidian, just like
fossils.

Making Things with Chinaberry
Think about chinaberry. Think about how every time you say the name, you’re reminded
of the word “Chinaman.” Think about how chinaberry is in a lot of southern literature and songs
as a signifier of place. Jessie Fauset’s The Chinaberry Tree is about New Jersey, but its titular
tree is brought up from Alabama and stains the northern yard with its southern influence as the
drama of infidelity stain the black middle class family of the novel. Read the best novel that
refers to the tree: Albert Murray’s Train Whistle Guitar. Murray makes a map of swampy
Alabama with blues songs and plants that can’t get reduced to literary motifs or symbols for
something else. Murray lets the reader touch the landscape his raised-in-Alabama-but-living-inNew-York-City body must have missed. His intimacy with place breeds urgency for real touch,
so get your hands on some chinaberry if you’re ever going to write or think about it.
I went south for whatever reason that was necessary and after a few days, I asked my
friend to drop me off in the most abandoned industrial area of Atlanta they could think of. The
website for the Georgia Invasive Species Task Force, a coalition of publically-funded
organizations, complains a lot about chinaberry. I’d been asking around about the tree. The
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people I talked to didn’t seem to mind it as much as the others who are referred to as “trash
trees”; maybe it’s more of a rural concern. And the wood expert at the good lumber spot said
people here don’t work with it much because it’s too skinny, but I am right to say it’s a
mahogany, with all the beauty that comes along with that family. He offers a sample and it seems
sacred. I wonder if the wood is from the tree’s native South Asia or from around here. He doesn’t
know.
Anyway, I roamed the edges of old Atlanta industry with its lots of broken-down cars and
a few pioneering hip bakeries. I saw plenty of kudzu and tree of heaven and holy empress, but no
chinaberry. After hours of walking, I finally found two right by my friend’s house. One was bent
over the highway and the other stood tall in someone’s yard. Even though my friend kept
reminding me not to go in peoples’ yards in the south without asking, I went over and picked a
bunch of the berries off the ground. Many still remained on the tree, fermenting and drying up.
They stay throughout the winter, turning from brown to yellow and getting a good rot smell. The
berries at that stage intoxicate the birds who eat them, as many fermented fruits in winter do.
Some, like waxwings, can take the intoxication better because they have stronger livers, but
others get confused and wobbly. Their drunkenness only lasts a few hours.
If you want to do what I did, you would take home the boozy berries and leave them
outside in a bucket to soak up rainwater. You’d throw in a dirty sock because the berries are
supposed to be good soap. In Mexico, they call them soapberries. They are not the same as the
soap nuts sold in natural food stores in this country. After a couple of days, you would rub off
the smelly flesh and throw it in the yard. That part is an insecticide and a mosquito repellent, it’s
also good for skin issues like psoriasis and dandruff, but I’d prefer using it on my skin before it
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ferments since the smell is so bad. I don’t need any insecticides. My sock soaked up rot smell. I
blame it on the berry flesh, not incorrect folk knowledge gleaned from the internet.
I dried out the chinaberry pits, which give the tree another of its common names: bead
tree. People make rosaries out of them. Nowhere in my research does anyone specify where in
the parts of the world that chinaberry is considered native these rosaries are made. I do know that
Cajuns in Louisiana make rosaries with what they call China balls. They are supposed to ward
off contagion. I drilled into them with a tiny bit and strung them together so I won’t get sick.

Nguyen’s Texas Chinaberry
Some of these experiments I’m writing feel cheesy. They come from my tendency toward
play and craft—one that makes me stop for roadkill to take home and tan, or collect seeds for
redistribution from gardens surrounded by concrete that prevents spread. I am a bit ashamed to
share them because they don’t fall into any categories of expert practice. They’re amateur and
might not yield much. But they proliferated the number of ways I was able to relate to the
chinaberry tree that I first learned about in poems and then sought out in person. This kind of
proliferation is not unlike what could be concluded of Darwin’s notion that species reproduce
more than necessary because many will be lost, or how one could think about reading or writing
poems—which is another kind of multiplication of output, only some of which can stick. For the
remainder of this chapter, I close read Nguyen’s poetry at length. By staying suspended in a
localized and playful attention to the poems, I hope I am experimenting in ways that refuse
expectations of singular outcomes. In other words, I think close reading is a practice in
indeterminacy and refusal to generalize—a practice that is directly counter to the mode of
thinking that the managerial approach to land requires.
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*
The first poem to follow Nguyen’s introductory essay is aptly titled “The Problem.” It
follows the themes of the essay, describing invasive species who spill out of the bifurcations of
the city. The first stanza reads:
The problem with the lights and the
smell of apples

rotted sliced apples

I put into the lights
cleaning them out
in order to see better

not a good spot

for apples (87)
Rot in the apples and grime in the light fixtures are domestic problems. They are also both
troubles in time: the sliced apples have sat around for too long and the light fixtures also bear the
evidence of deterioration. The problems of apples and lights are not reliant on each other in the
poem. They are not causal, nor need they even be problems in the same category. Without a
decisive narrative to force them together, the dilemmas involving apples and lights can move
freely toward and away from each other. They can also drift in and out of one’s attention. Apples
sliced, say, for a kid’s lunch that was never packed, can be forgotten until their smell begs for
confrontation. On the other hand, apples and lights are maybe not problems at all. If the apples
rot, the worms will eat them. If the light grimes up, maybe its quality will change and it will cast
a nice shadow over the room, or in the refrigerator where little lights may or may not illuminate
apple rot. Because of the introductory essay, or because I’ve read Nguyen, or because the poem
ends with the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico, I think of global warming and its status as a
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problem in time: collapsing geologic scales into a fast-paced present. I also think of Nguyen’s
introductory essay where she describes her son playing with fossils, which is also a playing in
and with documents of time and climate change. Like the domestic problems of lights and
apples, global warming can drift in and out of the mind, but at some point it becomes stinky for
some and deadly for others. It is also not a universal problem. Just as worms will eat Nguyen’s
sliced apple, many microorganisms will continue to thrive as the Earth gets hotter.
The spaces that Nguyen leaves between clusters of words on some of her lines make each
separated, punctuation-free grouping seem autonomous and therefore moveable. The phrases of
the first line, “smell of apples” and “rotted sliced apples,” look capable of being transported to
somewhere else on the page. If poems are containers, Nguyen makes them like a sliding puzzle
for phrases, able to be shuffled around within a set of limitations. Nguyen’s form is both
conditioned and playful; with clusters of words that aren’t strung together with narrative, the
reader can experiment. Nguyen’s phrases are like the little Whiteheadian datum that gets picked
up by a strong, indeterminate feeling.33 I think that her poems, because of their form and
repetition, invite this process more than some other poems, though of course all close reading is a
provocation to play. Like Whitehead’s description of the sub-atomic realm, which is conditioned
by available data—each containing its own history—Nguyen’s poems condition the exploration
of the reader through literal language and persistent resistance to abstraction. She assigns the
parameters by which the reader is allowed to play, while still encouraging them to do so.
If the reader can rearrange word clusters and create various narratives, it is possible to
read the speaker as putting rotted sliced apples into the lights instead of “rotted sliced apples/I
put into the lights.” Or perhaps the “put” operates as it does in the phrase “put thoughts into
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For a description of Whitehead’s ontology, including actual entities, see the Introduction, pages 14-17.
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words” so that the rotting sliced apples undergo a similar transformation, making “I put rotted
sliced apples into lights” both an illumination and a material conversion. Maybe there is a
correlation between language, lights and apples. They are all Biblical, after all: in the beginning
was the word, and then the word produced light, and then there was evil in the form of
knowledge—later to be understood as existing in an apple. Or, there is a missing word. Maybe
the speaker means to say “I put [time] into the lights.” Maybe the word “time” is missing
because it’s all been taken up by the processes of the rotting of apples and the griming of lights.
If they hadn’t taken up so much time, maybe she could put a little more of it into the lights. Or
maybe the missing word is effort. Or money. What noun can the speaker lend to this task—if she
has anything at all extra to give? Like apples and lights, that both get worn out in time, the
speaker, who is tasked with cleaning out rotten food and accumulated domestic sediment, is
maybe a little worn out.
The apples are not in “a good spot.” They’ve rotted and their smell is beginning to be a
problem. The apple odor takes over, wafts outward, has no boundaries, and is a nuisance to be
cleaned up—like the “invasive” chinaberry tree. The speaker cleans, disturbing the progression
of griming and rotting. Remember that “invasives” come to disturbed areas, their “pioneering”
nature fitting well into places where natives are choked out by toxicity and habitat destruction.
The speaker’s cleaning is an invasion of sorts. If human conceptions of cleanliness, like mowed
expanses with one kind of grass growing, are quite disturbing, Nguyen’s speaker’s solution is to
address directly that which is more often deemed the problem: the tree that shoots up and
becomes an irritant to a “clean” landscape. In addressing “the problem,” the speaker says:
I talked to the invasive tree
how to replace China Berry Poison ivy
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Running bamboo
knocking it over
how to restore

humans

Literally

crack the big limb
as in the children’s book

looking for the ordinary snortle pig
plants

animals and homes equally numbered (87)

Nguyen’s separation, and capitalization, of “China Berry,” emphasizes tree’s association with a
singular country of origin, even if incorrect (China is not one of the places chinaberry is said to
be native). The name, with China acting as adjective instead of noun, introduces a host of
orientalist connotations. Though poison ivy is considered native, each plant Nguyen lists could
be said to invade in some way. She aligns their names, making space between “China” and
“berry” so the tree can fit in with the others. The pattern invites analogy: China is to poison is to
running; berry is to ivy is to bamboo. The list is introduced by “how to replace,” and such a
replacement seems necessary because the ivy is poisonous and the bamboo is running rampant.
The analogy makes the berry replaceable because of its affiliation with China. “how to replace”
might be a question and might be an offering of information. The speaker might refer to
disposing of the plant itself, but she might also refer to exchanging the value-laden language
used to qualify each plant.
“The problem” that the title of the poem suggests is not singular. Each conundrum
introduced invites a host of others. If the chinaberry is a problem, then so is the China Berry as
name, and so is the human who created space for its growth. If this is the case, is the human
migrant from China also a problem? The list collapses and troubles the category of problem.
Finally, her list of plants ends with “humans.” That the two are pulled into the same category by
the list, calls attention to the slippery way an over-simplified approach to managing that which
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does not belong in the natural world is connected—linguistically and practically—to ordering the
human who does not belong. If the noun of “China” becomes the adjectival justification for
extirpation, as poison does for ivy, what are the implications for the human realm? If they begin
to look like ethnic cleansing, what can be said about plant management?
The “humans” on the list might be “Literally” replaced, or they might act as the subject
of the verb “knocking”—making them the agents of replacement. This is a problematic position
to be in, as both subject and object of the verb. It is also the position of the plants she lists who
supposedly invade the landscape. Bamboo is rhizomatic, as is its cousin, Japanese knotweed
(which storms all the medians and vacant lots in the city where I live). Their roots spread over a
vast area and sprout up anywhere along the rhizome. I am so glad that Deleuze and Guattari used
the rhizome as a metaphor to theorize how the work we do comes to displace capitalism by
getting nourished in the dirt and spreading out in such a way that when one beautiful stalk is cut
down, another grows up elsewhere—the network feeding its various limbs across a vast
expanse. 34 People cut down bamboo and poison the stump with glyphosate-based herbicides, like
Roundup, which will kill most plants they come into contact with—unless those plants are
Monsanto’s Roundup-Ready crops, which have been genetically engineered to withstand the
herbicide. But another way to deter growth is to step on the stalk. Razing it produces shoots
elsewhere, but crushing it holds back rejuvenation (the analogy between the rhizome that is
trampled—not cut down—and State responses to people building their own oppositional systems
is pretty easy and discouraging). With knotweed, I’d put a black tarp on top of it after stepping
and then maybe start building up the soil again from there; but I haven’t tried this to see if it
works. So, one way humans could replace that which invades is by “knocking it over,” or one

I can’t remember who so beautifully explained this concept in 2007 at the first U.S. Social Forum in Atlanta. It
has stuck with me. Thank you.
34
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could “crack a big limb” of the rhizomatic bamboo, or chinaberry tree. An additional problem
emerges in which human acting as subject produces, at worst, destruction, and at best, a
managerial approach. The problem is how to emerge somewhere other than in this subject/object
conundrum.
Nguyen offers a way out through restoration and uses “the children’s book” as a model.
She must be referring to Una’s Garden, which tells the story of urbanization eating into a jungle
until the animals and people collectively stop the anthropogenic force. In the end, the wild tangle
of forest comes back but the snortle pig has gone extinct—restoration is limited by what cannot
return. Nguyen’s expansion of the scope for finding out solutions by asking the “invasive” tree
and a children’s book is a refreshing address to different sorts of knowledge. She finds that
restoration is not a resurrection of the past, but a balance that includes “plants

animals and

homes equally numbered”; or a redistribution of opportunities to thrive. The collectivelyproduced balance she asks for in the world, she makes possible on the page, with her moveable
phrases. Though the reader can play around with redistribution, the actor in the poem is more
ambiguous. If this is all an address to a tree, is the speaker warning the chinaberry that it will be
replaced, or does she offer to be replaced herself and thus relinquish the job of restoration to
some other being? Perhaps the restoration, as in Una’s Garden, is collective, and therefore the
ambiguity of who does the replacing and restoring must remain.
Part of how Nguyen maintains this ambiguity is by writing without punctuation. The only
exception in the poem is the fourth stanza, where Nguyen allows a colon, commas and three
periods. The commas and periods do not change syntax but help Nguyen obey the most technical
roles these punctuation marks can take on: “August 4, 2006”; “North Boggy Creek at Airport
Blvd.”; “Nitrate 2.8”; and “Phosphate .07” (87). The first line of the fourth stanza, however, lets
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in a bit more of punctuation’s capacity to make sound and significance happen. It begins: “our
local creek: Boggy” (88). It seems that, unlike the chinaberry, whose proliferation erases
specificity of place, Boggy Creek is a local body of water that necessitates an introduction. The
colon helps particularize the creek, and reminds the reader that a name with an adjective can
arise from local knowledge.
With so little punctuation, Nguyen’s phrases relate to one another in multiple ways—the
borders of expected soundless markings are lifted, and instead there are big spaces on the line to
rest, or change syntax, or rearrange order and meaning. As I write this, I make the decision to put
quotation marks around words that are in use but maybe shouldn’t be—words like “nature” and
“invasive.” My attempt to show where language fails more poisonously than it usually does has
required an abundance of punctuation. Nguyen’s tactics are quite opposite, and as a result, the
lines are less stressed, and words beckon to each other and hop into alternate relations. Without
the frame of punctuation, meaning more easily proliferates, and Nguyen gets language to behave
more like an ecosystem than the sad linearity of, say, a hedgerow.
The movement of one thing into another, both within and across scales, is enacted in
Nguyen’s content, as well. The last five stanzas move up in scale, though not consecutively.
First, the speaker “Peed in the backyard” and, again, “talked to the tree” (87). Then, she states
“Death is the return to the mother/return to the wet place,” which brings her back to the local:
Boggy Creek in Austin. She has the water sample results: “BAD” and “POOR” (87). And in the
following stanza, she is “reading of massive phyto-plankton/& algal bloom/Hypoxic zone
Gulf of Mexico dead zone” (88). Nguyen has stated, in the introductory essay, that she lived next
to Boggy Creek, which “feeds into Waller Creek, which feeds into the Colorado River” which
“empties into Matagorda Bay of the Gulf of Mexico” (84). So the pee, which she releases onto
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the ground, perhaps in a feral kind of way—like the three “feral” trees that grow in the yard—
ends up in the Gulf, where the dead zone continues to expand. The speaker pees “to mark this
mine” and, of course, the pee cannot stay in one place (87). Is this why she doesn’t use
punctuation, because she doesn’t want to mark the poem—or language—“mine”? The urine that
indicates possession flows into larger and larger bodies, expanding the realm of possession—sort
of like how the territory of the “invasive” continues to widen, or how the bad idea of ownership
begets more bad ideas.
The poem ends with a two-line stanza: “August Perseids seen/from the stoop” (88). The
house with human-built steps provides a place from which to see the meteor showers of droughtridden summer—meteor showers that people have seen falling from that poor hero Perseid’s
constellation for over two thousand years. From the stoop, a lowly human place from which to
watch, she is witness to the universe. She offers no finalizing punctuation; the vastness of sky
and smallness of stoop hang together without a period. Deprived of finality, Nguyen has no
revelation to sum up the poem. Her ending is an open system, ready to be rearranged.
I think the idea of invasion helps with the lack of revelation. Brendon Larson writes that the
violence of invasion biology is conceptually linked to how humans perceive themselves in the
environment right now: as destructive forces that gobble up all the resources before other species
can learn how to survive the growing lack. Nguyen’s poem certainly invites this conflation of
generalized human with generalized invasive plant. There is also, always lurking, the colonial
undertones of the invasive that takes over a native ecosystem. Again, a problem erupts from
generalization; not just a problem, but the contradiction of a settler colonial mindset arguing
against what is described as a colonial force upon native forms of life. The specificity of the
poem and the speaker’s direct address to the chinaberry complicate easy generalizations that end
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up stuck in contradiction. If invasion is enacted all over the poem, the subjects and the objects
are constantly shifting, refusing a direct statement about how they work. Nguyen’s accumulation
of examples through the consistent activity of invasion entangles the actors and the objects
together and refuses easy definitions of, or solutions to, the problem. In other words, Nguyen
pulls the reader out of the messy hierarchy of subjects and objects—what Whitehead calls
“subject-predicate forms of thought” (7).

Experiments with Chinaberry Facts
Facts tend to be abstractions. If you haven’t touched a chinaberry or watched it bend over
fences—looking like it wants to get out—or sat on the ground collecting all its berries on stained
sidewalks, maybe you should wait to play with facts. But do what you want.
Fact: As chinaberry expands in places it did not originate, many of the other trees in the
mahogany family are at risk of extinction because of logging.
Experiment: Draw abundant lack in multiple forms. Tend toward abstraction and maybe
end up with a generalized mold for mourning.
Fact: In Georgia, or Texas, or New Mexico, chinaberry shoots up in the cracks of parking
lots or gathers, and forms thickets, in ditches and along roadsides. Disturbed areas are
particularly receptive to chinaberry growth, and land managers notice that it responds well to
areas where kudzu, that famous southern invasive, has been chemically removed. Chinaberry
loves a riparian zone, but will take just about anything. Part of what makes it a good “invasive”
is its adaptability. In places like India, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Northern Australia, where it is
considered native, people plant it for shade. Because it is drought-tolerant, it can cool down a hot
place like Texas where everyone is losing groundwater. Chinaberry used to be ingested more in
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the so-called United States than it is now. In Herbert Covey’s book African American Slave
Medicine: Herbal and non-Herbal Treatments, which uses WPA interviews to accumulate an
inventory of medicines used by enslaved peoples, chinaberry is described as a cure for worms
and stomachaches. Janey Landrum, one of the people interviewed, explains how to use the tree’s
roots:
If you git the scrofula and want to cure hit, git a lot of china berry roots and poke roots
and some bluestone and boil them all together, strain, and make a salve to rub on the
sores. Then anoint them with a black chicken feather dipped in pure hog lard. This brings
the sores to a head and then you can press out the cores and you are cured. Lime water is
a fine tonic, especially in the spring of the year. (90)
Now, in the places where it’s called invasive, chinaberry is also called poisonous and supposedly
doesn’t attract any wildlife. Of course, a “trash tree” needs to be established as worthless. To
mammal bodies, chinaberry is both toxic and curative. Practitioners of traditional Chinese
medicine, Ayurveda, Siddha, and Unani all use it, in different ways, for human health. All warn
of toxic overdose, but generally recommend various parts of the tree for skin diseases, asthma,
worms, fungus, and inflammation.
Experiment: Make a list of things you use that others would find disgusting or pick one of
your ailments and make medicinal instructions that you have not yet followed. If possible,
include items someone would categorize as gross.
Fact: Chinaberry is allelopathic, so like garlic mustard, it sends out chemicals that hinder
growth around it. It repels other plants like it does some insects. But birds also flock to it.
Experiment: Draw a form made specifically for you in a very special place.
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Did you get it? Do you need to draw it again? Draw it again. And again until it feels
good. Don't decide why it feels good. Stay away from ideas.
From there you could write about the very nice experience of being in your form. But
drawing is enough.
Fact: Chinaberry grows rapidly and dies quickly too. Its shallow root system is easily
pulled up and its weak limbs can be torn off with little effort. The country singer and songwriter
Rodney Crowell remembers planting chinaberries in front of his house outside Houston, only to
find he would later be tasked with pulling off the thin branches for his mother to beat him with.
In his memoir, Chinaberry Sidewalks he writes: “Not until we stood back to admire the early
stages of our handiwork did the notion of planting more trees for more switches for more
whippings strike me as pure madness” (22). Crowell’s childhood excitement for his mother’s
new care for their surroundings, only to find the tree would be used against him, might be
reflected in the tree’s allelopathic nature.
Experiment: How is satisfaction replete with the possibility of its future dissolution? Give
examples.
Other possibilities: Arrange these incomplete facts into some kind of dendritic model and
then try to make a messy, contradictory whole.

Nguyen’s Chinaberry Facts
While Nguyen’s poem “The Problem” doesn’t make it into As Long as Trees Last
(though a different poem of the same title does), “Chinaberry” is in both Interim and her book. In
that poem Nguyen lists facts about the tree, each separated by the punctuation-less spaces that
are present throughout her work. As if she rejoices with Smart, but without commands, she lists
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basic information about the tree: “Also called Bead Tree” (1), “grooved seeds” (2),
“smooth/striped bark” (7-8), etc. Nguyen also enumerates some of its common names: “Feral
tree/Desert tree/Invader” (9-11). Perhaps both lists reveal how facts and names are illegitimate
ways of knowing; or that knowledges are multiple. If Smart praises with and thus finds
something out about the world, Nguyen unsettles the way a thing can be known and thus shows
the value of its complexity. Perhaps seeking intricacy is a form of praise—a way of assigning
more value. And if finding out about the “invasive” is praise, it is also an invitation to adapt to
changing landscapes rather than manage them through containment and removal.
Nguyen also begins with song, which is a reminder of how praise is often activated. The
poem’s epigraph is from Vic Chesnutt’s “Chinaberry Tree,” which describes the singer “going at
the chinaberry tree” with a machete. Nguyen’s epigraph from Chesnutt reads, “throwing myself
at the cut,” a lyric that formed the title of Chesnutt’s album, At the Cut. In the song, the singer
throws himself at the cut in the tree, “with a force heretofore unknown to me,” trying to fell “the
meanest chinaberry tree that has ever been.” Nguyen picks up the Chesnutt line, but misquotes it,
writing “grooved seeds and/a ‘force unknown/ to me’” (2-4). Turning the “force” from the
human cutting at the tree, to the tree itself, Nguyen also turns a song of removal into a
contemplation of that which “invades” and is also “unknown.” Remember chinaberry, like many
so-called invasives throws itself at the cut in the landscape—at the disturbed areas where life has
a hard time sustaining itself. The tree is also a kind of cut: both a reminder of something having
gone wrong and a supposed eyesore. Chinaberry is a negative force to be willed away. And
remember, too, that invasion language often conflates land and body. If “invasives” are like a
festering wound who, according to APHIS, are “infesting America’s agricultural resources,” then
throwing oneself into the cut is a way of joining “invasives” in what they do. Instead of aligning
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the body and nation under attack, what if Nguyen pushes at how the human can be conflated with
the “invasive,” both as disturbance and as restorer?
Like Chesnutt, Nguyen rhymes in her chinaberry poem. Within the multiplicity of
descriptions and names for the tree, is an awkward inner rhyme with chinaberry. The first stanza
reads:
Also called Bead Tree
grooved seeds and
a “force unknown
to me”

yellow hanging

(1-4)

The title rhymes with “Tree,” “seeds,” and “me” and the rhyme is carried into the second and
third stanzas:
Feral tree
Desert tree
Invader
Timber
like mahogany

Seeds for making
Rosaries

(9-15)

The repetition of the rhyme throughout the poem is random and inconsistent. It doesn’t
cleanly punctuate the ends of lines, but acts a bit like chinaberry: one is here on this line, and
there again, and over there in a cluster. I’m comforted by the rhyme. It lulls me into a sense of
being located in a space, cushioned around a repeated sound. Through her rhyme, Nguyen
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replicates the monotony, and perhaps also comfort, of a sound—or some other occurrence—that
becomes familiar through repetition. (Monocultures can be comforting—look at how many
people prefer recognizable chain stores). Many of the plants I know most intimately are
considered invasive. It makes it easier that the landscape is simplified, my knowledge can be too.
That is a complex feeling: to desire simplicity.
When Nguyen lists “Feral Tree/Desert Tree/Invader,” I think of the bluegrass legend
Norman Blake and his song from 1998, “‘Ol Bill Miner (The Gentleman Bandit).” It is a take on
the traditional “Ballad of Bill Miner,” which celebrates the famous train robber known for his
courteousness and refusal to rob the poor. Blake recounts some of the many myths about Miner,
singing “Desert raider, slave trader, he soon became you see.” The rhyme here is similar to
Nguyen’s, and I follow my associative mind to find Blake’s song about the robber who takes
advantage of the conditions of his time—the profiting off of the slave trade, robbing trains in the
diamond fields of South Africa, and “running guns in Rio and South Americae”—to make a
profit. The robber is similar to one version of the personified invasive who takes advantage of
destructive practices by taking over and proliferating amidst, and exasperating, ecological loss—
stealing all the resources from others who might benefit.
But that’s just one category in which the chinaberry can fit. It can also make birds drunk.
Nguyen’s last line is simply “Drunken songbirds” (16). She doesn’t end her list with anything
more revelatory than the other facts she enumerates. Her listing is like Smart’s, an accrued
account of days and observations. But as with any litany, the list becomes sacred in its repetition.
The songbirds probably should not be drunk, but Nguyen doesn’t seem to mind. Or, it’s not for
her to say. The drunken birds join Vic Chesnutt in his singing, they too throw themselves into the
cut in the landscape that is the chinaberry.
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Hack and Squirt
An herbicide from Dow or Monsanto will help get rid of a chinaberry tree. Because any
roots left in the ground can re-sprout, those interested in eliminating the tree recommend
chemical control instead of pulling it up or chopping it down. One successful way to remove is
with the “hack and squirt” method—which is particularly effective in the logging industry. All
anyone needs to do is make an incision into a tree with a hatchet and apply some herbicide into
the wound. No one needs to throw themselves into the cut, the chemical will do most of the
work. The herbicide used, usually Garlon or Arsenal, both of which are supposed to be written
with a registered trademark symbol next to them, will travel to the crown and the roots of the
tree, shutting down enzyme production and killing it within a year. All the person needs to do is
wait for the tree to lose its leaves, wither and fall. I was in the woods of New York among the
new sassafras of spring, chewing on the little leaves for the taste and the calm they offer, when
my friend told me about fighting the logging industry in Oregon. She said the companies
underpay people to walk around hacking and squirting without protection, which means they
inevitably get very sick. And then they return in a year to collect an entire forest bound for Home
Depot or wherever else. Every time I read or write about hack and squirt I cry. It’s just true. Slow
and easy death sometimes seems more violent.
If Nguyen’s poems are peppered with climate anxiety, peppered with chinaberry,
peppered with concern about acting like a negative force in a larger system, one of the
underlying anxieties I feel when I read them is the relation between Vietnam, where the poet was
born, and the conditions she writes about in Texas. What does it mean for her to describe her
concerns about intruders and also name herself as an intruder, given where she was born? What
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does she make of the fact that so many of the invasive species in the so-called U.S. were brought
here for ornament and then chemically removed when that ornament began to misbehave—
mimicking the ways Chinese laborers—and many others—were brought here and then expelled
in various ways? What about the fact that the very chemicals that are used to remove invasive
species are those that were used to starve and force out communist fighters in Vietnam? How
does one write about Agent Orange being brought back to decimate swathes of growth that is too
wild, too abundant, and too threatening to that which supposedly has more right to be in a given
place? I wonder if Nguyen’s poetry can experiment with language enough to show that difficulty
is pleasurable, contradiction inevitable, and the ease of hacking and squirting does not make the
world fall down and become possessable. Or, if it does, such a world at one’s feet is not very
enjoyable.
Following WWII, the poet Lorine Niedecker wrote a short poem, “Consider,” in honor of
plants from elsewhere. It reads:
Consider
the alliance—
ships and plants

The take-for-granted bloom
of our roadsides
Queen Anne's Lace
Black Eyed Susans
rode the sea
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‘Specimens graciously passed
between warring fleets’
And when an old boat rots ashore
itself once living plant
it sprouts (284)
In the poem, war is an occasion of “gracious” reciprocity. Niedecker relays this idea by quoting
Loren Eiseley, a natural science writer of her time. In his 1958 book Darwin’s Century he
explains how an eighteenth century French scientist had plant specimens passed between warring
fleets (Hair 11). Niedecker’s decontextualization of the quote takes human agency out of the
equation, showing how seeds will pass on their own, sprouting out from the cycle of rot and
return to soil of wooden ships brought ashore. What if war can produce different alliances? What
if seeds can participate in their own peaceful exchange amongst anthropogenic chaos? Niedecker
asks her reader to consider how plant life is conditioned by human war, but also exercises its
own autonomy by spreading beyond enemy lines. Nguyen, too, shows how plant life—and
demise—is conditioned by human language but thrives in weird excess of it.

Invasive Scales Disrupt Poetic Form
As Long As Trees Last spills nouns from one poem into another, and then another. The
spilling seems both a refusal to be confined to a singular poem and a mimicking of the droughtridden Texas landscape. Nouns like “cut” (12, 12, 12, 12, 15, 17, 48), “rain” (2, 6, 27, 40, 40, 43,
45), “chinaberry” (4, 15, 18, 20, 22, 45, 49), “birds” (1, 16, 17, 17, 19, 46, 59, 59, 59),
“Independence Day” (2, 2, 45), and “cups” (3, 5, 5, 12, 14, 14, 19, 28, 29, 32) won’t stick to
individual poems, and instead seep out of the singular form of a poem, permeating the rest of the
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book. I notice the recurring words because there are, in sum, so few words in the book. Nguyen
has a limited well from which to draw up her words—maybe also from which to draw the
material for her poems. The individual words take on the form of Whitehead’s actual entities. 35
The chinaberry becomes, like an actual entity, again and again in the book, as it finds its relation
to other words and settles into a different meaning with each new phrase. Words are always in
process through use, but Nguyen illustrates the process of linguistic becoming through her
repetition with a difference, her insistent pursuit of a word in a new milieu. I’d like to think that
the nouns Nguyen repeats can’t help but contain the active verbs that put them into new
relations, as if each word carries with it the verb it took to travel from one poem to another.
The repeated “chinaberry” or “Independence Day” show the process of becoming and
also a Whiteheadian satisfaction, wherein the coming together of words become legible as a
thing in the world to be read together and digested as such. Perhaps one could say that the
speaker’s, then the reader’s, search for the relation to the other words ends as each line stops
being in process and comes to stand as parts of a complete whole. Or the reader refuses to settle
on any understanding of the relation between words, and the process of finding satisfaction is
protracted. If I’m allowed to continue to abstract into language Whitehead’s understandings of
how tangible things work in the world, I would take the process out of the poet’s, or the
speaker’s, or the reader’s hands. Actual entities themselves seek satisfaction of their own desires;
their process is not dictated by, in this case, human hands; so reading without deciding on
meaning might be a pleasurable process but it doesn’t suspend the process of words themselves.
Though the chinaberry finds its place in the poem, the completion is insufficient. This could be
the case in any poem, but in Nguyen’s, the end has no finality, nor do the relations among words
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For a description of Whitehead’s ontology, including actual entities, see the Introduction, pages 14-17.
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as they exist in the poem. “Chinaberry” ends with “Drunken songbirds,” complete in its form and
satisfying to read, but not final. Chinaberry can, again, be picked up later in “Scraping It” or
“Another Chinaberry” (49, 45). Nguyen’s rejection of resolution and recycling of nouns illustrate
the ongoing process that Whitehead describes as actual entities perishing in their satisfaction,
turning into datum for new processes.
In many of the poems in As Long as Trees Last, the quotidian to which Nguyen gives a
terse depth is interrupted by large-scale ecological anxiety, sometimes also mourning.
“Interrupted” may not be the right word, as the speaker’s thoughts, from the domestic to the
planetary scale, are, if not syntactically reliant on one another, internecine on the page in such a
way as to be inseparable. Nguyen even calls attention to her habit in her poem “Bread,” putting
in parentheses a kind of stage direction to either herself or the reader: “(insert an
involuntary/psychic activity)” (4-5). That psychic activity is not always a thought of ecological
disaster, but it often is. And when large-scale anxiety operates simultaneously with the smallscale and the domestic, it feels as though the former invades the latter. In “Another Drought
Almost-Sonnet,” she writes “There are no free Popsicles/at Home Depot Dry permanent/climate
change?” (8-10). The line, “at Home Depot Dry permanent,” fits the largest lumber buyer chain
store next to the, now capitalized “Dry” that deforestation causes. Nguyen’s collapsing of scales,
again, creates simultaneity: while the speaker looks for free popsicles, there is climate change;
permanent dry-up of thirst-quenching frozen treat supply. Water that used to be held in tree root
tangle goes elsewhere when those trees are ripped out or hacked and squirted. Nguyen’s Texas
poems are preoccupied with where the water is going. In “Another Chinaberry,” she writes again
that “There are,” again, “no/free Popsicles” and also that she would “like to see it rain again” (23, 8). In “Intimate,” her notes lack even a verb, there is just “Rain deficit in excess/of 20 inches”
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(6-7). In “Rage Sonnet,” her dream of Charles Olson and Ezra Pound is interrupted by the
quotidian that is also large: “Lack of rain and the #30/bus may run now all the way to
downtown” (15-6). Sometimes the poems seem to beg for water, crescendoing in an
accumulation of anxious observation of lack. Her repetition begins to sound like supplication
without the proper phrasing, her poems’ permeable forms becoming invitations of the watery
“forces/no longer forces” that she misses so much. But if the poems need to remain porous to
receive the rain, they end up open to the invasion of the drought-tolerant chinaberry as well. The
chinaberry tree will probably do well in the Texas aridity that expands beyond its previous
container. Will the poet who writes about the drought-tolerant tree also be able to withstand
water-lack?
I’m not sure Nguyen’s poetry seems very anxious about human survival, but it is
concerned with human contribution to destruction. Usually, the anxiety is on a small scale. She is
doing too much driving, too much consuming, too much digesting of Earth’s materials, too much
sending those materials back as poison into the atmosphere. Her poems, like her introductory
essay in Interim, call attention to the machines that work simultaneously with her. In “No One
Wants,” the refrigerator runs all day while she drives around, each humming along in fuel burnthrough. And in “You Can Sample,” she writes “I wear a SpongeBob SquarePants BandAid/hear the running toilet” (5-6). The broken toilet invades, gulping up precious clean water so
that shit can get flushed, simply, away. Will there soon be enough water to flush the toilet?
Probably not. What about the guilt of writing a poem while the toilet runs? Even the toilet’s verb,
that it runs, is too rapid. Clean water moves quickly to join waste. As the toilet uses up, so does
the human. In “Intimate,” the speaker knows that methane gas from factory farming warms up
the planet far more efficiently than carbon, and that nobody wants to think about how those
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animals get treated. But she still has an appetite for meat. The poem begins: “(intimate) I know
where the meat comes from/my blah blah boring day

blah/Blunt my appetites for today” (1-

3). Maybe she’s referring to Keith Haring’s painting that says “EVERYBODY KNOWS
WHERE MEAT COMES FROM IT COMES FROM THE STORE.” Nguyen has a humorous
recognition of the blah of consumer politics, the blah of everything-is-so-fucked-up and the blah
of knowing a blunted appetite for a day doesn’t make a damn bit of difference. Perhaps to those
who think with urgency about the things like the disposability of so many forms of life—those
who are harassed by scale—also know consumer politics are a ploy; but the thought of how to
reformulate small ways of being in the world are also maybe a good preoccupation.
Because Nguyen’s poems are like daybooks, each day feels permeable, as if the spaces in
the poems are less precious protection of an open indeterminacy or breath than just holes in the
day, holes that disrupt any expectation of narrative, ability to remember, or desire to make
whole. The holes of the poets mind where anxiety about water or the observation of yet another
chinaberry seem to flood in, are similar to the holes in the landscape where evidence of an
unexpected aridity or fecund “invasion” fill in the gaps left by that which could, for whatever
reason, not survive. The similarity between poet and landscape resembles the harmony Ralph
Waldo Emerson describes when he writes that “The lover of nature is he whose inward and
outward senses are truly adjusted to each other; who has retained the spirit of infancy even into
the era of manhood” (“Nature”). Nguyen’s inward and outward adjustment looks pretty anxious,
maybe because the systems to which she adjusts are in extreme flux. But her playful
experimentation does hold on to “the spirit of infancy,” despite its condition of anxious change.
Nguyen’s poems might better resemble the scene of interruption that Emerson’s friend Nathaniel
Hawthorne described in his journal as harmony intruded upon by the train that signifies
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industrialism eating its way into the landscape (qtd. in Marx 13). For Nguyen, the intrusion
continues until she adjusts to harmonize with it. Pauline Oliveros would probably approve.
The invasions into Nguyen’s poems are perhaps welcome invasions of a false sense of
subject as discrete entity. They are also invasions of a woman, which negates the overlysimplistic idea that to destroy the subject is to productively dismantle all that the Enlightenment
venerated. Nguyen’s poetry does not try to will away these, and other, contradictions. They all
exist within the contradictions of that which conditions. History keeps working upon everyone,
Agent Orange recurs, Independence Day arrives in 2010, and then in 2011, each with her furious
response. The pervasiveness of drought and invasive species overtakes the book, forcing
Nguyen’s poems into small forms that cramp words into claustrophobic trios on the line,
surrounded by open Texas space. But Nguyen doesn’t mourn, nor does she praise in any
expected ways. She writes instead as if ignorance and avoidance are impossible. Nguyen reckons
with a changing landscape by letting her surroundings more fully dictate the terms of relation
instead of an anthropocentric response that is based in a failed expectation of nature. As in
“Prairie Notes,” the “forces no longer forces” need to be conditioning once again. Drought needs
to invade the poem to the extent that it invades both the landscape and the mind. But also the
condition of rain would be nice.
In As Long As Trees Last, Nguyen finds ways of being conditioned by forces in process,
rather than a fixed container. From the conditions of the biosphere imposed upon the poems, she
finds a way out of the container of “How houses are boxes without/a plan for a city of boxes”
(“Intimate” 4-5) and into the position of wanting to dwell in forces that remain forces, though
they continually shift, similar to how Whitehead’s data condition the creative becoming in the
world. If a poem is a contained space with its own conditions of language and form, Nguyen’s
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containers are porous because her repeated words spill out of singular poems and get dispersed
across the book. And the container of a previous form fails to contain the poems she produces,
like her “Almost Drought Sonnet” that documents both the almost-drought and almost conforms
to the sonnet form.
Brendon Larson writes that invasion biologists depend on a container model that cannot
accommodate porosity. It is interesting, now, that in Western science and popular culture, the
body is being understood as a microbiome. The many replace the one, uncontained by a literal
edge of skin or a figurative edge of selfhood. The containers of the body, bioregion, and nation
vary in conditions but remain porous, despite best efforts to shore up some of their borders. Like
Nguyen’s poems, whose forms allow for invasion—in all of its contradictory and troubling
implications—the containers of body, bioregion and nation are shown to be similarly open to
invasion, uncontained by false notions of some original, unsullied state.

Looking Low
That which has been deemed noxious swarms the edges of the Brooklyn Botanic Garden,
where a fence helps order imported beauty. I retreat into their tangled mass every time I walk by.
Some of the Japanese honeysuckle is finding its way onto all my broken chairs in poorly-woven
bundles. The peripheries of the beaches in the city where I live are also thick with so-called
invasion wherever concrete or other maintenance doesn’t hold it back. Some of them probably
came from the ballast water of container ships like the ones floating on the horizon, preparing to
settle into the port close by.
I don’t want to experiment my way into generalization or conflation of the human with
the other-than-human realm through a moral lesson plucked from the vegetal and returned home.
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Difference is important. And besides, there are too many contradictions on the large scale: my
desire for the decolonization of this and other lands is paired with my desire to pick apart the
idea of invasion; my interest in encouraging open systems also sometimes looks to invite
trauma—especially rape and war; and I want to praise-through-use both that which has made
each ecosystem diverse and the newcomers who look to be budging them out. These desires are
less contradictory when following Smart’s assertion that “he [sic] that looketh low shall learn” as
a call to stay with the small-scale and let experiment emerge from particular conditions in
particular spots.
So, in my own small ways that are inconsequential, and maybe also of rippling
significance, I feel quite pleased to experiment with planting milkweed all over my
neighborhood in the vacant lots so that monarch caterpillars might have something to eat and lay
their eggs in; or to seed oysters on sun-bleached shells from restaurants around the city; or to
sing my made-up songs to the heirloom starts in my window who I’ll plant when the moon
waxes. I think humans and poems are soft infrastructure, which is a term from landscape
architecture that refers to that which can adapt to varying conditions—such as marshlands or
living dune systems—as opposed to engineered hard infrastructure like sea walls and jetties. I
think experiment can cultivate an appetite for things that make the body a soft infrastructure
through which the milieu might permeate.
While I learn some of these methods from poetry, wildness need not be confined to
literary consumption or production—it can reveal methods for undetermined and collaborative
experiment with the material world. Poetry offers forms of intimate, humble and curious
experimentation that do not aim to produce knowledge so much as produce a more complex
relation. Knowing thus becomes a byproduct of making, or play, and also prefigurative—
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enacting in the present the kinds of political, economic and environmental relations hoped for in
the future. The poets and writers in this chapter invite the reader to work upon the day as one
would a poem. This provocation is not moralistic or prescriptive, but methodological. It provokes
the spilling out from expected containers, but within its own particular sets of limitations. I have
my examples of how writing can be a form of working in the conditions that exist in order to
enact what is hoped for in both the present and the future: Shiva’s local knowledge, Nguyen’s
punctured landscape (of the poem) by historically-situated things that “invade,” Conrad’s open
mouth, Smart’s praising with that creates non-hierarchical intimacy, Oliveros’ displaced sound
receptors, and Kincaid’s forest garden. But many more examples abound.
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CONCLUDING IN THE INTERSTICES:
CRAWED-IN

I
Yes, the planet is very literally shaped by smallness. But the scale of the effects of the
small is old news. What do worms have to do with the unimagined, or unremembered? Today,
accrued knowledge comes from the park where we go peeling back layers of pine needles in toowarm February and find worms who are fat with sleep—who lengthen and lean themselves in
our hands as they wake up. They can pull a thing with their mouths, but they can’t see while they
do it. They aren’t from here. None of them. Glaciers killed off all worms in this region and now
there are new ones who, by accident or by intention, are eating through the compacted dirt of this
asphalted place. We notice that the translucent one with the black band has ends who take turns
leading the rest of the body. And it’s becoming rude to make that worm a mouthy metaphor for
whatever might sense the world by eating it. I started this dissertation with worms who eat
books. I’m still comforted by the words that fit into holes I’ve dug—holes that make space for
the particular kind of understanding that language offers. But also, there is other necessary
digging.

II
I have an appetite for this place where I live—for the many things this place also is. Here,
some of us feel tucked into a tree’s insides. And in this tree-like place, where lots of creatures
and me might go, we too feel stampeded. I want to be in the only sad, magnificent tree on this
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street in my little cocooning of dirt and creatures. If I were in a pin oak, the entrails would be
very lean—sucking in the crevices as the leaves do. Will I be lonely in my little oak tree?
Away from this city, some insects are serpentining their way through the ash trees. It is
very hard for the ash trees to eat when the labyrinths of borer nourishment are multiplying. And
we remember: what will happen when the little beetle has crawled into the last opened space of
the last ash on this continent? Little emerald ash borer, who everyone is looking for, how does it
feel to thin out the whole forest? Borer, show me the entrails of this tree and I’ll lick with you
but I will not bite. Small swarm, will you die with the thing you devoured? How will we show
we miss you?

III
Everybody knows the seasons can’t stay in place. The quadrant where we live is spilling
out. But there are many empty spaces to crawl into. If my mother was also once a child, she had
saddle shoes and thin legs that wound close together in the car with the siblings also squirming
and closely pressed together, and bicycles too, because everyone’s going camping in the
pinewoods of Maine. Maybe my mother was scared to be a creature amongst many, so she got
very small. And that small mother, and her saddle shoes, and everybody’s bikes, and somebody’s
fishing poles, and all the other objects of a life I wanted and never got, were carried to Maine in
some car that pumped carbon into the air behind its advance through New England. And today,
on the last day of November, the cherry blossoms are blooming in New York. And some
creature, who maybe got a taste for a little cherry blossom that is not from here but still has food,
might not find what she wants in the spring because the blossoms have come at the wrong time.
That small creature will wander for some other blossom, for some other evidence that she is part
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of this world. She is in the leftovers of all it took to carry my mother’s childhood around. And
we stand in it. And it opens. And it is a forecast.

IV
We go down to look at how far the water is peeling away from us. Everyone knows this
was first dreamed-up and that all the rocks feel nostalgic. Their lava caves are throbbing. Loose
construction is scooped out while cold summer moods into sequence again. Is it frantic out there
with everybody losing everybody else? If we want to get to it, if we want to touch it and say
sorry, if we want to tell everybody that it is in us too, will the water drive up a little closer and
cocoon us into it, with our old gills opening to some mother medium?
Bridges are drowned-out by oak and other no-big-deal groan. Everybody knows how
easy this is. I am so angry, I could tear up the edges and use them for squishing. Middle of
entrusted bank, between eater of walls: the before-beginnings are nipping toward surface. And
meanwhile, we are all so water-heavy here, the roof bends to it. We would like to store our
bodies in this small place when the moon laps up a last mollusk in her big mouth and the tide
rolls out. We will wander around for evidence that we are part of this world. Who is burrowing
and how did they squirm into their small place? Or, what is each and every stance on naming?

V
Drought-jawed for an aspiration pulled out and seething: if salt-lick pastness surges on,
uneasy does it. Not everything assimilates into a restless body.

221

The roses beg acidic and the chamomile shifted and fit and shifted again for splat of
disoriented new. How hard to be a seed. How holes want to be here dug up and bit—begging all
the sleep there is and the attention too. And also the slow pump method into jack shit. Fielding
seedless progression identified as sedge wound or leger ways into mend-remainders as
somebody’s asking: can you hold this?
My mother smells originary sea bed, googles phantom sea and feels frustrated with the
yield. There are worm-wending of crooks in mouth here. And the sneaking out of seed bank.
Banks are alluvium and swell-present toward out. Look what punctures the deposit. Look
what steals to prevent rot, forgetting the decay is a burst of seed. Yearn the shape enwombed in
big weathering while knotted-up pale protrudes.
Meanwhile, there is a mouthing off into soil gnawed by the wrong appleseed mines. Mine
is a bad law. Mine entrails into the crack. Not mine. Just farmed-out. Earthed over, then refused.
Or, formed to it.
Slow down, small swarm. My attention is bending to it and I’m telling you, there are
definitely empty spaces to crawl into.

VI
This girl I love texts me photos of the border wall between Nogales in Mexico and
Nogales in Arizona. There are so many things worth breaking. We push at the edges together.
We turn on each other because the edges are so militant, they make us feel the same. If an
organism is an organism—is also a country—and a concept—because they all set boundaries, if
all the queers really like the word boundary, are you sure the bounded thing is in that spot, there?
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Especially as a young person, my feminism was deeply connected to tactics of sturdiness and
barriers: physical, verbal and emotional fuck you’s. And I’m sorry my description falls into these
clichés, but poetry was in, and constitutive of, a tender and small place adjacent to the visible.
Many other things tumbled in afterward. And now I think about the trees and waterfalls I
crave—the big things that feel sturdier than I because of age or experience or some pseudosilence. They are disappearing or becoming increasingly toxic. Dirt is eroded-out, deep timedout, or just displaced—which is embarrassing—and I too feel lonely.

VII
Yesterday, we spent the class time reading aloud:
Then too, however solid objects seem,
They yet are formed of matter mixed with void:
In rocks and caves the watery moisture seeps,
And beady drops stand out like plenteous tears;
And food finds way through every frame that lives;
The trees increase and yield the season's fruit
Because their food throughout the whole is poured,
Even from the deepest roots, through trunks and boughs;
And voices pass the solid walls and fly
Reverberant through shut doorways of a house;
And stiffening frost seeps inward to our bones
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(Lucretius Book I:348-58)

And we nodded and someone said it was beautiful: the void that makes the matter.

VIII
If everybody’s small self is missing other small selves and also some big thing to worm
into and lose vision, maybe the thick grief that springs up in the crevices can also make space for
whatever humbly seeks life. So when everything gets real sad and sacred, me and you walk
around slow and put our faces in the sun. There are movements related to being a receptacle for
some shared feeling that looks for a place to go. Submitting to those movements is pretty much
the least we can do.
We put some fallen branches together in a pattern and chew on the white pine. We look
into everybody’s sun faces and stay quiet or do whatever else needs to get done. And something
between the abundance and the lack crawls into what we make.
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